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A Constructive Theology of Truth as a Divine Name 
with Reference to the Bible and Augustine  
(Summary) Emily Sumner Kempson 
 
 This study is a work of constructive theology that retrieves the ancient Christian 
understanding of God as truth for contemporary theological discourse and points to its relevance 
to biblical studies and philosophy of religion. The contribution is threefold: first, the thesis 
introduces a novel method for constructive theology, consisting of developing conceptual 
parameters from source material which are then combined into a theological proposal. Second, 
applying this method to selective texts of Augustine of Hippos’ corpus and the Christian Old 
Testament does original work to excavate their accounts of truth and divinity. Third, this harvest 
is re-interpreted and developed into a constructive theological proposal, that understanding God 
as truth can robustly contribute to accounts of truth in general.  
 The first chapter positions my study within the fields of theological and philosophical 
debate and presents its methodology. This clarifies its relationship with historical theology, and 
delineates a productive engagement with biblical studies and cognitive linguistics, which 
accomplishes theological retrieval and resolves interdisciplinary tension.  
 The second chapter examines Augustine’s writings On Free Will (De Libero Arbitrio), 
Confessions (Confessiones), and On the Trinity (De Trinitate). This engagement produces 
conceptual parameters that cover mathematical truth, Trinitarian logic, and human epistemic 
limitations.  
 The thirst chapter examines the Old Testament. Judicious engagement with biblical 
scholarship and cognitive linguistics illuminates the Hebrew text’s complex articulation of 
senses and concepts associated with truth. From this, I extrapolate conceptual parameters that 
address truth-bearers and the relevance of divine truth to God’s love, being, law, word, and 
wisdom. 
 The fourth chapter synthesises and augments the conceptual parameters developed in 
chapters two and three. The resulting constructive theology establishes the consequences of 
approaching ‘God as truth itself’ for truth in general. The relevance to perennial controversies in 
theology are noted, along with its potential to resolve philosophical challenges with further 
study.  
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Chapter I: Context and Method 
 
Truth has become a problem for Western thought. Although always contested, over the 
past century, an unprecedented uncertainty over truth itself has arisen. In the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries both analytic and continental philosophy have persistently disputed the 
nature and existence of truth. This uncertainty has spread from academic discourse to the public 
sphere, often with widely lamented consequences—such as the so-called ‘post-truth’ quality of 
recent political debate. Theologians and church communities have not been immune from the 
impact either, perhaps most notably in attempts to defend their faith’s reasonableness. Strikingly, 
the increased academic and public interest in truth has conducted itself almost without reference 
to a once commonplace understanding of truth. Specifically, there has been little reference to the 
longstanding and sophisticated tradition of speaking of God as truth.  
It is the purpose of this study to retrieve this understanding of naming God as truth for 
contemporary discourse in Christian theology. The strength of this constructive impulse may 
perhaps be best appreciated by considering three questions, phrased in general terms: i) What 
form did the idea take in its prime? ii) What led it to be overlooked and omitted? and, iii) Can the 
ancient Christian approach to God as truth be given a contemporary articulation? The first two 
are historical questions. To i), one would answer with a historical theology, depicting the 
historical notion(s) per se of God as truth. For ii), one requires a history (possibly in the form of 
a genealogy) for an answer, laying out the historical progression of events that lead to the 
notion’s decline. Question iii), however, is a matter for constructive theology, in that it can only 
be answered with a theological proposal that demonstrably re-articulates the ancient notion of 
God as truth for contemporary theology. This project is addressed principally to the third 
question, ‘Can the ancient Christian approach to God as truth be given a contemporary 
articulation?’ and thus, it is a study in constructive theology, not historical theology or 
intellectual history.  
This study lays out a methodology specifically tailored to the task of retrieving an ancient 
Christian approach to God as truth for contemporary discourses. The methodology incorporates 
historical theology and modern biblical scholarship—particularly with the aid of cognitive 
linguistics—utilising their insights for constructive theological import. Applying the novel 
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method will clarify the relationship between historical and constructive theology and enact a 
productive interdisciplinary rapprochement between theology and biblical studies. This will 
involve drawing on the Bible and texts composed by the highly influential Christian theologian 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE). Examining these texts in Chapters II and III will also yield 
newly articulated insights into each corpus’ portrayal of the relationship between truth and 
divinity. These insights, characterised as ‘conceptual parameters’ will be reconfigured in Chapter 
IV to create a new constructive theology of truth—one that addresses many longstanding 
theological controversies and challenges involving the nature of truth and truth-claims in 
Christian theology and philosophy.  
This chapter provides the groundwork for my proposal. I begin (I.1) by distinguishing the 
study of truth itself (alethiology) from epistemology and scholarship in general, indicating that 
this project primarily consists of alethiology. Next, I clarify the West’s current predicament over 
truth and outline the major philosophical responses. This delineation of current thought provides 
the intellectual context and points of reference—a foil—for this study’s proposal. I then (1.2) 
display in miniature the Christian understanding of God as truth—indicating its centrality and 
antiquity—so that its absence from present discourse is thrown into relief. This lacuna is further 
illustrated (I.3) by three instances where theological discourse, despite a driving concern for 
truth, has nevertheless overlooked the understanding of God as truth (Christian fundamentalism, 
reformed epistemology, and postliberal theology).  
Their oversight, however, does not indicate that this study is the first to observe this God-
as-Truth gap. We shall briefly review (I.4) three theological projects that have attempted to 
address the oversight by providing their own theologies of God as truth: those of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, of Bruce Marshall, and of John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock. For reasons that 
will be explained, this study does not continue their work, instead preferring to present a new 
methodology for constructive theology, one particularly fit for the task of retrieving an ancient 
Christian approach to God as truth and re-conceiving it for contemporary discourse.  
The remainder of the chapter outlines our distinctive methodological approach (I.5). 
Essentially, because I understand constructive theology to be inherently interdisciplinary, I have 
devised a method that respects its distinction from historical theology, biblical studies, and 
cognitive linguistics, while at the same time responsibly drawing on these neighbouring fields. 
The method’s most distinctive trait is its aim to draw conceptual parameters from historical texts 
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(in our case, the Bible and Augustine’s corpus) and then to deploy these parameters in its 
constructive theology of truth.  
 
I.1 The Trouble with Truth 
 
Scholarship, Epistemology, and Alethiology 
 
Preliminarily, it is crucial to distinguish three inquiries, each of which is concerned with 
truth, though in different ways. Broadly speaking, these are: scholarship (the pursuit of truth 
and/or knowledge); epistemology (the study of knowledge itself); and alethiology1 (the study of 
truth itself). Making this tripartite distinction clarifies the aims of this project and its intellectual 
context.  
According to the three-part schema I have devised, scholarship is characterised by the 
pursuit of truth in the form of knowledge. Its practitioners intend to discover and establish what 
is, was, or will be the case, as well as to determine whether certain beliefs are true, in a manner 
that is demonstrable to others. Under this broad definition, practitioners include not only scholars 
but also scientists, judges, and journalists. At least two bastions of society, its judicial and 
academic/educational institutions, are integrally dependent upon scholarship so understood. 
Notably for our purposes, scholarship (as the pursuit of truth) implicitly presupposes an 
established alethiology and epistemology. Put differently, scholarship confidently presumes that 
one understands what truth is, and second, that one knows how to attain truth such that it counts 
as knowledge.  
Epistemology—instead of primarily seeking to acquire knowledge as scholarship does—
asks what knowledge is. In the most influential recent formulations of analytic philosophy of 
religion, epistemology defines knowledge as ‘justified’ true beliefs, in contra-distinction to true 
beliefs that are accurate merely by chance (which disqualifies them from being knowledge). 
Epistemic theories differ in their explanation of justification, but all agree that justification 
concerns the legitimate circumstance for holding true beliefs such that they count as knowledge. 
In this way, epistemic theories frequently stipulate that true belief only counts as knowledge 
 
1 NB: ‘alethiology’ not ‘aletheology.’ The former term is preferred because it is etymologically applicable to both 
philosophical and theological studies of truth. 
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when the appropriate truth-seeking method has been followed. Epistemology’s study of 
knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ focuses on the content of ‘justified’ while largely passing 
over ‘true.’ For this reason, it shares scholarship’s confidence that ‘truth’ is already well enough 
understood so as to not require special attention, but questions the second presumption, that one 
knows how to attain truth such that it counts as knowledge. The result is that one’s epistemology 
has direct implications for one’s scholarship. 
Alethiology is distinctive in that it seeks to question and clarify scholarship and 
epistemology’s shared presumption that truth is already well understood. The study of truth itself 
openly questions the nature, qualities, value, and definition of truth. At its most extreme, 
alethiology disputes whether truth exists at all. Having distinguished the pursuit of truth and the 
study of knowledge from the study of truth itself, it is clear that scholarship depends upon 
epistemology, which in turn depends upon alethiology. An understanding of the nature of truth 
(implicit or explicit) is nested within all epistemologies, and an epistemology (implicit or 
explicit) is nested within all scholarly pursuits of truth or knowledge. 
One result of the nested relationship between these three inquiries into truth is that when 
alethiology openly questions the nature (and even more so the existence) of truth, there are 
repercussions for epistemology and scholarship. These implications are practical as well as 
theoretical. One’s conceptualisation of truth has a direct real-world impact, for instance on 
scientific methods, scholarly procedures, religious practice, judicial process, political campaigns, 
and public debate.  This state of affairs should make it no surprise that scholarly debates over the 
nature of truth have repercussions in the public sphere. My study of the longstanding and 
sophisticated tradition of naming and approaching God as truth is driven in no small part by a 
deep concern for the direct impact alethiology has upon cultural institutions, especially those that 
are crucial to society’s functioning and individual flourishing.  
This study is designed to be primarily a work of alethiology, in that it takes truth itself as 
principal topic. It must be remembered, however, that alethiology is intricately connected with 
epistemology and scholarship. Their inter-relation is taken into account by this study in two 
ways. First, during Chapter II and III’s examination of the Bible and some of Augustine’s 
writings, attention will be paid to their epistemological stances insofar as it illuminates their 
treatments of the nature of truth itself. Second, Chapter IV’s proposed constructive theology of 
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truth will elaborate upon its alethiology by including the potential implications of this approach 
for epistemology. 
 
Troubling over Truth: Analytic and Continental Philosophy 
 
The tripartite distinction of scholarship, epistemology, and alethiology explains why eras 
centrally concerned with the pursuit of truth or the nature of knowledge do not necessarily 
question what truth is. This was the case in the early modern period. Since the early decades of 
the twentieth century, however, Western philosophical thought increasingly convulsed over the 
nature of truth itself. Many conflicting theories of truth now exist in tension and the questions 
posed by alethiology are very much alive, rendering truth an unresolved problem. The following 
brief study of, first, the early modern consensus, and, second, the diverse ways in which 
twentieth-century analytic and continental philosophical traditions have understood truth, 
highlights the highly fragmented and contested intellectual landscape. In the process of this 
review, I will also introduce and define the phrase ‘thin truth’, which will be a key term going 
forward, especially in Chapter III.  
As explained above, writers have frequently and comfortably pursued scholarship and 
epistemology without engaging at length with questions concerning the nature of truth. This was 
the case during the early modern period when epistemology absorbed many of Europe’s best and 
brightest minds.2 An account of truth was certainly ‘indispensable’, but only because of its 
subsidiary relevance, developing secondarily out of other concerns.3 At this time, the notion of 
truth that predominated was that ‘truth is the agreement of our thoughts with their objects’— a 
view which predates the modern period, most memorably expressed by Thomas Aquinas as 
‘veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus,’4.5 Early modern thinkers did not dismiss Aquinas’ 
notion of truth as a medieval misstep to overcome; on the contrary, this motto was widely 
endorsed by seminal thinkers, including Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Georg 
 
2 Michael Glanzburg, ‘Introduction,’ in Michael Glanzburg ed., The Oxford Handbook of Truth (Oxford: OUP, 
2018), 2. 
3 Alan H. Nelson, ‘Early Modern Theories of Truth,’ in Michael Glanzburg ed., The Oxford Handbook of Truth 
(Oxford: OUP, 2018), 75. 
4 The translation of this phrase is contentious, but it roughly means ‘truth is the agreement of thing and intellect.’ 
5 Clinton Tolley, ‘Idealism and the Question of Truth’ in Michael Glanzburg, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Truth 
(Oxford: OUP, 2018) 93-4. 
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Meier, and Kant.6  Of course, they did not all develop this motto in identical ways, but the basic 
idea of truth was thought to be uncontentious.7 For many centuries it appears that truth was a 
matter of general agreement; epistemology, rather than alethiology, was a more common point of 
concern.  
This early modern consensus among Western intelligentsia over the basic idea of truth 
may no longer exist in academia, but something like it continues at a popular level. Many people 
today still hold the basic notion that truth is an agreement between thoughts and the object of 
thought. In other words, a widespread, intuitive, and unreflective understanding exists among 
English-speakers that one sense of ‘truth’ is when a thought, sentence, or similar accurately 
indicates some aspect of reality. I will refer to this simple notion as a ‘thin’ sense of truth in order 
to distinguish it from other senses of the word ‘truth’ in this study.   
‘Thin truth’ indicates a sense of ‘truth’ as a thought, sentence, or similar which agrees 
with an aspect of reality. If one excludes philosophers and other academics, this intuition rarely 
involves a developed articulation of categories; distinctions between thoughts, beliefs, sentences, 
and propositions are undefined and disputes over what constitutes ‘agreement’ do not arise 
(correspondence? correlation? identity? reliably accurate indication?). Importantly, ‘thin’ truth is 
only one of several senses of truth that the common English-speaker can understand without 
deep reflection. None of the common phrases ‘a true friend’, ‘true love’, and ’truing a beam’ 
imply a ‘thin’ sense of truth. 
 Because ‘thin truth’ is an intuitive, widespread, and unreflective understanding, I will 
largely not impart aspects of philosophical truth-theories to it.8 ‘Thin truth’ is an important term 
for this study going forward, especially once it is contrasted with what I will call ‘thick’ truth—
meaning an understanding of truth which combines a sense of ‘thin truth’ with additional senses. 
The content of ‘thick truth’ will be clarified in later chapters.  
The demise of the early modern general agreement regarding the nature of truth is readily 
apparent from the highly diverse understandings of truth articulated in the twentieth century, both 




8 This distinguishes the use of ‘thin’ in this study from philosophical writings that use ‘thin’ to denote a property that 
is ‘metaphysically thin’, meaning that it does not have a nature. There is no such implication in this study’s use of 
‘thin truth.’ Likewise, it does not denote the distinction sometimes made in ethics between thick and thin concepts 
where ‘thick’ concepts are both evaluative and descriptive and ‘thin’ concepts are only one or the other. 
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philosophers. Viewed together, these schools of thought demonstrate that the essence of truth—
including whether it has one at all—is up for debate. Despite their widely divergent 
commitments, methods, and schools of thought, all are clearly engaged in what I have called 
alethiology.  
Analytic philosophy has been directly concerned with the nature of truth from its earliest 
days.9 Founding figures such as Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and Frank P. Ramsey railed against the understanding of truth advocated by British 
idealism, most prominently by F. H. Bradley.10 The continuing uncertainty over the nature of 
truth is evident in the unabated proliferation of truth theories in analytic thought ever since. Four 
‘classical’ truth-theories emerged early on:11 coherence, correspondence, pragmatist, and identity 
theories, each of which can be said to accord with a common intuition about truth. Coherentist 
views, in essence, take truth to be characterised by the coherence of all truths together; a belief is 
true if it coheres with other true beliefs. This accords with the intuition that two contradictory 
beliefs cannot both be true (i.e. the law of the excluded middle). Correspondence theories 
account for truth as when a proposition (or similar) corresponds to the world. I would consider 
‘thin’ truth to be the background intuition of this truth theory, that is, that there is truth when 
what is said or thought matches reality. Pragmatist truth-theories could be said to express the 
intuition that truth is useful, and so it posits (broadly speaking) that truth is what works such that 
it is satisfactory to believe—it can be successfully relied upon. Identity theories are the fourth 
type of classical analytic truth theories. These hold that truths do not correspond with reality 
(unlike correspondence theories); rather, they are identical with reality. This, I would say, 
accords with the intuition that when one says something is the case, that the truth of the sentence 
is the matter at hand. A more recent addition to the four classical truth theories is deflationary 
theories of truth, which hold that defining truth is a fool’s errand. The deflationary intuition is 
that when a statement is true, nothing further needs to be added to it to convey the point.  
Different forms of these theories have come and gone, but often when one theory falls out 
of favour it re-emerges in new form: e.g. traits of early-twentieth century coherentism are evident 
 
9 Thomas Baldwin, ‘Truth in British Idealism and its Analytic Critics,’ in Michael Glanzburg, ed.,  The Oxford 
Handbook of Truth (Oxford: OUP, 2018), 126. 
10 Glanzberg, 3. 
11 For more detailed treatments, see in the bibliography: Lynch, ed. (2001), Kirkham (1997), Künne (2003), Wrenn 
(2015), Schmitt (1995) and Glanzburg, ed., (2018). 
   
 9 
in Michael Dummett’s anti-realist theories of truth.12 The predominantly Anglophone analytic 
debate has argued over the relative merits and faults of coherentist, correspondence, pragmatist, 
and deflationary accounts of truth. In the process, it has refined its preferred linguistic apparatus 
(e.g., devising symbolic logic and adopting Tarski’s T-sentences) and gained insights into the 
strengths, weaknesses, and possible variations of each truth-theory’s opposing positions. 
Nevertheless, as indicated by the anthologies and current surveys cited above, consensus remains 
elusive. In short, the uncertainty in analytic thought over the nature of truth is made evident by 
the continuing proliferation of truth theories. 
Continental philosophy’s handling of truth (its alethiology) has been characterised by a 
series of intellectual giants—rather than theory-types—who have each developed influential 
webs of thought concerning truth’s conditions of possibility and its character (or lack thereof). 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Michel Foucault stand out for 
their influential alethiologies.13 Each of these thinkers built upon his predecessors, engendering a 
certain family resemblance among them. But just as individual relations may go their separate 
ways rather than form a cohesive family unit, so too these continental philosophers’ individual 
understandings of truth do not amount to a single coherent vision. Similar to analytic thought, a 
variety of proposals concerning truth has arisen from the continental philosophical tradition, 
some of which even go so far as to dispute truth’s existence or attainability. While this study does 
not engage at length with how the continental philosophical tradition has enquired into the nature 
of truth, a highly programmatic survey of these four thinkers serves to highlight specific 
terminology and concepts that have become widely adopted beyond this tradition, and which I 
will use in later sections of this study.  
First, Nietzsche is widely known for impassioned prose commending brutal honesty and 
the pursuit of truth above all else, often typified by his vociferous declaration that God is dead. 
Some further recognise that his later work14 implies that once a society loses its belief in God, it 
will ultimately lose its faith in truth as well, gaining a despondency over whether truth is 
attainable, worthwhile, or even exists. More work has been done, however, to reconstruct 
 
12 Ralph Walker, ‘The Coherence Theory of Truth,’ in Michael Glanzburg ed., The Oxford Handbook of Truth 
(Oxford: OUP, 2018), 219-30. 
13 For selected relevant works of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Gadamer in this regard,  see their bibliographic entries; 
for an overview of Foucault on truth see Deere (2014) and Rouse (1994). 
14 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2001). Book 5, §343-4. 
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Nietzsche’s posthumously named ‘perspectivism’, the idea that no one can ever escape one’s 
own perspective to achieve an ‘objective’ view of truth. Second, Heidegger’s most well-known 
contribution to discussions of truth (alethiology) is the idea that there is a condition of possibility 
for truth, something which is conceptually prior. Before one recognises truths, there must first be 
something, some field, which first is intelligible and then subsequently is recognised as true. The 
dynamic underlying truth, he says, is one of revealing or un-concealing, in such a way that any 
revelation necessarily entails a concealing too. (He supposes the etymology of the Greek alētheia 
for truth is ‘unconcealing.’) Third, Gadamer expands upon Heidegger’s rendition of truth as, at 
root, ‘un/concealing’, and elaborates its impact for hermeneutics. In his eyes, this means that all 
interpretation (all meaning-making) cannot simply re-produce the original, but rather emerges 
from a fusion of the horizons between the source text and the interpreter. Because this is always a 
unique event particular to the individual horizons that are fused, there is no single method which 
can encapsulate or codify the process of finding meaning. Finally, Foucault, an ardent follower 
of Nietzsche, studied the historical production of knowledge, giving special attention to the role 
of power in determining what is taken to be true. In his account, political, economic, and 
institutional regimes control the production of knowledge, and in his view, there is no remainder, 
nothing else to ‘truth’ other than the impact of their power.  
As with analytic truth-theories, I would suggest each of these continental approaches to 
truth has a certain resonance with common intuitions about the nature of truth. Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism contested the value and attainability of genuine objectivity; similarly, 
many people certainly recognise they cannot completely escape their subjective viewpoint. 
Heidegger’s portrayal of a concealing/unconcealing dynamic as the ground of truth’s possibility 
chimes with the intuition that recognising truth brings something already in existence to one’s 
awareness. Gadamer found truth in a fusion of disparate horizons which is irreducible to any 
method, which accords with the diversity of methods established for different objects of 
scholarship as well as the experience that every new truth a person comes to grasp is known in 
relation to his/her unique set of pre-existing knowledge. Foucault laid bare the role of power in 
the production of (so-called) knowledge and truth, making it difficult to deny that truth is not 
merely discovered but also established and constituted by our discourses and practices of 
scholarship (broadly understood). This study does not evaluate or critique these positions, but 
   
 11 
will reference them in passing to contextualise and clarify the understanding of truth presented in 
this study.  
Evidently, twentieth-century philosophy in both its analytic and continental variants has 
dealt extensively with matters of alethiology. In addition to scholarship and epistemology, truth 
itself has become a question in academic circles, with little consensus over its general form. As 
these truth debates continue to be digested and their implications teased out, the public sphere 
has felt the impact of academic uncertainty—a progression that is hardly surprising given the 
relationship between the academic disciplines of alethiology, epistemology, and scholarship and 
the importance of these concepts in informing the aims and practices of society’s cornerstone 
institutions, such as education, the judicial system, and political debate. Words are signs of the 
times; one bellwether of zeitgeist is vocabulary. ‘Post-truth’ went from being an obscure 
neologism to emblazoning international headlines in less than a decade. This rise to prominence 
was so pronounced that it led the Oxford English Dictionary to designate ‘post-truth’ as its 2016 
word of the year. Undeniably, concerns over the actuality and attainability of truth which had 
once been limited to academic spheres have irrevocably passed into public discourse. Over the 
past century and a half, Western thought and society has increasingly convulsed over the nature 
of truth itself.   
 
I.2 Truth as a Divine Name 
 
Remarkably, despite the turmoil over alethiology, a once-common way of understanding 
truth has not entered the philosophical fray. This is the long-standing Christian tradition of 
naming and approaching God as truth. This section outlines this venerable tradition and its 
scriptural foundation. This overview will render its absence from much current theology and 
truth-debates all the more striking. ‘Truth’, as we shall see, is but one of many divine names in 
the Christian theology. Of late, divine attributes have received more scholarly attention than 
divine names, so this section also outlines the importance of distinguishing between the two. 
This project aims to be squarely within the divine names tradition, though it does hold 
implications for discussions of divine attributes. To that end, the important distinction between 
treating divine attributes and treating divine names—and its significance for this study—will be 
   
 12 
brought forward, as will the appropriateness of the phrase ‘God as truth’ for this study’s 
endeavour.    
 
Naming God Truth 
 
Christian theologians through the ages have written, prayed, and sought holy knowledge 
while naming God Truth. As Chapter II will establish, Augustine says that God is truth and the 
chief good, whom one comes to know through loving God who is love itself. He addresses God 
in prayer and names God as Truth throughout his seminal autobiography Confessions.15 His early 
dialogue On the Free Choice of the Will16 aims to prove God’s existence by first showing that 
eternal truth exists and then that this truth must be God. His mature work The Trinity17 expounds 
upon the Trinitarian Godhead and each of the three divine persons as truth in themselves. 
Subsequent to Augustine, ‘Truth’ is one of the divine appellations discussed in Pseudo-
Dionysius’ The Divine Names as part of a contemplative ascent towards the transcendent God.18 
Anselm too elaborates upon the ‘truth’ as a divine name19. Thomas Aquinas explicates at length 
on God as truth itself.20  Even during the Reformation, calling God truth itself remained so 
fundamental that it is stipulated in the opening pages of the Westminster Confession.21 The 
accounts of God as truth (their content, metaphysical implications and practical applications) 
vary from one to the next, but they hold a common conviction that the God revealed in Christ is 
appropriately named ‘Truth.’ Much more work could be done to investigate the variations and 
commonalities within the longstanding practice of naming God as truth among Christian 
theologians; this would be a worthwhile task for historical theology. This study, however, aims to 
 
15 Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding and ed. David Vincent Meconi, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press 1997). Henceforth, Confessions. 
16 Augustine of Hippo, ‘On the Free Choice of the Will’, in Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace 
and Free Choice, and Other Writings, ed. and trans Peter King, (Cambridge: CUP 2010), 3-126. Henceforth, Free 
Will. 
17 Augustine of Hippo, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill and ed. John E. Rotelle (2nd ed., New York: New City Press 
1991). Henceforth, Trinity. 
18 Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1987), 55, 105-110. I am not suggesting that Denys is building directly on Augustine. The ‘divine 
names’ tradition was already a broad one by his time. 
19 Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, eds., Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 31-32, 46-7, 
51, 152. (‘Monologion’ chapters 18, 30, 31, 35; ’On Truth’ chapter 1). 
20 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: God, trans. and ed., Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: UNDP, 
1955),1.60.1-1.62.5 (p204-8). 
21 Anon., The Confession of Faith: The Larger and Shorter Catechisms with the Scripture Proofs at Large together 
with the Sum of Saving Knowledge (Inverness: John G. Eccles Printers, 1976), p19, chapter 1 article 4. 
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be a constructive theology which is occupied with alethiology, producing a contemporary 
theology of truth which names God as truth. For this reason, it does not pursue the historical 
theological project and instead selects one theologian, Augustine of Hippo—who is one of the 
most ancient and well-developed Christian examples of treating God as truth—to serve as 
insightful historical source material for constructive theology (see Chapter II).  
To Augustine, ‘truth’ is not a Hellenistic divine attribute which he brings into the 
Christian fold; on the contrary, he is fully aware of its prominent position in the Bible as a divine 
name, as no doubt were the aforementioned theologians who name God ‘Truth.’ The New 
Testament indisputably secures Truth's place among the divine names of Christian theology, due 
to a number of widely known and centrally located passages in which ‘truth’ and ‘true’ are key 
terms for God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The most prominent use is in the Johannine 
literature. The opening prologue of John’s gospel directly draws on Exodus 34.6 when it 
proclaims twice that the incarnate Word, who is Jesus Christ, is full of ‘grace and truth’ 
(1.14,17).22 Jesus explicitly self-identifies as no less than truth, saying ‘I am the way, the truth, 
and the life,’(John 14.6). As for the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit is named by Jesus 
repeatedly and explicitly as the ‘spirit of truth’ (John  14.17, 15.26, 16.13; cf. 1 John 5:6 ‘the 
spirit is truth’). Johannine literature also makes the true God a recurrent theme, as in John 3.33 
(‘Whoever has accepted his testimony has certified this, that God is true.’) and John 17.3 (‘And 
this is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have 
sent.’). If we read Jesus’s assertions that ‘He that sent me is true’ (John 7.28, 8.26 KJV) in light 
of Trinitarian orthodoxy, then it is clear that the Father (as well as the Godhead) is true. God is 
also named as one who is true in Pauline literature (e.g. 1 Thess. 1.9 ‘how you turned to God 
from idols, to serve a living and true God,’; Rom. 3.4 ‘although everyone is a liar, let God be 
proved true’ cf. Rev. 6.10 ‘they cried out with a loud voice, “Sovereign Lord, holy and true…”’). 
Calling God ‘truth’ and ‘true’ is, in short, a prominent theme in particular portions of the New 
Testament. 
This practice does not emerge out of nowhere—like all of Christianity, it is built upon a 
Hebrew foundation. ‘Truth’ appears as a divine self-naming in the Jewish Hebrew Bible and 
 
22 All biblical translations are NRSV unless noted otherwise. Because of ʾĕmet’s variable translation as both ‘truth’ 
and ‘faithfulness’ (see Chapter III), recourse is occasionally made to the KJV to highlight a pericope’s relevance to 
this study. 
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Christian Old Testament.23 In Exodus 34.6, one of the cardinal divine self-revelations, 
immediately after refusing to show his face to Moses, God instead chooses to self-describe and 
identify as: ‘YHWH, … abundant in goodness and truth’ (KJV). The psalms praise YHWH as 
‘God of truth’ (Ps. 31.5 KJV) and invoke divine truth on numerous occasions. The frequent 
naming and invoking of God’s truth in the Old Testament is obscured in English translations, 
because the Hebrew word for ‘truth’ (ʾĕmet translated as ‘truth’ in the KJV pericopes above) is at 
times alternatively translated as ‘faithfulness’ (the NRSV’s choice for Ex 34.6 and Ps 31.5). 
Chapter III will investigate the implications of this variable translation and uncover a web of 
utterances about God and truth that are opaque in English translations. This study will map 
relations among divinity, truth, and related concepts (e.g. wisdom, law, word, and YHWH) in the 
Old Testament which develop in the New Testament.  
This overview from the Old Testament to the Westminster Confession indicates that 
naming God ‘Truth’ is an ancient Christian practice with biblical roots which endured at least 
into the early modern period. This study takes two sources of this tradition, the Old Testament 
and compositions by Augustine of Hippo, as primary resources for its constructive theology of 
truth.  
 
The Divine Names 
 
This study also emphasises the significance of treating truth and true as divine names 
rather than simply as divine attributes, and draws on the work of Janet Soskice to indicate the 
importance of this distinction and the value of recovery of divine names at this time. The 
longstanding and sophisticated tradition of naming and approaching God as truth is but one of 
many names in Christianity’s ‘divine names’ tradition. This tradition is a collection of names 
used for God and things God is called, such as Love, the Holy One, Rock, Light, and Wisdom. 
Unlike Islam’s codified ninety-names of God, there is no definitive or exhaustive list of divine 
names for Christianity. Treatments of divine names are often distinguished from treatises on the 
Trinity which only treat the names of the Trinitarian persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
 
23 Throughout, this study refers to the Old Testament, rather than the Hebrew Bible, because this study is a work of 
Christian theology that treats the text as Christian Scripture. Its Old Testament analysis is meant to only have 
authority as a work of Christian theology, and makes no claim to being pertinent for Jewish interpretation of 
scripture. This respects Judaism’s prerogative to interpret its scripture for itself. 
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though this is not always a clear-cut distinction, as may be seen in the common use of the divine 
name, Word). The most well-known example of this line of theological thought is Pseudo-
Dionysius’ treatise The Divine Names, though as Janet Soskice points out, he is by no means 
alone; the divine names are expounded upon by many illustrious theologians, including Thomas 
Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Ambrose, Origen, Hilary of Poitiers, and Philo of Alexandria.24 
Furthermore, rather than being restricted to highly technical treatises, the divine names are 
invoked in liturgy, prayer, and hymnody, as in the Sarum Rite of medieval England.25  
Soskice rightfully indicates that the divine names are not to be confused with what 
modern theologians refer to as divine attributes, though there is arguably some overlap between 
the two. Divine attributes are specific qualities of God, such as when Descartes specifies the five 
attributes of a perfect being: one who is infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent.26 
All divine attributes may be predicated of God. It is readily apparent that the names recited by 
the Sarum Rite and enumerated by Pseudo-Dionysius are not all predications in the sense of 
classical attributes. The medieval litany includes ‘Messiah, Emmanuel, Firstborn, Alpha, Omega, 
Lamb, Serpent, Goat, Lion, Word, Worm, Splendour, Bridegroom.’27 Pseudo-Dionysius lists the 
names being, life, light, and truth alongside sun, star, fire, water, cloud, and rock.28 Lamb and 
star (or even being-a-lamb or being-a-star) cannot be said to be attributes of God. In this way, 
nomination is not identical with predication; divine names may be used in a more varied manner 
than divine attributes. In addition to predicating an attribute (eternal, everlasting), divine names 
can be metaphorical (light, rock), or designate God’s relation to creation (creator, redeemer), or 
express an identity statement (God is Love).29  
The significance of a divine name—whether metaphorical, relational, as an attribute, as 
an identity, as a proper noun, or otherwise—only becomes clear when one observes how the 
name is used in the broader Christian context. The dangers of removing divine names from their 
theistic context are profound. A divine name that has been deracinated and treated as a purely 
philosophical divine attribute may be stripped of characteristic traits it possessed within the 
Christian divine names tradition. For instance, removing the practice of calling God ‘eternal’ 
 
24 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘Being and Love: Schleiermacher, Aquinas, and Augustine,’ Modern Theology, 34:3 (July 
2018) 481. 
25 Ibid., 482. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Pseudo-Dionysius, 55-6. 
29 Soskice, ‘Being and Love,’ 489. 
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from the Christian devotion to a Creator God alienates it from the notion of creatio ex nihilo.30 
This in turn makes it possible for the characterisation of the ‘eternal’ God to have more in 
common with Aristotle than Christian thought. As Soskice explains,  
 
where for Aristotle divine “eternity” can mean everlastingness with neither 
beginning or end, for Aquinas – and for that matter Augustine and Boethius – 
divine eternity cannot be this, but must be that God, as Creator of space and time, 
is not a creature of space and time but absolutely present to all created 
temporality.31 
 
 To prevent the distortions of un-contextualised readings, this study attends to the broader textual 
context of Augustine’s writings and the Old Testament when investigating in what way they 
speak of God as truth. Its significance can only be fully understood within the larger theistic 
framework.  
Another distinction between divine attributes and divine names is that divine names are 
classically taken to be scriptural in origin. In his seminal text The Divine Names, Pseudo-
Dionysius explicitly says as much: ‘we must not dare to resort to words or conceptions 
concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being, apart from what the sacred scriptures 
have divinely revealed.’32 Examples are ‘I am being’ (Exod 3.14, Rev 1.4), ‘good’ (Matt 19.17, 
Luke 18.19) ‘eternal’ (Isa 40.28, Bar 4.8), and ‘truth’ (John 14.6).33 It is true that some have 
argued that certain attributes which are also divine names are deducible from rational reflection. 
Others have taken the classical attributes to be Hellenistic in origin, subsequently baptised by 
Christian theologians into orthodox doctrinal thought. Nevertheless, for the purposes of Christian 
theology, one should be able to draw on scriptural support for each and every divine name, and 
‘Truth’ is no exception. For this reason, among others, this study makes the Bible one of its two 
main resources for its constructive theology of truth. 
 
God as Truth 
 
30 Soskice, Janet Martin, ‘Athens and Jerusalem, Alexandria and Edessa: Is there a Metaphysics of Scripture?’ 
International Journal of Systematic Theology, 8:2 (April 2006) 149-162. 
31 Soskice, ‘Being and Love,’ 484. 
32 Pseudo-Dionysius, 49. 
33 Pseudo-Dionysius, 55. 
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In this thesis I will speak of ‘approaching’ and ‘understanding’ ‘God as truth’ in order to 
preserve the multivalent quality of naming God and, in due course, attempt to perform its 
retrieval. If one were to say from the beginning that naming God ‘truth’ means ‘God is Truth’ or 
‘God is true’ these might misleadingly suggest the ‘is’ of identity. Speaking of ‘approaching’ and 
‘understanding’ ‘God as truth’ encompasses a range of possibility as to how ‘God is truth’ might 
be taken, consonant with what we find in earlier theological texts. This means it can compass 
additional phrases which do not ‘name’ God as truth but are clearly cognate (e.g. ‘the truth of 
God,’ ‘the true God’, ‘God is true.’ etc.). Occasionally Truth will be capitalised in this study 
when it explicitly functions as a name for God, but this practice is not universally applied 
because of the vagueness of some instances. In this way, the content of ‘God as truth’ will be 
given greater detail from the course of our study, rather than my analysing the significance of the 
phrase in and of itself.  
It appears that the language of divine attributes has displaced treatment of the divine 
names. In Soskice’s view, 
 
At some time in early modernity the divine names tradition fades away, especially 
in Protestant and Anglophone writings, and is replaced by discussions of the 
“classical attributes” – infinite, eternal, immutable and so on – defended or 
attacked as free-standing philosophical assertions. That is what we find in Locke, 
Hobbes and Hume and their modern successors amongst philosophers of 
religion.34  
 
Interestingly, Soskice argues elsewhere that the slippage from divine names to divine attributes 
(and the loss of the former’s distinctively Christian features) is at the root of the twentieth-
century contention that Christian thought does not have a distinctive metaphysics of its own, but 
rather one which it adopted from Hellenistic thought. As she puts it, 
 
 
34 Soskice, ‘Being and Love,’ 482. She also observes that Roman Catholic ‘Handbook theology’ also contributed to 
the rise of divine attributes and fall of divine names. 
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I … ask whether it is true, as some say, the fathers baptized Aristotle and that the 
classical divine attributes (‘eternal’, ‘unchanging’, ‘One’ and so on) were simply 
lifted from Greek philosophers to adorn the brow of the God of Israel. My answer 
will be ‘No’, my strategy to draw attention to a Christian (and Jewish) teaching 
that is metaphysical but distinctly unhellenic – creatio ex nihilo – and to argue that 
this teaching had dramatic implications for religious language, including the 
divine attributes, or as I prefer to call them, the divine names.35  
 
The repercussions of exclusive attention to divine attributes is significant enough that she 
argues the eclipse of divine names by divine attributes in modern, especially Anglophone, 
theology has been detrimental. As a result, some names have been left out/forgotten because they 
are not easily amenable to being considered as attributes. Some that are amenable have risked 
losing distinctive Christian characteristics (e.g. eternal, free). As an antidote, Soskice 
recommends that the divine names receive renewed attention. This study proceeds along 
sympathetic lines, in that its theology of truth treats truth as a divine name rather than as simply a 
divine attribute. It proposes that treating God as truth was once a robust and distinctive 
understanding of ‘truth’ in the ancient world, and may be successfully retrieved, resourced for 
current debates over truth, being first of most obvious relevance to Christian thought, and 
secondarily to philosophy. In this study’s view, (a) talk of divine attributes is not in itself wrong, 
though it needs careful work to maintain contact with Christian theological thought and (b) 
continued attention to divine names is important. This study attends to truth as a divine name - 
and if successful will produce insights that are of value for those who seek to articulate truth as a 
divine attribute. 
 This study does not, however, attempt a genealogical explanation of how ‘truth’ 
specifically fell from favour as a divine name over the course of the modern period, resulting in 
its absence from much current theological discourse. This study is meant as a proposal situated 
among current theological and philosophical discourse, and for that reason the next two sections 
(I.3-4) examine the theological context, attending first to recent theological work on questions of 
truth that has overlooked truth as a divine name (I.3), and attending second to those that have 
taken up this ancient Christian locus of thought and practice (I.4). 
 
35 Soskice, ‘Metaphysics of Scripture,’ 149-50. 
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I.3 A Theological Lacuna 
 
Despite the twentieth century’s proliferation of interest in truth (its essence or essential 
qualities, see I.1), the conceptual possibility of God as truth itself (see 1.2) appears largely 
forgotten. The gap, or lacuna, is evident in (at least) three arenas. First, at a popular level, the 
phrase ‘God is truth’ is often merely a poetic way of saying ‘God doesn’t lie,’ or ‘what I have 
asserted about God is true.’ Second, it is largely absent from philosophical inquiry: neither 
continental nor analytic philosophical traditions, which we surveyed above, have developed 
truth-theories that lay weight on the idea of God as truth. Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, 
there is a theological gap or lacuna; when one turns to the theologians and traditions from this 
period who have sought most prominently to assert the relevance of truth for Christian theology, 
little recourse is made to understanding God as truth. This section explores the lacuna where a 
productive theological locus once stood. 
Three strands of debate will be taken into consideration: Christian fundamentalism, 
reformed epistemology, and postliberal theology (including its ‘postconservative’ off-shoot). I 
have selected these theological developments because, while all three focus sharply on the 
veracity of Christian truth claims, the character of their approaches to establishing the truth of 
Christianity greatly differ from one another. Each recognises that Christian theology requires a 
robust articulation of the origin or nature of Christian truth, yet none turns to the idea of naming 
God ‘Truth.’ In other words, even theists who are preoccupied with the truth-value of Christian 
faith rarely make recourse to God as truth itself. My conclusion is non-evaluative, in that it does 
not judge what impact—positive or negative—this omission has on the three strands of Christian 
thought. It is not arguing that this lack or omission is a fatal flaw. The aim is to establish the 




Christian fundamentalism, one of the most potent religious forces of the twentieth 
century, has been perhaps the most vociferous and high-profile Christian tradition to insist on the 
importance of ‘truth’ for right belief, and it is therefore worth examining precisely how ‘truth’ is 
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understood within this tradition. James Barr’s lengthy and influential analysis in 
Fundamentalism is well respected among scholars and provides us with a theological insight into  
the movement as it existed in the late twentieth-century.36 As Barr makes clear, Christian 
fundamentalist thought has typically drawn on an understanding of truth that resembles 
correspondence theories. Moreover, Barr argues, this approach has progressively reconfigured 
this tradition’s approach both to biblical texts and to its own evangelical origins.37 It has not, in 
other words, offered an account of ‘truth’ as a divine name. 
Fundamentalism is often charged with ‘literalism’ in its approach to the Bible, but, as 
Barr is quick to demonstrate, fundamentalists frequently advance non-literal readings of 
scripture. It is inerrancy rather than literalism which is of greatest concern.38 The central tenet is 
that the Bible is inspired and free from error—not merely theological error, but error of any kind, 
including historical, geographical, and scientific fact.39 In his analysis, Barr finds that it is not a 
literalistic hermeneutic but a sense of truth as ‘correspondence to external reality’ which is 
preserved above all else.40 In his analysis, 
 
Though the degree of correspondence is allowed to vary, and in this sense, as we 
have just seen, fundamentalist interpretation is not literal, correspondence with 
external reality must be affirmed as an inalienable and essential property of the 
biblical texts, and especially so when they narrate events that seem on the surface 
to be events in space and time. We can best illustrate this by putting it negatively: 
for fundamentalists it is usually wrong to interpret a biblical passage as if it were 
a myth, or a legend, or the product of theological reflection, unless it itself 
represents itself as a piece of theological reflection.41  
 
For fundamentalism, in other words, maintaining correspondence between verbal biblical 
pronouncements and the external material/concrete world is paramount to maintaining inerrancy.  
 
36 James Barr, Fundamentalism, 2nd ed., (London: SCM, 1981). 
37 Fundamentalism here is not to be equated with conservative evangelicalism per se, but rather a particular ideology 
within the evangelical tradition of Christianity. See, Barr, Fundamentalism, xix. 
38 Ibid., 40. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 49. 
41 Ibid., 50. 
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Barr also draws attention to the fundamentalist efforts to harmonise all biblical passages. 
This practice stems from the concern that if any one part were to be untrue, it would impugn the 
divine authority of the entire text.42 The insistence that the Biblical text be perfectly consistent 
has superficial commonalities with a coherentist view of truth, but it is driven by concern for the 
consistency of divine inspiration, rather than an understanding of the nature of truth. Notably, 
Barr argues persuasively that this is an approach to scripture that is not substantiated by the text 
itself. While there is support for the inspired and authoritative nature of the texts, the extension 
of these two concepts to inerrancy is based purely on supposition: ‘here conservative 
evangelicals go over to a purely philosophical and non-biblical argument: if it was inspired by 
God, then how could there be any error of any kind in it? . . . [this] belongs to a purely 
philosophical assumption.’43 Inerrancy, I would add, is a natural extension of the idea that truth is 
correspondence with external reality; if any part of the Bible lacks this, then that part is not true, 
and if the entire Bible is the inspired authoritative word of God, then none of it should lack this 
quality.  
Fundamentalism’s overwhelming commitment to inerrancy and correspondence-type 
understandings of truth also drives its engagement (and disengagement) with biblical criticism 
and other forms of Christianity. Barr asserts that fundamentalist biblical interpretation will freely 
pass from literal to non-literal, depending upon which best supports the case for correspondence-
truth. Similarly, it does not genuinely draw conclusions from biblical scholarship, but merely 
uses it to substantiate the conclusions it has already determined. Furthermore, Barr notes that the 
same priorities have caused a ‘frightening alienation of fundamentalism from the main stream of 
the church life and theology.’44 Fundamentalists have willingly alienated themselves from their 
own evangelical heritage, he warns, because ‘in place of the religious functioning of the Bible it 
takes, as primary guarantee of the authority of scripture, the absence of error, especially in its 
historical details.’45 The long-standing evangelical emphasis on a personal relationship with 
Jesus, the incarnate God, has been gradually replaced by a relationship with an inert text. In 
Barr’s view, ‘It is striking that a religious form which places so much stress on personal faith in 
Christ is made dependent on a rationalist proof of the inerrancy of the Bible, in which the 
 
42 Ibid., 62, 65, 70. 
43 Ibid., 84-5. 
44 Ibid., 338. 
45 Ibid., 339. 
   
 22 
promises of God are not considered trustworthy unless they are enshrined in a book all 
statements of which are infallible and inerrant.’46 Clearly Christian fundamentalism is not most 
closely concerned with the relationship between God and truth, but rather with the Bible as truth. 
Correlatively, it is not the holiness of truth and the worthiness of its pursuit, but rather particular 
truths of biblical texts that are maintained by any means necessary. 
 Barr identifies two difficulties that result. First, there is the movement’s hostility towards 
other forms of Christianity whenever there is a perception of doctrinal disagreement or of the 
other being ‘non-evangelical’. Because of the narrow correspondence view of truth, 
acknowledgement of the valid faith of Christians who differ on doctrinal issues would ‘damage 
the exclusiveness claimed for the evangelical path to God.’47 The movement’s preferred 
alternative is to dismiss other forms of Christianity as illegitimate (e.g. ‘Catholic not Christian’). 
The second difficulty is hostility towards modern theology and biblical criticism because their 
questioning of fundamentalist interpretations is taken as a threat: one to sever ‘the intellectual 
link with the Bible which for fundamentalists provides them with the final assurance that their 
religious faith is true.’48 As these interpretative authorities are rejected, fundamentalism becomes 
increasingly dependent upon personal authority, all as a result of resting their faith’s truth on 
biblical inerrancy and a correspondence view of truth.  
From Barr’s insightful analysis, it would appear that fundamentalism’s understanding of 
truth has divorced its adherents from their own conservative evangelical tradition, the biblical 
text, the broader Christian tradition, church community, and the intellectual community, resulting 
in a dependence upon a code of exclusion and personal authority, with dire political and religious 
consequences. Relevant to this study, even though truth is an overriding concern in Christian 
fundamentalism, no significant use is made of the practice of naming God ‘Truth’. It is the truth 
of the Bible—rather than God as truth itself—which is maintained at any cost. Surely, this is 
based in a desire to defend the reality of God as revealed in Christ, but, functionally, the Bible 
has replaced God as the focus of defensive action. It could be that if a theology of God as truth 
displaced the emphasis on biblical inerrancy and correspondence truth, many of these difficulties 
would become avoidable without compromising faith. 
 
 
46 Ibid., 340. 
47 Ibid., 342. 
48 Ibid. 




A similar lack of attention to the possibilities of understanding God as truth is noticeable 
in recent Christian theology that engages with analytic thought, as may be exemplified in the 
work of the theist philosophers labelled ‘reformed epistemologists.’ A brief study of three 
prominent thinkers in this tradition—Alvin Plantinga, William P. Alston and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff —highlights that they are centrally concerned with the truth and justifiability of 
Christian belief, especially belief in God’s existence. Their direct engagement with God and truth 
does produce epistemologies that directly involve the divine, but it does not generate an 
alethiology wherein divinity and the nature of truth itself are intimately related.  
Alvin Plantinga’s magnum opus Warranted Christian Belief49 is the culminating volume 
of his trilogy on warrant. The first two books aim to establish that warrant, rather than 
justification, is what separates genuine knowledge from accidentally true belief, and the final 
volume intends to demonstrate that there is warrant for Christian belief. His main topic, then, is 
epistemology, and truth is undeniably at the heart of his project—he avows that ‘Everything 
depends on the truth of Christian belief.’ But the nature of truth, alethiology, is not in question 
for him.50 This is clear in the passage below, in which Plantinga uses contemporary confusion 
over truth’s nature to illustrate that obvious realities can become confused in a cognitively 
compromising environment. He offers,  
 
An analogy: Thomas Reid and others point out that the idea of truth, as a relation 
between beliefs and the world, is part of our native noetic equipment. We 
ordinarily take it utterly for granted that there is such a thing as truth, and we 
ordinarily take it for granted, with respect to any given belief we hold, that it is 
indeed true. But the right kind of cognitive environment can squelch and smother 
our notion of truth, so that some people in some circumstances wind up 
apparently with no concept of truth at all.51 
 
 
49 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
50 Ibid., xiii. 
51 Ibid., 216. 
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It is evident from this passage that, in Plantinga’s view, someone with un-addled cognitive 
abilities will naturally hold what I have termed a 'thin’ sense of truth (that is, truth as a relation 
between beliefs and ‘the world’, see I.1). Even when, later in his study, Plantinga considers other 
views of truth, he lists what he calls ‘postmodern’ versions only to clarify that in his view they 
offer no insights into the nature of truth. He explains that they are incompatible with Christian 
belief, and he thus dispenses with them without further consideration of the long debate over 
truth itself that has marked Western philosophical thought.52  
Plantinga’s lack of interest in alethiology is also evident in his distinctive position that the 
proper functioning of human noetic capacities involve God. For Plantinga, humans have an 
innate sensus divinitatis, a ‘kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism’ that can provide a sense of 
the divine, similar to sense-perception or memory.53 He argues that if this sensus divinitatis is 
innate, it follows that belief in God is properly basic. This would mean that just as ‘I am 
conscious’ is a properly basic belief (it does not require evidence to be considered knowledge) 
because it is self-evident through sensory experience, so too would belief in God be properly 
basic (i.e., not requiring evidence to be knowledge). In brief, this is how Plantinga hopes to 
secure the Christian’s right to claim that his/her belief in God is warranted, even if it can do little 
to persuade those who have no awareness of a sensus divinitatis in themselves. The truth of 
Christianity is at stake, but for Plantinga it is a question of epistemology, which implicitly 
presumes ‘truth’ to be a sort of ‘thin’ truth or correspondence; ‘truth’ is certainly not another 
name for God.  
Another reformed epistemologist, William P. Alston, stakes out  a similar position in 
Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience.54 Like Plantinga’s focus on the 
sensus divinitatis, Alston sets out ‘to show that putative perception of God can provide 
justification for certain beliefs about God and thereby contribute to a basis for religious belief.’55 
He advances a ‘doxastic-practice epistemology’ which focuses on how belief-forming practices 
justify belief, but he provides no in-depth consideration of the nature of truth. There is only a 
footnote clarifying that his epistemology ‘takes the realist view that there is a basic (roughly, 
“correspondence”) concept of truth, and a single concept of reality, that is common to all 
 
52 Ibid., 424-5. 
53 Ibid., 172, 175. 
54 William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991). 
55 Ibid., 68. 
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doxastic practices. They all aim at forming correct beliefs about a common reality.’56 Behind his 
sense of truth as ‘roughly correspondence’—‘thin’ in my terminology—no sense of God as truth 
itself is detectable in the text. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff fruitfully serves as a final example of the way truth has been dealt 
with by reformed epistemology. In his essay ‘Can Belief in God be Rational If It Has No 
Foundations?’ he addresses what he calls ‘the evidentialist problem’, that is, whether there is 
enough evidence to justify belief in God.57 This problem is at the forefront of Plantinga and 
Alston’s minds as well: where Plantinga wishes to show that belief in God was properly basic 
(thus exempt from demands for evidence), Alston prefers to argue that mystical experiences can 
supply evidence for theistic belief. Like Plantinga and Alston, Wolterstorff’s concern is with 
whether one can be justified in taking beliefs about God as true, leaving the ‘thin’ sense of truth 
itself un-interrogated.  
Insightfully, Wolterstorff recognises the ‘evidentialist problem’ to be a uniquely modern 
conundrum. Looking back to the medieval thought of Anselm and Aquinas he recounts that,  
 
Taking Anselm and Aquinas as typical, it becomes clear, then, that the medievals 
were doing something quite different in their project of natural theology from 
meeting the evidentialist challenge. They were engaged in the transmutation 
project of altering belief (faith) into knowledge. No one in their milieu was 
claiming that it was permissible to believe that God existed only if one did so on 
the basis of adequate evidence, and with a firmness not exceeding that strength of 
the evidence.58 
 
If the evidentialist problem is a uniquely modern challenge, one might infer that that the 
problems addressed by reformed epistemology do not arise for certain pre-modern Christian 
understandings of truth. Relatedly, this thesis will ultimately advocate for a ‘thick’ sense of truth, 
one which incorporates the ‘thin’ sense alongside a richer account of truth and, by extension, true 
belief. Foreshadowing this study’s proposal, there is a point when Wolterstorff displays a sense 
 
56 Ibid., 239 fn19. 
57 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Can Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?’ in Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1983), 136. 
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that belief in God is deeper than simply holding true beliefs about God and related claims. In his 
opening paragraph, he states: 
 
Central to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam alike is the conviction that we as 
human beings are called to believe in God—to trust in him, to rely on him, to 
place our confidence in him. To believe in God is our fundamental human 
obligation. Central also is the conviction that only by believing in God can the 
deepest stirrings of the human heart be satisfied.59 
  
Here, believing in God takes on qualities of trust, reliance, and confidence as well as cognitive 
assent. Wolterstorff does not, however, follow up on this notion that Christian belief may be 
more than a conviction awaiting appropriate rational evidential support.  His essay remains 
committed to meeting the evidentialist challenge on its own grounds.  
There is much to be said for the work of reformed epistemology in meeting the 
evidentialist challenge, as many theists, atheists, and agnostics hold it to be of decisive 
importance for religious epistemology. This study's interests, however, lie first with alethiology. 
From this brief survey, it is apparent that although reformed epistemology is highly concerned 
with matters of truth, its proponents do not explore the possibility that belief in God may be 
metaphysically consequential for the nature of truth. It is this possibility that this study explores. 
This is, I suggest, a meaningful lacuna in the otherwise valuable insights of the reformed 
epistemologists; moreover, as I will suggest in my concluding chapter, it is possible that this kind 
of constructive theology of truth which names God as truth itself could contribute positively to 




Both Christian fundamentalism and reformed epistemology contain a dominating concern 
for  truth, without extensive questioning of the nature of truth itself. Rather, both have absorbed 
or deployed non-theistic theories of truth (frequently though not always something akin to a 
correspondence theory of truth) in an effort to answer popular and philosophical demands that 
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faith be justified. The final theological tradition I will consider—that of postliberal theology, 
including its more recent postconservative offshoots—has dealt more directly with questions of 
what I have called alethiology. As a brief study of three seminal thinkers in this tradition (George 
Lindbeck, Hans Frei, and Kevin Vanhoozer) makes clear, postliberal thought has recognised that 
certain widespread understandings of truth are problematic and has taken steps to avoid these 
problems with limited moves to develop alternatives. It has not, however, recognised the value 
for its own questions of a revived alethiology of God as truth itself.  
When George Lindbeck published The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age, it was explicitly intended to address how the truth of Christian doctrine can be 
defended today. His book proposes a ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach to doctrine, one derived from 
‘philosophical and social-scientific approaches.’60 As James Fodor explains, Lindbeck’s 
approach is meant to navigate between the dominant ‘propositionalist’ and ‘experiential-
expressivist’ models for understanding religious doctrine (the former focusing on doctrinal truth 
as an objectively measurable reality and the latter viewing doctrine as ‘non-informative … 
symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations.’61) In this way, he seeks to avoid 
both fundamentalism and liberal theology’s approach to doctrine. The complaints of some critics 
notwithstanding, Lindbeck is committed to propositional truth maintaining a role in the 
development and nature of religious doctrine, saying, ‘We must not simply allow for the 
possibility that a religion may be categorically as well as symbolically or expressively true; we 
must also allow for its possible propositional truth.’62 Lindbeck’s book proved greatly popular, 
with both its adherents and its detractors recognising that he had located a commonly felt 
problem in the dichotomy between ‘propositionalist’ and ‘experiential-expressivist’ approaches.  
When Lindbeck does present an account of truth, it addresses the truth of statements. In 
it, he articulates two rough analogues of coherentist and correspondence truth-theories, which he 
calls ‘intrasystematic’ truth and ‘ontological’ truth. In his own words, 
 
The first [‘intrasystematic’ truth of statements] is the truth of coherence; the 
second [‘ontological’ truth of statements], that truth of correspondence to reality 
 
60 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984), 
7. 
61 James Fodor, ‘Postliberal Theology,’ in David F. Ford and Rachel Muers, eds., The Modern Theologians: an 
Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 232. 
62 Lindbeck, 63-4. 
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which, according to epistemological realists, is attributable to first-order 
propositions. Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the 
total relevant context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-
linguistic terms, is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of 
life.63  
 
Doctrine, Lindbeck proposes, can be defended as truth in the ‘intrasystematic’ sense, in that 
doctrines are ‘second-order’ propositions, rather than being ‘first-order propositions’ that make 
‘ontological truth claims.’64 We can see that Lindbeck has passed into alethiology in his efforts to 
defend the truth of doctrine—not yet offering a full account of truth while yet refusing to 
uncritically adopt the alethiologies implicit in challenges to Christian faith. While Lindbeck does 
discuss the nature of truth, his excursus does not suggest that divinity in some way undergirds 
the nature of truth. 
If Lindbeck showed a hesitancy to adopt un-interrogated or implicit theories of truth, then 
Hans Frei exhibited an outright refusal to adopt a regnant theory of truth or to offer his own 
definition. Frei was centrally concerned with biblical exegesis rather than doctrinal formulations 
and proposed that a hermeneutic of narrative should be applied to the Bible. His seminal work, 
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative,65 examines gradual changes in hermeneutical approaches to 
biblical text from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, over which time, he argues, the 
approach of reading the Bible as “realistic narrative” was gradually lost. The alethiological 
implications of his narrative or ‘aesthetic’ approach to scripture are explicitly addressed in his 
essay ‘Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal.’66 He asserts that understanding the 
biblical text aesthetically ‘often entails the factual affirmation and existential commitment.’67  
And yet, even as questions of understanding and truth are not to be avoided, superfluous 
specificity is to be scrupulously avoided: ‘My plea here is—the more formal and less loaded one 
can make the notion of understanding the better. … it involves a search for a notion of 
 
63 Ibid., 64. 
64 Lindbeck, 80. 
65 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
66 Hans W. Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (Oxford: 
OUP, 1993). 
67 Ibid., 43-44. 
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understanding that is as little as possible moved by considerations of man’s understanding as 
moved by his being.’68 
Frei’s essay ‘Response to “Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal”’ (from the 
same collection) also lays bare the source of his reticence to define not only ‘understanding’ but 
‘reference’ and ‘truth.’ He laments that there is no clear ‘natural’ philosophy from which a 
theologian may begin.69 For this reason, he will admit that a certain idea is indispensable while 
refusing to define his terms for fear of privileging the matter. He defends himself by saying a 
simple definition is not possible:  
 
So, “reference,” again, is a difficult thing to get hold of even though one wants to 
refer. Unlike Dr. Henry, I think “reference”—to say nothing of “truth”—in 
Christian usage is not a simple, single or philosophically univocal category. … I 
do not mean to deny reference at all.70 
 
Frei intentionally does not advance a theory of truth per se and yet is very clear that his work 
necessarily raises and deals with such concerns. His reticence to define truth does not result from 
viewing questions of truth to be peripheral, but rather a concern that defining truth and related 
topics would obscure, mislead, or privilege the questions at hand. This concern to avoid 
excessive conceptual baggage is a commendable commitment, and undoubtedly stems in part 
from Frei’s concern to avoid the same hazards that Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic approach is 
meant to avoid; Frei too does not wish a false dichotomy between different theories of truth to 
occlude a narratival reading of biblical texts.  
I would tentatively suggest, however, that greater articulation of a theory of truth would 
in fact help Frei’s wider project. Examining Lindbeck and Frei’s response to questions 
concerning the nature of truth, I agree with James Fodor’s critique that ‘As a whole, postliberals 
have been less than forthcoming on what a more full-bodied, theological account of truth looks 
like.’71 Fodor states: 
 
 
68 Ibid., 31. 
69 Ibid., 209-10. 
70 Ibid., 210. 
71 Fodor, 240. 
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The question of truth looms large in postliberal theology. To be sure, much of 
postliberal theology’s polemic against existing theories of truth serves a wider 
agenda of correction, reform, and repair—which does not include setting up an 
alternative account of theological truth. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon 
postliberals to become clearer on these matters than they have sometimes been.72  
 
Chapter IV will suggest that understanding God as truth could provide greater clarity to a 
Christian account of truth, such as Fodor desires.  
One more recent theologian in the postliberal tradition who has attempted to provide a 
fuller account of truth is Kevin Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer is deeply informed by postliberal 
sensitivities, while in fact self-describing as a ‘postconservative’ theologian. He shares Lindbeck 
and Frei’s concern to expand the sense of ‘truth’ beyond what is merely ‘propositional’, and in 
his major work The Drama of Doctrine73 goes further than either of his postliberal predecessors 
in seeking to address specifically alethiological questions. On closer inspection, however, it is 
apparent that Vanhoozer’s proposal in this work explicates how truth may be understood within a 
specifically Christian context (what he calls ‘theological truth’), rather than presenting a general 
truth theory or understanding of truth in its own right. He says he will uphold truth as adaequatio 
intellectus ad rei in the sense of ‘correspondence of mind and thing/subject matter’ only if he 
may ‘define adaequatio’ to mean ‘sufficient, good enough’ instead of ‘a perfect, complete 
equivalence between language and world.’74  
Clearly, Vanhoozer aims to critique adaequatio intellectus ad rei as it is traditionally 
understood (in his words as 'the philosopher's ideal of complete equivalence'). His re-
characterisation of ‘adaequatio’, however, does not amount to a re-characterisation of truth in 
general because he only applies it to the case of Christian truths. For Vanhoozer, God’s word (by 
which he means the Bible) is sufficient to convey the necessary propositions and imaginative 
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It is time to draw the various threads of this discussion together and say how 
postconservative theology affirms truth as adaequatio intellectus ad rei. The 
adequacy of that is truth’s measure should not be seen in terms of the 
philosopher’s ideal of complete equivalence but in rather less formal terms: good 
enough, sufficient. Scripture is sufficient, first, in the formal sense: just these 
literary forms are adequate for rendering the Word of God. The truth of God’s 
word is not merely but richly propositional. Scripture summons the intellect to 
accept its propositions, but it also summons the imagination to see, feel, and taste 
them as well.  …The truth in Scripture is adequate, second, in that it suffices; it 
communicates enough. … Enough is not an absolute but a relative term: we know 
enough truth for the purpose at hand. Specifically, our intellect apprehends 
enough of what God is doing in Christ (the res, or substance of the theo-drama) to 
understand the main thrust of the action.75   
 
Plainly, this is a theory of the truth of the Bible, not of God or the content of faith. Despite his 
critique of other theories of truth, Vanhoozer has not presented his own so much as asserted that 
scripture is ‘good enough’ to answer whatever religious truth concerns an individual may have. 
He has made a productive a play on words, punning adaequatio with ‘adequate’, to re-
characterise truth only in the context of Christian truth claims, not broader non-Christian 
contexts.  
In an earlier work,76 Vanhoozer appears to concur with such a characterisation of his 
position, stating that he wishes to address the ‘evangelical truth claim’, which is neither an 
‘empirical’ nor ‘existential’: ‘it is primarily a claim about the reality of God. … The evangelical 
truth claim is thus a claim about the meaning of the whole.’77 He next advances a special 
epistemology for evangelical truth claims, based upon martyrdom and witnessing, with the hope 
of addressing the epistemological challenges of the twentieth century. Once again, his proposal 
does not touch on truth in general, keeping more narrowly to the truth of revelation and faith. 
 
75 Ibid., 291. 
76 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity 
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77 Ibid., 339-40. 
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There are times when Vanhoozer speaks briefly in a manner that might imply the idea of 
God as truth, but these do not amount to more than an evocative turn of phrase, as when he refers 
to Jesus as ‘God’s truth claim’: 
 
Jesus, one might say, is God’s truth claim: the divine self-revelation in history, the 
Word above all words that can be relied on—the Word (a person rather than a 
proposition) whose life, death and resurrection, taken together, displays how 
things (ultimately) are (or will be). The truth of Jesus Christ has a propositional 
component.78 
 
Here, we see once again that this is not a development of his understanding of truth in general, 
but of truth as exclusively related to Jesus. Though he describes Jesus as truth in the sense of a 
person being true, this does not appear to inform an understanding of truth in general.  
Lindbeck, Frei, and Vanhoozer have rightly identified what I term alethiology as one of 
the modern challenges to Christianity. There is much to appreciate in Lindbeck’s approach to 
doctrinal truth, Frei’s reintroduction of biblical narrative, and Vanhoozer’s ‘adaequatio’ 
alternative to evangelical propositionalism. Yet it is my suggestion that, for all their aspiration to 
address questions of truth, the postliberal thought of Lindbeck and Frei has in fact been rather 
less articulate in its constructive proposals. The same could be said for Vanhoozer. Like 
Lindbeck and Frei, he openly affirms the importance of truth to his inquiry and also has a healthy 
sense of the difficulties of these waters in modernity. But his account of the veracity of 
evangelical truth claims does not amount to a complete alethiology because it leaves non-
Christian truth untouched. Beyond tantalising suggestions, understanding God as truth itself has 
no notable role in his work. If truth itself has become a problem, it would appear that this 
avoidance of problems, while salutary, is not itself a provision of solutions. Lindbeck, Frei, and 
Vanhoozer do not wish to become beholden to secular definitions of truth. And yet, their various 
responses do not fully advance their own truth-theories beyond what might specifically regard 
Christian truth. 
 Naming God as truth, I propose, could fill the gap. If postliberal theology and its 
successors were to integrate an understanding of God as truth into their theology, they could 
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build more usefully on the pre-existing strengths of their projects. This thesis aims to provide the 
necessary groundwork for such a shift in understanding, by proposing a contemporary 




This brief survey of three currents of Christian thought explicitly concerned with truth 
indicates that the idea of God as truth has largely vanished, even from theological discourse, 
despite the pressing concern with God and truth. Christian fundamentalism has sought to address 
it through a commitment to biblical inerrancy, that is, the Bible as truth. Reformed epistemology 
appeals to carefully reasoned claims about experience, whether about properly basic beliefs or 
mystical experience. Only the postliberal tradition has explicitly attempted to address questions 
of the nature of truth—alethiology—and even then has done so in a limited form, and with no 
treatment of the venerable tradition of naming God as truth and truth as divine. It is this striking 
lacuna that this study seeks to rectify. 
 
I.4 Recent Treatments of God as Truth 
  
There are, however, three prominent recent theologians who have engaged in 
alethiological questions and have done so with the constructive aim of articulating an 
understanding of God as truth for contemporary theology: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Bruce 
Marshall, and Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank. All three recognise a crisis of truth, 
whether for Christian theology specifically or Western thought more broadly; each seeks 
resolution through a thoroughly theological alethiology in which God is named as truth. This 
section provides an overview of their proposals and engages in a brief analysis of each before 
finally highlighting two points significant for this study. First, each agrees with this study’s 
contention that discussion of God as truth has been unduly neglected in recent theological 
discourse; and, second, this study makes a unique contribution when it employs an approach of 
retrieving the ancient understanding of God as truth that is distinct from the methodologies 
employed in these three projects. 
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Hans Urs von Balthasar 
 
Hans Urs von Balthasar is known for his multi-volume theological reflection on three 
divine transcendentals: beauty (re-characterised as glory), goodness (re-characterised as drama), 
and truth. By divine transcendentals, he understands God to essentially be beauty, goodness, and 
truth, and creatures to be capable of being called beautiful, good, and true only by analogy to 
God. The trilogy explicates these transcendentals throughout, with the most sustained treatment 
of God as truth in three volumes titled Theo-logic.79  
In Balthasar’s account, the idea of transcendentals had been dismissed in the late modern 
era. The positivism of his day, he says, was constitutionally opposed to transcendentals of being 
and similar concepts, a rejection made all the easier by Kant’s earlier emptying of the once 
venerable ideas.80  Balthasar goes on to say that ‘ever since Nietzsche’ there has been a 
‘hollowing out of the transcendentals’ to the point that anyone who looks directly at all the 
‘falsehood, malice, ugliness’ and so forth that humanity has inflicted on the world, is left with no 
choice but to ‘dismiss the idea that being is true, good, and beautiful as hopeless.’81  Balthasar is 
attempting to respond to this banishment of the transcendentals. In the absence of 
transcendentals, Balthasar sees a number of questions have grown around truth itself, and ‘one of 
these constantly recurring questions is the question: Does truth in fact exist?’.82  
Balthasar’s ‘General Introduction’ and ‘Introduction’ to Theo-logic contend that the sense 
of a God named Truth has been lost and that it would be beneficial to recover it, integrating it 
into one’s understanding of truth overall. He articulates his own understanding that God 
undergirds man’s faith in the transcendentals: ‘It is God then who secures the transcendentals 
against all the assaults of human freedom—however much ruin this freedom might cause.’83 A 
form of the idea that God is truth is at play in his thought, as the transcendentals are grounded in 
God’s being and he wishes to have all discussion of worldly truth leave a door open to the 
infinite.  
 
79 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Volume I: Truth of the World, trans. Adrian J. 
Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000);  ——, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Volume II: Truth of 
God, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004); and ——, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical 
Theory: Volume III: The Spirit of Truth, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005). 
80 Balthasar, Theo-Logic I, 15-6. 
81 Ibid., 16. 
82 Ibid., 23-24. 
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Balthasar’s methodology for theological recovery begins with philosophy. At the 
beginning of the Theo-logic, he indicates philosophy’s indispensable role in his project, saying,  
 
From the first to last, the trilogy is keyed to the transcendental qualities of being, 
in particular to the analogy between their status and form in creaturely being, on 
the one hand, and in Divine Being, on the other. … By its very nature, theological 
insight into God’s glory, goodness, and truth presupposes an ontological, not 
merely formal or gnosological, infrastructure of worldly being. Without 
philosophy, there can be no theology.84 
 
Balthasar describes his ‘preliminary philosophical work’ as being in the form of a ‘renewed 
phenomenology that gazes upon the truth of the world in an original act of beholding. This 
phenomenology will serve theology best.’85 What he later describes as ‘an immanent 
phenomenology of worldly truth’ serves as the methodological foundation of his theology and 
appears to be greatly indebted to Martin Heidegger.86  
Balthasar’s affinity to Heidegger is widely observed, and the similarity in his 
understanding of truth has been specifically noted.87 There are obvious parallels between 
Heidegger’s account of truth and Balthasar’s subsequent formulation, as they both etymologise 
alētheia to portray a dynamic of concealing and unconcealing/revealing, with a central role given 
to mystery and freedom.88 Of course, Balthasar’s elaborations and conclusions are not identical 
with Heidegger. Balthasar spends the first volume of Theo-logic expounding his philosophical 
foundation, while Volume II is mainly concerned with Jesus Christ as truth and Volume III with 
the Holy Spirit. In this way, the structure of his works reflect his methodology, which begins 
with continental philosophy (specifically phenomenology in a Heideggarian form) and then 
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Bruce Marshall states that his motivation for writing Trinity and Truth89 was his 
conviction that ‘a genuinely theological account of truth and epistemic justification needs to be 
robustly Trinitarian.’90 In this, he differs from the reformed epistemologists discussed earlier, 
who seem generally satisfied to let a received philosophical sense of truth stand, even as they 
query and revise justification and warrant. Nonetheless, similar to the reformed epistemologists, 
Bruce Marshall sets out in Trinity and Truth to ask ‘what it is for Christian beliefs to be truth’ by 
engaging analytic thought.91 His rationale for this philosophical partnership is not unlike 
Balthasar’s, when he says  
 
This book’s engagement with analytic philosophy of language aims not to provide 
a philosophical basis for Christian beliefs, but to make theological use of some of 
the best available reflection on the topic at hand. It strives to turn an important 
body of text and argument to specifically theological purposes – to follow, in 
short, the scriptural injunction to “take every thought captive to obey Christ” (ii 
Cor. 10:5).92 
 
After careful consideration over a number of chapters, Marshall determines that on 
analytic truth-theory, a ‘Tarski-Davidson’ account of truth, is ‘the most plausible outcome 
currently available of the long philosophical debate about what truth is.’93 He then attempts to 
square this with the biblical assertions (as he interprets them) that ‘ “is the truth” is a genuine 
predicate of both Jesus Christ (see John 14:6) and of the Holy Spirit (see 1 John 5:6).’94 In his 
truth theory, he does consider God to be truth, in that he speaks at length about Jesus and the 
Spirit as being themselves truth, and he describes a metaphysical situation where the persons of 
the Trinity undergird almost all truth. His result is that the Tarski-Davidson account is ‘left-
 
89 Bruce D. Marshall, Trinity and Truth (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
90 Ibid., xi. 
91 Ibid., 6. 
92 Ibid., 14. 
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intact’ and to it he adjoins a supplement, a theological expansion, which renders ‘truth’ as an 
intelligible predicate for the second and third persons of the Trinity.95  
He portrays a Trinitarian dynamic in which all three persons of the trinity are involved in 
making the sentence/proposition ‘Jesus is risen’ a true one that an individual may hold. He even 
explains how correspondence within the Trinity may be extended to persons in general, as 
follows: ‘If correspondence to the Father is itself identity-constituting and non-contingent for the 
Son, then “truth” belongs, in a sense, to God’s own identity, in the form of the Word’s perfect 
correspondence to the Father whose total reality he expresses.’96 Marshall then extends this idea 
to (almost) all true statements, on account of their participation in divinity. He excludes true 
statements about evil things, which can have no participation in God. True statements which are 
about evil things retain applicability of the Tarski-Davidson theory of truth without the 
Trinitarian expansion.  
Upon closer examination, it emerges that some truths are not divine, that God as a whole 
is not considered to be truth, only the second and third persons, and that Marshall has not so 
much developed a theory of truth grounded in God, but rather that he has adopted a ‘Tarski-
Davidson’ understanding of truth (as he calls it) and then explicated its metaphysical 
repercussions if ‘Jesus is risen’ were considered to be true in this sense. The conclusion of his 
speculation is that God is instrumental in humans coming to know (most) truths and that the 
Tarski-Davidson view of propositional truth can be applied metaphorically to the second and 
third persons of the Trinity. At the end of the day, the Tarski-Davidson theory of truth is ‘left-
intact.’97 Holding God to be truth does not affect the initial divinity-free definition of what 
constitutes truth.   
  
John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock 
 
The third exception to the present-day lacuna around approaching God as truth is Truth in 
Aquinas98 by John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock. They too see a gap in theology regarding 
God as truth, and they seek to fill it. Yet unlike Marshall (whom they strongly criticise) and 
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Balthasar (of whom they make no explicit use), Pickstock and Milbank do not set out to draw on 
contemporary philosophy. They instead turn to Aquinas99 as the main resource for their proposal. 
Their stated motivation is straightforward, for there has been nothing less than a ‘crisis of truth’: 
 
One can detect four main attitudes toward truth in contemporary thought. The first 
is a doubt as to the possibility of truth altogether; the second is a confinement of 
truth to practice rather than theory; the third, a confinement of truth to theory 
rather than practice, but a theory so esoteric that only a tiny minority is privy to it; 
the fourth promotes, in the face of the first attitude, a fideistic affirmation of some 
religious truth or other. 
 
 After presenting their view of the weaknesses of each position, they employ ‘a new reading of 
Aquinas’ understanding of truth’ to address these shortcomings in contemporary thought.100  
Where Marshall and Balthasar begin with philosophy and add a theological expansion 
(noting that they believe their philosophical material is inherently open to such expansion), 
Pickstock and Milbank design their view of truth to be entirely theological, in contrast to modern 
truth-theories:  
 
So whereas for modern correspondence theories and some other theories such as 
coherence theory and diagonalization, one first has a theory of truth and then 
might or might not apply it to theology, for Aquinas, truth is theological without 
remainder.101 
 
Their result is to integrate God at all levels. All modes of being are true only in reference to the 
divinity, for ‘truth is also a property of all finite modes of being insofar as they participate in 
 
99 Their reading of Aquinas is distinctive (cf.: William Wood, ‘Thomas Aquinas on the Claim that God is Truth,’ 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 51/1 (January 2013) 21-47; Paul J. DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy: a 
critical inquiry (New York: Routledge, 2014). This study limits its observations to methodological structure and 
motivation of Truth in Aquinas and does not weigh in on debates over Thomistic interpretation. 
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God.’102 Similarly, even a person’s judgments as to the correspondence between one created 
object and another involves God. As they explain, 
 
For when the human intellect receives into itself the species of the material 
substances it knows, it does not know them in the manner of an arraignment of 
inert facts. Rather, it must always judge or discern whether they are true to 
themselves. This means that even corresponding to finite objects is really only a 
corresponding to the Mind of God.103  
 
Consequently, to them the incarnation, paradigmatically encountered through the 
Eucharist, is the only way to regain the divine contact that genuine knowledge requires.104 Christ 
and liturgical participation are crucial for redeeming one’s cognitive faculties from the 
deleterious effects of the fall.   
 
For Thomas Aquinas, in a post-lapsarian economy, the Incarnation is the sole 
ground for the restoration of our participation in the divine understanding. 
Consequently, for us, not only are things true only as participating in God; also 
they are only true as conjoined to the body of the incarnate Logos. Aquinas 
therefore insists that, besides being sole bearer of grace to us, Christ is alone our 
reliable teacher, who restores for us also truth and knowledge.105 
 
It is readily apparent that Pickstock and Milbank have presented a thoroughly theological 




Considered together, the accounts of ‘God as truth’ in Balthasar, Marshall and Pickstock 
and Milbank are noteworthy for the current study in two respects. First, each concurs with this 
 
102 Ibid., 9. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 53. 
105 Ibid., 52. 
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study's contention that there has been insufficient consideration of the significance of God as 
truth. Second, consideration of their various methodologies helps to highlight the distinctive 
methodology of this study.  
This study adopts a rather different methodology from Balthasar and Marshall, both of 
whom are methodologically dependent on insights drawn from secular philosophy. Balthasar 
begins with continental philosophy (specifically phenomenology in a Heideggarian form) and 
then expands to draw on explicitly Christian theological sources; Marshall adopts an account of 
truth drawn from analytic philosophy and accords this Tarski-Davidson theory great importance 
in shaping his own theological account of truth. As Sain notes in her article comparing their 
accounts, this dependence shapes their different resulting proposals for understanding God as 
truth.106 Without examining whether the resultant theology is compromised by this philosophical 
background, it is enough to note that Balthasar and Marshall seek to revivify the theological 
discussion of truth with methodologies significantly dependent upon secular philosophical 
discourse. While valuing both thinkers’ contributions to the theological discussion of truth, this 
study proceeds in a methodologically distinctive manner. It is theologically and biblically 
grounded in a way intended to be avoid dependence upon any particular modern philosophical 
approach to truth and thus be accessible to all such approaches. 
In contrast, Pickstock and Milbank ground their exploration of truth in a theological 
source: the writing of Aquinas. Like this study, they are attempting to retrieve a pre-modern 
understanding for contemporary circumstances. On the other hand, this study chooses different 
source material, grounding itself in the Biblical text and drawing on a late antique rather than 
medieval theologian. Rather than engaging in further comparison, though, I feel it better to let 
my own methodology speak for itself; it is to this task that I now turn.                 
 
I.5 Methodology for Constructive Theology       
 
Presently, the nature and even existence of truth has become an open question in both 
continental and analytic philosophy. Though the pre-modern understanding of God as truth has 
been largely overlooked, the previous section explored three exceptions to this forgetfulness. 
This study employs a markedly different methodology from these three, as detailed in this 
 
106 Sain, 274. 
   
 41 
section. Our aim is a Christian constructive theology of God as truth, one which is congruent 
with the Bible, congruent with the Nicene Creed, and informed by Christian tradition. Rather 
than beginning with contemporary philosophy or medieval theology, this study turns to the 
ancient origins of Truth as a divine name, giving special attention to Augustine and the Old 
Testament in the hope that those who recognise the truth-fraught state of contemporary Christian 
belief and practice will be interested in a constructive retrieval of an ancient Christian approach 
to truth. This study’s attempt to correct the neglect of an ancient and formerly prominent 
approach to truth is unlike any that have gone before, and the remainder of this chapter 
elaborates the method through which my constructive theological proposal will be advanced.     
 
The Choice of Source Material 
 
One guiding commitment of this study’s constructive theology is this: if Christianity has 
genuine insight into God, and truth has become a problem, theologians should return to the 
earliest encounters and see what can be learned there regarding the nature of truth.  
The first ancient resource from which I will draw is Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE). 
The choice of Augustine is made for a number of reasons. He is a seminal figure and ecumenical 
figure, one of the most influential theologians in the entire Christian tradition and one who both 
Roman Catholics and Protestants recognise as a central theological resource while the Orthodox 
Church holds him in reverence. Another reason for taking up Augustine is that he speaks about 
God as truth explicitly and at great length, including in the three texts we will examine: On the 
Free Choice of the Will, Confessions, and The Trinity. These works vary greatly in genre, topic, 
and chronology within Augustine’s corpus, indicating that the topic held lasting significance and 
interest for Augustine. This vein in his thought, however, has been unduly neglected. No major 
study on the notion of God as truth in Augustine exists. Finally, I have been drawn to Augustine’s 
understanding of God as truth because of the consonance of his writing I see in the scriptures, 
which has lead me to believe it has more biblical resonances than are usually acknowledged. 
Indeed, on the level of historical theology, I would argue that in addition to the central role in his 
writings for God as ‘Truth’—even to the extent of using ‘Truth’ as a divine name—it is possible 
that Augustine brings to fruition ideas that spring from deeply biblical roots. For these reasons, 
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although other theologians could well be used, this study selects to analyse Augustine as a source 
of conceptual parameters for a constructive theology of Truth. 
The second resource for my constructive theology of truth is the most ancient, central, 
and authoritative texts in the Christian tradition: those codified as the Bible. For ecumenical 
reasons, I will limit my investigation to books which all Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and 
Protestant Christians include in their Bibles, which in practice means overlooking the deutero-
canonical or apocryphal books, though I believe they would further substantiate a number of my 
findings. Because of space limitations, I will not be able to give the entire biblical canon its due 
attention. I have chosen to focus on the Old Testament for the following reason. Even though the 
New has priority in the sense that its testament to the revelation of God in Christ is the sine qua 
non of the Christian faith, the Old Testament has its own priority in the sense that the revelation 
of the New cannot be properly understood without first taking into account the revelation of the 
Old. It is the one God Yahweh who is revealed in Christ. Thus, I believe that the New 
Testament’s treatment of truth and divinity will not be properly understood if its grounding in the 
Old Testament is not established from the outset.  
A lack of explicit attention given to the New Testament, however, does not mean that it is 
inconsequential for this study. On the contrary, it will have an indirect but decisive influence. As 
will be explained below, this study’s methodology includes a self-imposed requirement that the 
final constructive theology be congruent with the Nicene Creed. As a result, its constructive 
theology will be fully in keeping with what the early Church took to be the heart of the gospel 
conveyed by the New Testament. This will be further reinforced by the influence of Augustine on 
this study, for he surely was deeply informed by what he found in the New Testament scriptures. 
An examination of the New Testament similar to Chapter III’s examination of the Old will have 
to wait for another time, but the final proposal will be no less congruent with scripture as a result.  
The order of chapters is not meant to imply that Augustine’s texts are given priority over 
Biblical ones, which is expressly not the method of this study. The progression from Augustine to 
the Old Testament is solely for convenience of reading and ease of comprehension. For this 
study, the Old Testament is more challenging source material than Augustine’s writings, because, 
unlike them, the Old Testament does not engage in explicit and sustained alethiology. It does, 
nonetheless, speak frequently and at length about truth and divinity. We saw at the outset of this 
chapter that alethiology lies implicit within epistemology and scholarship, that is to say, pursuits 
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of truth and knowledge. Since the Bible deals with matters of truth and knowledge, it necessarily 
has implicit elements of alethiology. I have devised a methodology to discern them for the 
purposes of constructive theology, and will apply it to both biblical and Augustinian texts. The 




This study is a work in constructive theology, not historical theology. Hence, Chapter IV 
will present an ‘Augustinian’ and ‘biblical’ view of God as truth, not ‘Augustine’s view’ or ‘the 
Bible’s view’. The aim is not to lay out precisely what Augustine or the biblical authors and 
community thought about truth (though that is a study eminently worthy of scholarly attention). 
It is instead to explore how, by drawing on Augustine’s thought extensively alongside the core 
features of the Bible (identified with the eyes of modern scholarship), these may then be 
renovated and extended for present-day application.  
I do this with the aid of a mechanism that is, in its specific working, novel, although I 
believe deeply in keeping with the logic of creedal Christianity. This is the mechanism of 
‘conceptual parameters’:  
 
Conceptual parameters, as they are defined in this thesis, differ from concepts in that 
conceptual parameters set out boundaries or essential traits for what are acceptable and 
unacceptable approaches when treating a given topic, whereas concepts treat a given topic by 
specifying its content, meaning they go further than conceptual parameters by fully detailing the 
topic.  
 
Conceptual parameters may accordingly themselves be concepts, but they do not amount 
to a complete conceptual schema for the matter at hand. Allow me to illustrate the distinction 
with the concept of a very concrete activity: doing the dishes. One conceptual parameter for the 
topic how to do the dishes is ‘At the end, all cutlery and crockery must be free of food and 
grease.’ This specifies criteria which must be accounted for by any concept of doing dishes. If 
one wanted a specific concept of the topic doing the dishes, it could be ‘Stack the dishes by the 
sink; Fill the sink with hot soapy water; Wet a sponge; etc. . . .’  Another equally viable 
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possibility of a concept is ‘Stack the dishes in the dishwasher; add detergent; etc. . . .’ The 
concepts of washing dishes by hand and of running a dishwasher are non-identical, but each 
satisfy the conceptual parameters for giving an account of doing the dishes. 
A more theological example of how conceptual parameters function involves the Nicene 
Creed.107 One could say that the Nicene Creed provides conceptual parameters for one’s concept 
of the Trinity, without specifying the full metaphysical content of that doctrine. For instance, 
from the creed, one may draw the conceptual parameter that any Trinitarian-concept must hold 
that there is one God (developed from the text ‘we believe in one God, the Father almighty’) and 
a second parameter that the Father and the Son must each be considered to be God as well 
(developed from the text ‘and in one lord Jesus Christ … begotten of the Father … very God of 
very God’). The Nicene Creed does not provide a concept for how to satisfy these two 
parameters and gives no theologically rigorous account of Trinitarian relations. Augustine’s The 
Trinity is one theologian’s attempt to give a theologically rigorous account of the Trinitarian 
relations. Karl Rahner’s The Trinity108 is another attempt, one which differs significantly from 
Augustine’s. Despite their differences, both intend their constructive theological proposals to 
remain within (what I call the conceptual parameters of) the Nicene Creed. It is a task of 
constructive theology to propose an approach to Trinitarian relations which is theologically 
rigorous and congruent with the creed’s conceptual parameters. Just as there is some variety 
among orthodox Trinitarian theologies, so too there may be multiple theological accounts of truth 
which accord with the conceptual parameters developed from Augustine’s corpus and biblical 
texts. My final conceptual schema will be one possibility.  
Note that discerning conceptual parameters is in itself a constructive act. Discerning 
conceptual parameters from ancient texts is not an exercise in reconstructing ancient biblical or 
theological concepts per se. The latter is a historical project. Establishing the concepts held by 
historical individuals or peoples should involve investigating their entire context, not simply 
their texts, including personal, social, cultural, and political contexts. For instance, attempting to 
establish what the individuals present at the Council of Nicaea had in mind is a historical 
question while attempting to establish what guidelines or essential traits it provides for 
constructive Trinitarian theology is another. Of course, one may consider the historical context as 
 
107 From the First Council of Constantinople (381), also called the Niceno-Constantinopoltan Creed, as distinguished 
from the Creed adopted at Nicaea in 325. 
108 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Seabury Press, 1974). 
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one develops conceptual parameters, but this is not the same as determining precisely what 
conceptual schemas were on the mind of ancient authors and worshipping communities. Clearly, 
Augustine and Rahner’s mature works conceptualise the Trinity differently from the Nicaean 
delegates, in that they implement conceptual schemas (such as Rahner’s well-known comparison 
of the economic and immanent Trinity) which are highly unlikely to have been explicitly 
discussed at Nicaea. Nevertheless, both are congruent with the Nicene Creed. Discerning Nicene 
conceptual parameters is a constructive theologian’s attempt to determine what it would take for 
any future constructive theology to be congruent with the Nicene Creed.  
How one discerns and develops conceptual parameters from a given text depends upon 
the theologian’s question or topic of inquiry as well as upon the nature of the text under 
consideration. In this study, there are two distinguishable sources for conceptual parameters: 
textual meaning and sense relations. Textual meaning is taken from the interpretation of 
individual passages themselves. For example, if we consider again the Nicene Creed, one 
textual-meaning based parameter is ‘There is one God’, a parameter derived from the textual 
meaning of the opening phrase ‘I believe in one God’. Multiple passage may corroborate a single 
content-based parameter. Developing conceptual parameters from textual meaning requires one 
interpret the relevant passages.  
Sense relations are the boundaries and relationships among different senses of terms in a 
given text. For instance, if the English word ‘bank’ cannot simultaneously mean both a riverside 
and a financial institution in a single utterance, this indicates that there is a complete division 
between these two senses, meaning that they are conceptually distinct. Sense relations supply 
parameters as well because they are essentially conceptual boundaries, which are a form of 
conceptual parameter. Parameters based on sense relations are determined from the meaningful 
content of multiple passages taken together. In this way, they are inductively gathered from the 
textual meaning. While textual meaning is explicit, sense relations are usually implicit in a text 
and are identified after the textual meaning of many passages has been interpreted. To develop 
the Nicene example, Jesus Christ is said to be ‘eternally begotten of the Father’ and ‘the only 
Son of God . . . God from God.’ If Father and Son are distinguished such that one is ‘begotten 
of’, ‘of’, and ‘from’ the other, the meaningful content implies that there is a distinction in sense 
between the Father and Son. Thus, one has the conceptual parameter that any concept of the 
Trinity must distinguish between the Father and the Son, rather than fully conflate them, despite 
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their both being called ‘God’ and even ‘of one being.’ ‘Sense relations’ is a term I have borrowed 
from cognitive linguistics, a field on which I draw extensively in my study of the Old Testament, 
whose benefits will be explained in Chapter III. 
Our Augustinian conceptual parameters will be developed from textual meaning whereas 
our biblical conceptual parameters will be developed from both textual meaning and sense 
relations in the Old Testament. Historical theology, biblical scholarship, and cognitive linguistics 
will be consulted as appropriate where this thesis interprets the textual meaning and sense 
relations of a given text. There are further discussions of the specific approach to Augustine’s 
texts and the Bible at the beginning of their chapters (II and III). Similarly, the question of how 
multiple conceptual parameters may be combined into a constructive theological proposal will be 
addressed at the beginning of Chapter IV, which endeavours to do just that. For now, allow me to 
note that for clarity and ease of comprehension, the conceptual parameters developed in Chapters 
II and III will each be given a letter and loose title (e.g. (a) understanding God as truth; (b) the 
human apprehension of divine truth, etc.). They are designated with letters rather than numbers 
to indicate that the order in which they are developed does not indicate any priority, sequence, 
contingency, or other relationship among them. The order in which I have chosen to introduce 
the conceptual parameters (and indeed the placement of the chapter on Augustine ahead of the 
chapter on the Old Testament) is merely meant to facilitate ease of comprehension in the reader, 
not to indicate anything further.  
One benefit of employing conceptual parameters is that it enables a theologian to clarify 
when s/he is speaking historically and when s/he is speaking constructively. It is not uncommon 
for a theological treatise to begin with historical theology and then gradually, seamlessly, 
transition into constructive theology, with minimal indication of when the explication of a past 
theologian’s position has ended and the elaborations of the present theologian, the extrapolation 
of its relevance, and applications for current thought or practice have begun. This can elide the 
distinction between, for instance, Augustine’s view and an Augustinian view. Some otherwise 
brilliant theological insights have been harshly criticised because they were presented as if 
historically accurate to another (usually long-departed) theologian and scholarly colleagues 
found this untenable. It would be better to say that theology is congruent with or informed by the 
work of predecessors than to elide it with one’s own constructive proposals.  
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Employing conceptual parameters also addresses the troublesome distinction between 
biblical studies and theology. The challenge has been widely recognised and numerous proposals 
made to address it.109 What is called ‘biblical theology’ has been widely criticised by text 
scholars as inappropriately pre-critical. While the question has not been settled once and for all, 
this study would hope to reclaim a critical ‘biblical theology.’ Any theological engagement with 
the Bible should be able to give an account of its own understanding of the relationship between 
biblical studies and ‘biblical theology’ thus construed. Simply put, the view of this study is as 
follows. No biblical author could have had the entire Bible in view, but a responsible biblical 
theology attempts to take it entirely into account. Thus, the conceptual schema presented by 
biblical theology cannot be identical to the conceptual schema of any given biblical text. If 
‘biblical theology’ understood itself as theology in keeping with conceptual parameters drawn 
from the Bible, the distinction between the two pursuits is more readily apparent. For most of is 
history, Biblical studies has aimed to answer historical questions about the biblical texts. The 
theologian may use these insights from biblical studies (and others from hermeneutics) as s/he 
develops conceptual parameters from the biblical text. A responsible biblical theology is then the 
development of these conceptual parameters into a constructive theological proposal.  
 
Constructing Christian Theology through being Congruent and Informed 
 
This study intends to outline a Christian theology of truth in Chapter IV. A theory of truth 
that is influenced by Christian sources, however, is not necessarily one that is itself Christian. 
Loosely speaking, non-theistic Western philosophy, Mormonism, and Islam are each (in different 
ways) informed by Christianity, but they are not congruent with Christian faith as articulated in 
the Nicene Creed. This study's methodology is designed to ensure the final proposal is defensibly 
Christian. To that end, I distinguish between being informed by a given text and being congruent 
with it. The theology of truth proposed by this study is Christian, not in the sense of being the 
one and only Christian theology of truth, but rather, in the sense that it is arguably congruent 
with both the Bible and the Nicene Creed and it is informed by the Christian tradition.      
 
109 e.g. Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the 
Christian Bible (London: SCM, 1992). 
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In my formulation, a scholarly proposal is informed by a source text when it has 
incorporated into its proposal some number of conceptual parameters developed from the source 
text. Becoming informed by a source text is a selective process, in that the scholar may reject, 
omit, or overlook aspects of the source text. A proposal may be informed by a source text while 
still disagreeing with it in some regards. If a scholarly proposal is congruent with a source text, 
however, it is not only informed but also limited by the source text (which is not the same as 
being identical with the source text). A scholarly proposal is congruent with a source text if it can 
present a case that it has not contravened the source text; that is to say there is at least one 
plausible reading of the source text with which the scholarly proposal is not in opposition.  One 
of the strengths of using the mechanism of conceptual parameters in constructive theology is 
that it facilitates transparency in the process of showing how a scholarly proposal is informed by 
and/or congruent with source texts. The burden of proof for congruency is not to demonstrate the 
scholarly proposal is identical with the source text; one need only show that it is in accord with 
conceptual parameters derived from the source text.  
I propose that, first of all, a constructive Christian theology should be congruent with the 
Bible. In this way, the congruent/informed distinction honours the special status given within 
Christianity to Scripture. The biblical conceptual parameters will inform in that they will 
contribute to the content of the final truth-theory. They will also limit it, curbing the possibilities 
of its shape, ensuring that the final truth theory remains congruent with the biblical text. In this 
way, being congruent with a source text entails being informed by it. 
Remaining congruent with our biblical conceptual parameters does not in and of itself 
ensure that our final constructive theology of truth will be a Christian one. Biblical congruence is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition as is readily apparent by the many theologies and 
spiritual practices in the course of ecclesial history which have been deemed heretical despite 
their proponents’ intention to be biblically based. Many have attempted constructive theology, 
only to find subsequently that they have gone astray in one way or another. Early Christological 
and Trinitarian controversies are recognisable examples. In response to these and other disputes, 
the on-going life of the Church has developed additional guidelines for what may or may not be 
considered orthodox Christianity. Broadly speaking, we may refer to this as the Christian 
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‘tradition’.110  A Christian theology should also be congruent with the Nicene Creed. I present the 
criterion of being creedal, in the sense of arguably congruent with the Nicene Creed, because it is 
an ecumenical creed, widely accepted by Protestants, Roman Catholics, and the Eastern 
Orthodox Churches.  
The final part of the standard for a Christian theology (after being congruent with the 
Bible and Nicene Creed) is to be informed by the Christian tradition. To that end, conceptual 
parameters may once more be adopted from a chosen theologian, liturgical practice, historical 
event, polity, and so on. One may, however, be selective and need not make use of everything. 
The selection of which part of the tradition to draw upon will, of course, depend on the matter, 
question, topic etc. at hand. This means that there is no demand to be congruent with all aspects 
of the Christian tradition, which is likely to be impossible in any case. For reasons explained 
above, I have selected three of Augustine’s theological writings to inform my constructive 
theology of truth. The Augustinian conceptual parameters we adopt will inform our constructive 
theology of truth, but we will not be limited by them; that is to say, the constructive theologian is 
free to differ with Augustine on various points, based on her/his own theological judgment. Most 
forms of Christianity allow for such selectivity and the diversity of options that results in that 
they designate certain Christian teachings as adiaphora or recognise differing spiritualities such 
that multiple spiritual disciplines (even mutually exclusive ones) are acceptable. 
In this way, constructive theology may be non-identical with its source material, bringing 
together elements from multiple sources, without compromising its Christian character. This 
project is constructive theology—rather than historical theology or biblical studies—because the 
ultimate aim is to provide a contemporary theological account. This means it will be informed by 
multiple ancient sources without being identical to any one of them. 
 
Responsible Interdisciplinary Theology 
 
Constructive Christian theology is naturally inter-disciplinary because it cannot forego 
engaging other disciplines, e.g. biblical studies, language study, ethics, intellectual history, 
ecclesial history, hermeneutics, philosophical categories, liturgical and social practices, and so 
 
110 NB: The Christian tradition’s normative role is already implicitly present in the demand for biblical congruence, 
because the biblical canon is determined by tradition. 
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forth. In this study, our goal is to excavate, as much as possible, ancient conceptual parameters. 
This thesis has no intention of drawing contemporary meanings from deracinated phrases in 
modern translations, thereby ignoring their linguistic, textual, and historical context.  
Biblical scholarship working in a historical mode or historical theology would simply aim 
to explicate the precise historical understanding of God as truth at the time when various biblical 
texts were composed or when Augustine wrote his treatises. Reconstructing a historical concept 
per se, as held by ancient individuals and communities, requires investigating their broader 
historical context and the extra-canonical record, as biblical scholars and classicists regularly do. 
My constructive theology, on the other hand, intends to provide a contemporary theological 
account which is not identical to but congruent with the biblical text and informed by 
Augustine’s corpus. For this, we do not need to reconstruct entire historical conceptual schemas 
from our ancient sources, but rather need to derive conceptual parameters. We are drawing 
directly only from the texts (not from other ancient texts, historical context, etc.) but our reading 
of the texts is historically informed.  
This may not be a work of historical theology, or of biblical studies, but it would be 
irresponsible (given our research question) not to make use of these disciplines. Relevant 
disciplines should be consulted while determining the conceptual parameters of an ancient text, 
but because we do not aim to determine the historical concept per se, we are justified in not 
drawing from sources beyond the biblical and Augustinian canons. This means, all the more, that 
the constructive theologian must engage in responsible interdisciplinary scholarship.  
To discern biblical conceptual parameters regarding understanding truth and divinity, two 
disciplines besides theology will prove invaluable: biblical studies, for its examination of biblical 
texts, and cognitive linguistics, which is uniquely well-suited for detailing the relationship 
between concepts and language use.111 To discern conceptual parameters when we turn to 
Augustine, historical theology should inform the reading of Augustine. See the opening of 
Chapter II and III for further detail on the engagement with historical theology (etc.) and biblical 
studies/cognitive linguistics.  
 
111 This study’s attention on the Bible and language use for theological ends is not in itself unique. (Its contribution 
is its method for doing so.) For instance, volume I of Katherine Sonderegger’s Systematic Theology Volume I and 
David Kelsey’s (systematically unsystematic) Eccentric Existence both make extensive use of scripture. In British 
theological sources, Janet Soskice’s Metaphor and Religions Language and Rowan Williams’ The Edge of Words 
are two stand-out works that reflect on the use of language and its impact on theology (see bibliography). 
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Because theology, by its nature, interacts with a multiplicity of fields, a competent 
theologian appropriately consults other fields when they are relevant to the theological project at 
hand. To be a scholar, not a dilettante, with non-native fields, I hold that a theologian must: (a) 
have demonstrable knowledge of the field’s basic concepts and controversies; (b) have a clear 
methodology for one’s constructive theological project and maintain/respect disciplinary 
boundaries; (c) consistently engage relevant non-native scholarship rather than cherry-pick 
support; and (d) limit oneself to drawing insights which are, if not beyond debate, at least 
respected alternatives within the non-native field. The opening of chapters on Augustine and the 
Old Testament cover (a) and (b) by presenting a clear methodology with disciplinary boundaries 
and an adequate awareness of the non-native field’s basic concepts and controversies. These 
chapters consistently apply the methodology described and live up to (c) and (d).  
Setting out conceptual parameters is the beginning of constructive theology, since it is 
already re-articulating the import of ancient texts in our own idiom. If our final theory is in line 
with ancient conceptual parameters, it may take a form that never occurred in the ancient world 
while yet also being congruent with the Bible and informed by Augustine. In this way, I will 
perform a retrieval, a ressourcement, a contemporary constructive theology that recovers and re-




Chapter I has completed the preparatory work necessary to develop a constructive 
theology of God as truth. It will be primarily a work of alethiology, which is distinguishable from 
works of epistemology or scholarship which presume that questions of truth's nature or qualities 
have already been settled. This thesis asks whether the ancient Christian approach to God as truth 
may be recovered for today, and will answer in the affirmative with its own proposal in Chapter 
IV. This approach is visible in the longstanding tradition of divine names in Christian thought, 
where naming God as truth is apparent in the works of major theologians and cardinal New 
Testament passages.  
This proposal enters an area of vigorous debate, since ‘truth’ has become a lively topic in 
philosophical circles over the past long century, both analytic and continental, resulting in a 
growing uncertainty over the nature and attainability of truth which has reached the public sphere 
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and religious discourse. Strains of Christian thought and practice have responded to renewed 
pressures to justify the truth claims and practices of the faith, but most have not approached God 
as truth, as can be seen in the disparate examples of fundamentalism, reformed epistemology and 
postliberal theology. There are three notable exceptions to the modern forgetfulness of truth as a 
divine name—Balthasar, Marshall, and Pickstock and Milbank—each with their own distinctive 
methodology and markedly different conclusions. This study shares their intuition as to the key 
importance of Truth as a divine name for Christian thought and practice (and perhaps even 
secular philosophy as well), but pursues a different route by foregrounding two ancient sources 
for its constructive proposal: selections of Augustine's corpus and the Christian Old Testament. 
Furthermore, it has developed a distinctive methodology to engage in the unavoidably 
interdisciplinary nature of its project. The result is that this study's contributions will be 
threefold: its methodology involving conceptual parameters offers a novel instrument for 
theology to constructively and respectfully engage with historical texts and adjacent fields; its 
analysis of Augustine and the Old Testament inquires into the understanding of God as Truth to 
an unprecedented extent, yielding fresh insights; and its final constructive theology of truth is a 
unique proposal among the alethiological debates in theological and philosophical spheres today.  
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Chapter II: Augustine 
 
The previous chapter covered the context of this study’s research question (‘Can the 
ancient Christian approach to God as truth be given a contemporary articulation?’) and also 
presented its novel methodology. This chapter deploys that methodology upon three of 
Augustine’s compositions. Its result is five Augustinian conceptual parameters for understanding 
truth and divinity. These parameters will be instrumental in Chapter IV’s constructive theology 
of truth.  
The first section (II.1) relates the methodology from Chapter I to Chapter II’s specific 
task and it previews the conceptual parameters advanced in this chapter. We turn to Augustine 
before the Old Testament because the conceptual parameters drawn from Augustine are more 
straightforward than those from the Bible; examining Augustine first does not give his texts 
priority ahead of the biblical canon. Sections II.2, II.3 and II.4 develop these conceptual 
parameters from examinations of On the Free Choice of the Will, The Confessions, and The 
Trinity respectively.112 First, II.2 considers Augustine’s proof of God’s existence in Free Will, 
which argues that the mind’s apprehension of truth in principles of mathematics and wisdom 
serve as the foundation. In II.3, truth’s role in the narrative portion of the Confessions comes to 
the fore—in other words, how the quest for truth undergirds Augustine’s search for God—in 
three key episodes: his reading of Hortentius (Cicero’s lost work), his vision in Milan after 
reading certain Platonist books, and his vision of the heavenly life with his mother Monica in 
Ostia. These latter two moments are visionary and yet also deeply intellectual, as his quest for 
God is also one for truth. Finally, II.4 delves into Augustine’s great work The Trinity (which vies 
with City of God for the title of his magnum opus), and here find his mature articulation of God 
as Truth and implications for the human pursuit of wisdom and knowledge. This study’s 
Augustinian conceptual parameters will be developed incrementally as each text is examined, 
accruing insight from multiple passages for each parameter. The last section II.5 draws together 
the findings of this chapter, clarifying what has gone before and solidifying its conclusions 
before Chapter III’s consideration of the Old Testament.  
 
II.1 Constructive Method and Augustine 
 
112 Abbreviated as Free Will, Confessions, and Trinity. 
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Section I.5 set out our methodology’s key terms and principles, including the nature of 
conceptual parameters, the distinction between being informed by and congruent with a source 
material, and guidelines for responsible interdisciplinary engagement. This section treats how 
these methodological elements apply to its engagement with Augustine of Hippo, including: our 
choice of texts within Augustine’s corpus; a preview of the conceptual parameters this chapter 
develops from these texts; in what sense the conceptual parameters developed here are 
Augustinian; and how being informed by Augustine’s The Trinity enables this study to be 
congruent with the Nicene Creed.  
From Augustine’s expansive corpus, this study examines Free Will, Confessions, and The 
Trinity. These texts were chosen because they explicitly treat both God as Truth itself and the 
human pursuit of truth.113 Furthermore, they represent a variety of genres and they range from 
his early to mature thought. As we shall see, understanding God as truth has a notable role in 
Augustine’s corpus. His early composition Free Will recognises the divinity of eternal truth, with 
far reaching metaphysical implications. Augustine repeatedly names God ‘Truth’ in his most 
well-known work Confessions. For him, ‘Truth’ is a divine name used in prayer and 
supplications. The mature work The Trinity treats at length the relationship of ‘Truth’ to other 
divine names, including the Trinitarian names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Despite its pre-
eminence, this study passes over City of God because it does not have extended explicit 
discussion of relevant issues. Likewise, though On Lying and Against Lying may appear relevant 
due to their titles, they too are not included because they treat the morality of lying rather than 
the nature of truth and falsehood.  
This chapter’s analysis of Augustine’s three compositions will yield five conceptual 
parameters. These conceptual parameters do not indicate categories through which the text was 
analysed. Instead, they were developed inductively from my engagement with Augustine’s text 
and secondary literature. Parameters were categorised and delineated subsequent to textual 
analysis. For clarity, I will refer to these conceptual parameters by loose titles and also letter 
them (a) to (e). By the end of the chapter the following five will have been developed:  
 
113 Since Augustine explicitly treats God and truth at great length, this chapter will look almost exclusively at textual 
meaning. Because there is notably less explicit alethiology in the Old Testament, Chapter III relies more heavily on 
analysis of word-senses and sense-relations. 
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The first conceptual parameter (a) covers what it means to understand God as truth, by 
characterising the truth of God as mathematical, wise (encompassing wisdom), and personal. The 
human apprehension of this divine truth is considered in (b), which portrays divine truth as 
apprehensible (without being subjected to the knower) yet incomprehensible to human beings, 
whose apprehension is limited, fallible, diverse, and variable. Conceptual parameter (c) finds that 
the human pursuit of truth may be characterised as benefitting and engaging the entire human 
person, constituting an on-going process of pursuit which continues, though in a changed 
manner, when God, who is revealed in Christ, is taken as truth. These first three conceptual 
parameters are developed from readings of Free Will and Confessions.  
The final two conceptual parameters are developed from The Trinity. The fourth, (d), 
concerns the Trinitarian implications of understanding God as truth, in that it delineates the 
divine name ‘Truth’ as a substantive name that applies to all three divine persons as well as the 
Godhead and is convertible with other substantive divine names. Our final conceptual parameter 
from this chapter, (e), delineates the relationship between wisdom and knowledge, such that 
human wisdom and knowledge have distinct objects (the divine and the created, respectively) 
and yet always develop in tandem, because neither is humanly possible without the other. 
Currently, these conceptual parameters no doubt appear abstruse, but their clarity will increase 
over the course of this chapter with the detailed study of Augustine’s corpus and the careful 
development of their content. 
In this study, the Augustinian conceptual parameters are meant to be closely tied to a 
reading of Augustine’s texts which scholars of Augustine would respect. In a word, this chapter’s 
conceptual parameters should be clearly Augustinian. ‘Augustinian’ is, of course, a loaded term 
that means different things to different people in different discourses. For this study, it merely 
means that a given conceptual parameter is developed from engaging with Augustine’s corpus. It 
does not necessarily mean that certain classic positions of Augustine’s thought have been taken 
on board, or that it is in keeping with a particular school of ‘Augustinian’ thought. The 
constructive theology of truth in Chapter IV is meant to be only informed by Augustine rather 
than congruent with his entire corpus. For this reason, one may neglect aspects of Augustine’s 
corpus or be at times in demonstrable disagreement with his thought, while yet being informed 
and Augustinian.  This study permissibly limits its engagement with Augustine’s corpus, since it 
does not reconstruct his full conceptual schema or its changes over time. It is sufficient to 
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determine texts which have a great deal to say to our questions and stick to them. On a 
methodological level, this means making recourse to said scholarship while interpreting the 
selected portions of Augustine’s corpus. The interpretation of Augustine will be duly informed by 
disciplines outside of constructive theology; the development of conceptual parameters is the act 
of constructive theology—they do not purport to present ‘Augustine’s view’ on a matter, but one 
influenced by Augustine.   
As already noted, conceptual parameters developed from historical source material are 
not identical with a historical concept per se. Developing a conceptual parameter from a source 
text is fundamentally an act of the constructive theologian’s judgment; it is neither a logical 
deduction nor a necessary conclusion. Furthermore, it does not claim to be a reconstructed 
historical concept (which would be the work of classicists, patristics scholars, or historical 
theologians who attend to historical material beyond the source text in question). It will, 
nonetheless, be a historically responsible interpretation of the texts in question, in that our 
reading of these texts accords with scholarship which has taken his other works, historical 
context, and intellectual influences into account.  As a result, it should be clear to the reader that 
each conceptual parameter is in some sense in keeping with the source text; in a word, they are 
Augustinian. 
A final benefit of deriving Augustinian conceptual parameters is that it will keep our final 
constructive theology congruent with the Nicene Creed and the New Testament.114 The Trinity is 
widely accepted by scholars to represent a firm defence of Nicene orthodoxy against the 
dissenters of Augustine’s day. If one were to compare the creed with the proposed constructive 
theology of truth, their congruence should be readily apparent (though this comparison will not 
be made in this thesis). Similarly, Augustine’s faithfulness to the Christ as revealed in the New 
Testament carries into his texts, a congruence which the constructive theologian intends to 
maintain as s/he develops conceptual parameters and ultimately a theology of truth. This study 
does not independently draw conceptual parameters from the New Testament, but does intend its 
conceptual parameters and constructive theology of truth to be congruent with it nonetheless. 
 
II.2 Truth and Divinity in On the Free Choice of the Will  
 
114 Congruent in the sense that every portion or aspect of it arguably in accord with a plausible interpretation of the 
Bible and the Nicene Creed. 
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 On the Free Choice of the Will115 is our first of three texts by Augustine whose 
examination will serve to develop conceptual parameters for a constructive theology of truth. 
Remarkably, this text includes a proof of God’s existence, which Augustine bases upon the 
existence of eternal truths, beginning with mathematics. Initial forms of three conceptual 
parameters will be developed from this text: (a) to understand God as truth will be illuminated 
by God’s relation with impersonal truths (including mathematical truths, wisdom, and 
incomprehensible Truth); (b) the human apprehension of the divine will receive material from the 
description of the cognitive dynamic involved when humans understand truth; and (c) the human 
pursuit of truth will be sketched out with characteristics of the ongoing pursuit of truth. These 
parameters will be further developed later in the next section II.3. A brief consideration of 
context precedes the textual analysis.  
 A careful and informed reading of the text in each instance is followed by a clear 
explication of what conceptual content is extracted from it to form conceptual parameters. Often, 
a conceptual parameter is developed over time, beginning in an embryonic form with a single 
notion and then accruing related content from multiple passages. As material is examined with 
the aid of historical theology, the constructive theologian indicates what conceptual material is 
drawn out and which conceptual parameter it adds to. This contributes greater transparency to the 
constructive theologian’s engagement with historical texts, clearly distinguishing her/his own 
judgment calls from those of historical analysis of the text in question. This study applies this 
approach throughout Chapters II and III. 
 
Historical Context and Divine Illumination    
 
Free Will is one of Augustine’s earlier compositions. He wrote Book 1 of Free Will in 
387-388, shortly after his baptism in Rome, on his way to Africa. Books 2 and 3, however, were 
not produced until he was priested in 391, possibly with revisions to Book 1 at the same time. 
The entire composition was certainly completed by 395, at which time we have evidence that 
Augustine sent a copy of it to a friend.116 This indicates that the first book was composed and the 
 
115 In this subsection, references to Free Will appear parenthetically. 
116 Peter King, ‘Introduction’, in Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other 
Writings, ed. and trans Peter King (Cambridge: CUP 2010), xvii. 
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others at least begun in Rome.117 Evodius is not named in the dialogue, but his identity is 
deduced from letter 163, and identifying the speakers as Augustine and Evodius continues in 
modern editions of the texts.118 This work has received greatest attention as Augustine’s first 
extended reflection upon the interaction between God and the human will before his contentions 
with the Pelagians developed these views into his decisively influential position on divine grace 
and human action, (though the argument for God’s existence in Book 2 has received increased 
attention in recent centuries).119 The historical context and genre of Free Will as a debate 
between two individuals presented for general edification will be kept in mind as the text is 
interpreted.  
To anyone familiar with contentious issues in Augustine scholarship, the prospect of 
investigating Augustine’s views of truth, divinity, and knowledge has no doubt brought to mind 
what many call Augustine’s ‘doctrine of divine illumination.’ How to interpret this ‘doctrine’ is a 
topic of intense debate, one which began in the medieval period and continues to the present day. 
Roland H. Nash describes it saying ‘No other important aspect of Augustine’s philosophy has 
proved as difficult to understand as the notion that God in some way illumines the human 
mind.’120 For the purposes of this constructive theological study, it is not necessary to take a 
position on which theory of divine illumination best represents Augustine’s historical views on 
epistemology. The strands of thought this study draws on are ones which others have woven into 
doctrines of illumination, but this study threads them instead into a theology of God as truth. One 
distinctive result is that Free Will, which tends not to be the source of key texts in discussions of 
theories of divine illumination, is discovered to have obvious and central relevance for this 
project.       
 
The Argument for God’s Existence 
 
Free Will is essentially a theodicy which justifies God’s goodness, the existence of evil 
notwithstanding, through an account of humanity’s free will. Looking past the defence of God’s 
 
117 Giovanni Capatano, ‘De libero arbitrio’, in Karla Pollman, Willmien Otten, et al. eds., The Oxford Guide to the 
Historical Reception of Augustine, 2 vols. (Oxford: OUP 2013), i, 328. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ronald H. Nash, ‘Illumination, Divine,’ in Allan D. Fitzgerald et al. eds., Augustine through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 438. 
   
 59 
justice, our focus is on one embedded argument in Book 2; it purports to demonstrate that God 
exists and its reasoning hinges upon God being truth itself, a thick sense of truth which 
incorporates both mathematical principles and principles of wisdom. For the sake of clarity, this 
subsection reviews the proof’s full argumentative arc. The subsections that follow perform close 
readings from which conceptual parameters are drawn. 
Augustine’s proof of God’s existence sits within a larger discussion of evil’s existence in 
the world. Book 1 opens with Evodius asking Augustine ‘Please tell me whether God is not the 
author of evil.’ (1.1.1.1). From this opening, their discussions in Book 1 also query ‘what is 
evil?’ (1.3.6), and ‘whence do we do evil?’ (1.2.4), to which they answer that evil is ‘turning 
from divine to temporal things’ (1.16.34) and humans do this ‘by free choice of the will’ 
(1.16.35).121 Book 2 concerns itself with whether God should be held morally responsible for the 
evil that humans do with the free choice that God gave them; it opens with Evodius’ request, 
‘Now if possible, explain to me why God gave human beings free choice of the will. If we had 
not received it, we surely would not be able to sin.’ (2.1.1.1). Augustine offers to answer this 
question by addressing three distinct issues:  
 
[1] How is it clear that God exists? 
[2] Do all things, insofar as they are good, come from God? 
[3] Is free will to be counted among these goods? (2.3.7.20) 
 
This study focuses on point [1], Augustine’s demonstration of God’s existence, summarised 
below. Book 2 next addresses points [2] and [3], arguing as follows: God is only responsible for 
granting humans the good of a free will, while it is one’s own responsibility for having used 
one’s free will for evil. The evil act itself is inexplicable because evil is an unknowable and 
inexplicable privation.122 In this way, Book 2 resolves the crux of theodicy raised by Book 1, 
leaving Book 3 to answer questions raised by the solution regarding God’s foreknowledge and 
the distinction between necessity and nature. 
Augustine’s argument for God’s existence—that is, his response to point [1]—may be 
summarised as follows. Evodius, Augustine’s friend and interlocutor, says he believes that God 
 
121 Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical significance of ‘De Libero 
Arbitrio’ (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 51. 
122 Ibid. 
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exists but wishes to understand, to see clearly that it is so (2.2.5.12). Together, they establish a 
burden of proof for demonstrating God’s existence. ‘I ask you,’ Augustine invites Evodius, ‘if 
you find nothing above our reason except what is eternal and unchangeable, will you hesitate to 
say that this is God?’ (2.6.14.55). Evodius agrees, saying ‘I will plainly admit that this being, to 
which we agree none is superior, is God.’ (2.6.14.56).  
After further dialogue over the nature and relative superiority of various sense 
perceptions and mental faculties, Evodius proposes that ‘the intelligible structure and truth of 
number’ (2.8.20.80) fits their criteria: the truth of number is superior to human reason, eternal, 
and unchangeable. Augustine elaborates Evodius’ idea as follows: an object many people see 
must exist independently of their visual faculties. By the same logic, number’s intelligible 
structure and truth [ratio et veritas] must be independent of the many humans with rational 
faculties who perceive it. This is apparent because if it were otherwise (e.g. if people each had 
our own unique individual idea of number) then one person could never persuade another that a 
mathematical exercise had been done incorrectly by appealing to commonly recognised 
mathematical truths. Yet, people can correct maths homework and settle numerical 
disagreements, and they do so by appealing to a consistent and commonly available sense of 
number’s truth and structure, something distinct and distinguishable from our own fallible 
understandings of it. Unlike the changeable things one sees and hears, however, the truth of 
number appears to be permanent and unalterable: while one can comprehend, conceptualise, and 
apply numbers with greater or lesser accuracy, the human rational faculty has no ability to alter 
the nature or properties of number itself. One cannot make 1+1 = 3. It appears that mathematical 
truth is unchanging and eternal. Thus, Augustine says the truth of number ‘remains pure and 
unchangeable, and is seen in common by all who reason’ (2.8.24.93). 
Augustine then offers another example of his own, turning to ‘the truth’ he calls ‘wisdom’ 
(sapientia), and runs the same line of argumentation. Just as rational minds possess an awareness 
of number, so too, he says, are minds aware of wisdom (2.9.26.102-3)—by which he means that 
all people sense that there are ways to live well that seek happiness, and ways to live that neither 
seek nor attain this end. Evodius at first objects, pointing out that individuals vary greatly in their 
conception and application of wisdom. He eventually concedes, however, that wisdom does have 
certain clear principles (for example, that individuals ought to seek justice and that equals should 
be compared to equals). These principles of wisdom are like mathematical principles—any 
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rational mind that understands principles of wisdom will recognise their truth (2.10.29.116). For 
this reason, Augustine concludes that ‘just as there are true and unchangeable rules of numbers, 
whose intelligible structure and truth you declare … so too are there true and unchangeable rules 
of wisdom’(2.10.29.119). 
At this point, Augustine sums up their discussion, saying ‘It is certainly evident that 
[wisdom and number are] each true, and unchangeably true. Consequently, you will not deny that 
there is unchangeable truth, containing everything that is unchangeably true’(2.12.33.130). 
Evodius agrees that Augustine has shown that when the human mind makes judgments it 
regularly appeals to truths of number and wisdom. Such truth is evidently distinct from human 
reason; human rational faculties are limited, prone to error, and changeable but this truth is 
unchanging and commonly perceivable. Thus, eternal supra-mental truth exists.  
Is this truth God, the divine who has no superior? If human reason appeals to eternal truth 
when making judgments, then the mind treats such truth as its superior. Augustine and Evodius 
have agreed that God has no superiors, that human reason is the apex of thinking living things, 
and finally, that this mind-independent, eternal, unchanging Truth is superior to human reason. 
Thus, by Augustine’s burden of proof, this superior eternal Truth whose existence is undeniable 
cannot be anything else except God. The only disproof could be demonstrating that there is 
something yet superior to eternal truth, that would then be God.    
 
Hierarchy and the Eternal God; Augustine’s Burden of Proof   
 
The first thought which begins (but does not complete) conceptual parameter (a) is that 
God is eternal, meaning that God is not limited by time or space, unlike all that is not God, which 
is limited by time and/or space and thus is changeable (including human reason). This partial 
parameter is developed from Augustine and Evodius’ discussion concerning the burden of proof 
to prove that God exists.   
Even the skeptic who doubts everything, Augustine begins, cannot doubt that s/he exists, 
is alive, and has understanding even in the midst of doubt. From this triad—existence-life-
intelligence (esse-vivere-intellegere)—Augustine establishes an ascending hierarchical relation 
within existence.123 When asked, Evodius agrees that things which have all three traits—
 
123 Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987), 178. 
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existence, life, and understanding—are superior to those which have only one or two (2.3.7.22-
4). Hence humans are superior to irrational animals who are superior to inanimate objects.  
Augustine next describes a hierarchy of judgment within the human person in which 
reason/mind/spirit is the apex. Augustine’s sense of reason [ratio] in Free Will is not a narrowly 
understood notion standing in contradistinction to consciousness, emotion, will, or similar 
cognitive categories—ones from which it has been distinguished in many of the 
Enlightenment/post-enlightenment works which condition modern thought on the topic of 
reason. Augustine says that by reason he means ‘something like the ‘head’ or ‘eye’ of our soul—
or whatever term is more suitable for reason and intelligence—which animal nature does not 
have’(2.6.13.53). As he explained in Book 1, ‘That by which humans are ranked above animals, 
whatever it is, be it more correctly called “mind” or “spirit” or both — we find both terms in 
Scripture — if it dominates and commands the rest of what a human consists in, then that human 
being is completely in order,’(1.8.18.61). Clearly, the identification, specification, and division of 
the soul is not Augustine’s driving concern in this dialogue, so we too shall refrain from placing 
too much weight on how ratio is distinguished from mind and spirit. It is imperative to note, 
however, a) that while reason is not bodily it is still temporal, which is to say, changeable 
(2.6.14.55), and b) that reason’s superiority does not result from its ability to understand; the 
object of understanding is not necessarily inferior or subject to the mind. O’Daly succinctly 
explains the significance of these two principles: 
 
 Augustine stresses the principle that understanding need not be superior to that 
which is understood, as well as the mutability of reason, because he wishes to 
demonstrate that the divine eternal immutability is both superior to human reason 
and yet can be known by it, or . . .  that something higher than our reason 
necessarily exists, i.e., God.124    
  
Following O’Daly’s reading, Augustine’s burden of proof for God’s existence builds upon the 
supposition that something which is not subject to time (it is eternal and unchanging) is superior 
to that which is; the constancy of eternal things is superior to the changeability of temporal 
things. Having established reason (broadly construed) as the apex of human existence (superior 
 
124 O’Daly, 179. 
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to one’s brute life and dumb materiality), Augustine proceeds to outline his burden of proof for 
the existence of God.   
Specifically, if one were to show something to be reason’s superior, then it would be 
higher than all else in creation, which would be what one calls God, superior to all. Augustine 
explicitly takes up immutability as a mark of superiority: 
 
Suppose that reason sees something eternal and unchangeable through itself, 
without recourse to any bodily organ … Reason must then admit itself to be 
inferior, and the eternal and unchangeable being [that it sees] to be its God. 
(2.6.14.56) 
 
Augustine asks Evodius, ‘If you find nothing above our reason except what is eternal and 
unchangeable, will you hesitate to say that this is God?’ (2.6.14.55). Evodius agrees to this 
burden of proof, saying ‘I will plainly admit that this being, to which we agree none is superior, 
is God.’ (2.6.14.56). As Harrison summarises, 2.6.14 has established a sufficient condition for 
demonstrating God’s existence: ‘show that there is something (eternal) superior to our reason. 
Either this is God, or this implies God as its superior.’125 
Augustine clarifies his argumentative goal with an analogy (2.7.15.9—2.7.19.72) 
between the senses’ perception of sensible objects and mind’s perception of something superior 
to itself (what are later called eternal truth). King neatly draws out the importance of Augustine’s 
comparison of our sensory perception of objects beyond our bodies with our awareness of 
number and wisdom: 
 
 Just as we believe that a sensible object exists because it is publicly accessible to 
our distinct individual senses – you and I can both see it – so too we should 
conclude that an “intelligible” object exists because it is publicly accessible to our 
distinct individual minds, in that you and I can both conceive it. … Mathematical 
truths are true whatever we may think about them, no matter how much we might 
want them to be otherwise. Augustine thus concludes that truth is “higher” than 
 
125 Harrison, 157. 
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our minds. Hence something higher than our minds exists, which either is or is a 
part of God.126    
 
That which remains commonly perceptible and unassimilated must exist in itself without being 
made subject or rendered inferior. For this reason—they seek something superior to human 
reason rather than assimilated and subjected to it—Evodius and Augustine ask themselves, ‘Do 
we find anything that all reasoning beings, each one using his own reason or mind, see in 
common? That is, something that is present to all, but is not changed into the [private] use of 
those to whom it is present … it remains incorrupt and intact whether they see it or not’ 
(2.8.20.79). In this way, their understanding of creaturely hierarchy and the eternal God 
generates their burden of proof for God’s existence. 
Before proceeding further with our close reading, let us gather up what will be an 
embryonic element for conceptual parameter (a) (which will come to be called understanding 
God as truth in due course). Specifically, this details a fundamental distinction between God, 
who is eternal, and all of creation, which is bodily and temporal (bounded by time and space). 
Two ideas in our close reading speak to this.  
First, we have seen the dialogue elaborate a hierarchy among created things: that 
intelligence is superior to unintelligent life which is superior to mere existence and also that 
reason reigns supreme within the understanding. Second, a distinction was designated between 
God and all that is not God: non-divine things are changeable, bodily and/or temporal, limited by 
time and/or space, while God is eternal, everlasting, constant, unchanging. These two principles 
complete each other but they are not inextricable. One may maintain that the eternal, everlasting 
God who is not subject to time or space is thereby superior to all creation (which is by definition 
temporal and bodily) without then proceeding to hierarchically categorise reason above other 
mental faculties or understanding above mindless life and mindless life above life-less existence.  
It is the constructive theologian’s prerogative to select which elements of a text inform 
her/his conceptual parameters. I intend to develop the first element of conceptual parameter (a) 
based upon the second of these two positions—that God’s superiority consists in not being 
subject to time or space while the cosmos is—leaving aside Augustine’s characterisation of 
 
126 King, ‘Introduction’, xxi. 
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hierarchy within creation.127  In my view, Augustine’s proof is equally effective without positing 
a hierarchy among created things. Having seen that the eternal is superior to the temporal and 
bodily, the eternal God is thereby superior to all created things, regardless of their interrelations. 
Thus if eternal truth is established, it is on the divine side of the eternal/changeable distinction. 
Its existence is (or implies) God. For this reason, the first embryonic element of conceptual 
parameter (a) is this: God is eternal128, meaning that God is not limited by time or space, unlike 
all that is not God (including human reason), which is limited by time and/or space and thus is 
changeable.  
 
The Eternal Truth of Number  
 
Returning to our close reading of On the Free Choice of the Will, Augustine has promised 
Evodius a demonstration of God’s existence. To that end, he sets Evodius the task of identifying 
something that is superior to human reason, as shown by its eternality and common accessibility. 
Evodius responds by proposing ‘the intelligible structure and truth of number’ as a candidate 
(2.8.20.80). As O’Daly explains, the intelligible structure and truth of number [ratio et veritas 
numeri] includes ‘mathematical propositions such as ‘7+3=10’ and … concepts such as the idea 
of absolute unity, but also .. systems of addition and subtraction.’129 Evodius presents his reasons 
as follows,  
 
The intelligible structure and truth of number [ratio et veritas numeri] is present 
to all reasoning beings. Everyone who calculates tries to apprehend it with his 
own reason and intelligence. Some do this with ease; others with difficulty. Yet it 
offers itself equally to all who are capable of grasping it. It is not changed and 
converted into its perceiver when anyone perceives it, the way food is. Nor is 
there a flaw in it when anyone makes a mistake; it remains true and intact while 
the person is all the more in error the less he sees it. (2.8.20.80) 
 
127 This move is legitimate because the study aims to be informed by Augustine rather than congruent with his work. 
There may be something like hierarchy within the cosmos—I do not exclude that possibility—and at times it may 
have elements that Augustine describes, but our final truth theory will not indicate one way or the other on the 
matter (in this way, it is not contradiction Augustine, but only refraining from making instrumental use of this 
thought). 
128 God’s eternality is also treated from an Old Testament perspective in Chapter III. 
129 O’Daly, 180. 
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 In this passage, Evodius has justified his choice by observing that the structure and truth 
of number is commonly available to all minds which make use of numbers, though some have a 
greater talent for arithmetic than others. The truth and intelligibility of number remains the same 
even when someone makes an error in their mathematical judgments, indicating it is independent 
of the mind—like a visible object grasped by sight, rather than something incorporated into the 
mind, like edible food tasted and taken into the body.  
Augustine and Evodius further substantiate that the truth of number is eternal rather than 
bodily and temporal by together building an argument that sensory experience alone cannot 
furnish the mind with its awareness of number. In their view, sensory objects are by definition 
changeable and mutable.130 Though people do perceive numbers in sensory objects (e.g. by 
counting), it is only a person’s internal sense of number which allows him/her to prove a 
mathematical error (e.g. that the counting has gone wrong) (2.8.21.82-3). Furthermore, unlike the 
object of our sense perceptions which are changeable, the truth of number does not alter: ‘seven 
and three are ten not only at the moment, but always; it never was and never will be the case that 
seven and three are not ten’(2.8.21.83).  
To further substantiate the point that the ratio et veritas of number which our minds 
perceive cannot be entirely explained by our sensory perception (contra the view that one learns 
addition from, e.g. adding three apples to seven apples for a total of ten), Augustine points out 
that there are laws of mathematics which people are aware of, but which cannot be directly 
observed. As Hill helpfully translates from 2.8.23.89-91 into modern algebra, ‘the “law” is that 
for any number n, the nth number after it is its double, 2n.’131 Though one might be able to 
observe particular instances of this law—that the third number after 3 is 6, which is twice 3—it is 
manifestly impossible to observe that the law holds true for all numbers n. The universality of 
this ‘law’ could only be extrapolated (my term), not observed, and that extrapolation is only 
possible because of an awareness of the non-sensory numerical truth (2.8.23.92). Thus, while 
sensory experience is not alien to observations of number, it is insufficient to explain our 
perception of incorruptible and eternal numerical truths.132 Harrison agrees that by 2.8.21-4, 
Augustine has refuted the theory that sensory perception gives rise to knowledge of numbers, 
 
130 Ibid. 
131 Free Will, fn35, p48. 
132 Cf. Confessions X.12.19. 
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having shown both that ‘the ratio of numbers is infinite, and therefore known only by reason’ 
and also that ‘One cannot be perceived, and so is prior to perception of unity.’133   
For these reasons, Evodius and Augustine readily agree as follows: ‘the intelligible 
structure and truth of numbers does not pertain to the bodily senses. It remains pure and 
unchangeable, and is seen in common by all who reason.’ (2.8.24.93) They have identified a 
truth which is eternal, commonly available to all rational minds, and which is unerring even as 
minds err, indicating its superiority to the mind which perceives. An eternal truth has been 
identified.    
The embryonic conceptual parameter (a) (which will eventually earn the title 
understanding God as truth) so far involves an eternal God unlimited by time and space. Now it 
can be developed to include a second component: the eternal truth of number. Mathematical 
truths are eternal, or rather, the single truth by which we judge our articulation of individual 
mathematical truths is eternal. It does not change and is not curtailed by time or space. It is 
apprehensible by human mind, but also superior to it as the mind may err but the truth of number 
does not itself waver.  
Subsequently, the relationship between the eternal truth of number and God will be 
delineated. But first, an additional type of eternal truth will be considered. The intelligibility and 
truth [ratio et veritas] of number is a special case. When Evodius first proposed it as something 
superior to human reason, he introduced it by saying that ‘there are many! It is enough to 
mention just one’ (2.8.20.28). What else might be superior to reason, eternal, and commonly 
accessible? Augustine proposes, wisdom. 
 
The Eternal Truth of Wisdom 
 
Augustine next turns to ‘the truth’ he calls ‘wisdom’ (sapientia), and runs the same line of 
argumentation. The younger interlocutor, however, at first objects to this example. Augustine has 
proposed that there could be wisdom ‘common to all so that the more someone participates in it 
the wiser he becomes?’ (2.9.25.96). Evodius’ objection is that it is unclear what is meant by 
‘wisdom’ since there are numerous interpretations of wisdom: ‘I do not yet know what you mean 
by “wisdom,” for I see that people have various views about what is said or done wisely,’ 
 
133 Harrison, 158. 
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(2.9.25.97).) He explains his position, observing that some people pursue a good life through 
military service, others find farming superior; some pursue money, others shun temporal things 
to find eternal truth, and still others counsel and conduct human individuals and society—and yet 
each person holds his/her own choice in life to be a wise one (2.9.25.97-98). 
Augustine responds by agreeing that people pursue differing and at times mutually 
exclusive goods, but argues that this does not mean wisdom itself is changeable. He begins by 
clarifying what they agree upon: ‘You do think wisdom is the truth in which the highest good is 
recognized and grasped, do you not? All the people you mentioned, who follow different things, 
pursue good and avoid evil’ (2.9.26.100). As Harrison aptly interprets, Augustine has here 
defined truth as that ‘truth in which the supreme good is seen and possessed.’134  Augustine 
explains that different people may select many different goods whilst yet judging by the same 
singular truth of wisdom. O’Daly explicates the position, saying  
 
such a diversity of goods (Augustine is clearly now thinking, not of purely 
subjective fantasies about what is good, but of plausibly demonstrable goods) 
need not entail a corresponding plurality of wisdoms, for wisdom need be none 
other than the insight into the diverse nature of the good. To that extent, wisdom 
may be one, and so common to all men.135 
 
To illustrate the point, Augustine compares it to people viewing the world by the same sun; 
individuals may choose different things to look at and enjoy whilst yet all receiving the same 
illumination (2.9.27.108). At this point, Evodius concedes that this is possible, but maintains that 
it remains to be demonstrated that wisdom’s truth isn’t itself variable (2.9.27.109).  
Augustine makes two points to complete his case that the truth of wisdom is unified, 
common and consistent despite variations in its application. First, he argues that all humans seek 
to be happy, which implicitly is a search for wisdom (wisdom having been defined as ‘truth in 
which the supreme good is seen and possessed’), thus showing that the existence of wisdom is 
implicitly known by all humans, all of who seek happiness. Second, he argues that a number of 
principles of wisdom are clearly true to all who consider them (much like mathematical 
 
134 Ibid. 
135 O’Daly, 181. 
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principles). His conclusion is that the truth of wisdom is eternally true and commonly available 
to human understanding, just like the truth of mathematics.  
Augustine concludes the first of these two points in the following passage.  
 
Thus, just as we have had stamped on our minds the notion of happiness before 
we are happy, for it is through this notion that we know and confidently declare 
without hesitation that we want to be happy, so too we have had stamped on our 
mind the notion of wisdom before we are wise; it is through this notion that any 
one of us, if asked whether he wants to be wise, will reply without the shadow of 
a doubt that he does. (2.9.26.103) 
 
He clearly holds that even though humans choose many means by which to seek the happiness of 
a good life, all such choices betray a pre-existing intuition that there is such a thing as a good 
happy life and that there exists wisdom in how to live it. Otherwise it could not be sought. 
Wisdom is commonly perceptible and pursued.  
His second point bolsters his first, in that it identifies a number of principles or beacons 
of wisdom that any rational person would recognise. These include such chestnuts as ‘one should 
live justly,’ ‘equals should be compared to equals,’ and ‘that the incorrupt is better than the 
corrupt’ (2.10.28.113-4). Evodius concedes that such truths are ‘present and common to me, to 
you, and to all who see the truth’ (2.10.28.113). It follows that these commonly recognised truths 
are not particular to each mind, but rather independent and unchanging. Augustine calls these 
commonly recognised truths the ‘rules and beacons of virtue’. They are ‘true and unchangeable, 
and they are present, whether singly or collectively, for the regard of those who are capable of 
recognizing them, each by his own mind and reason.’ (2.10.29.116). Furthermore, these few 
principles of virtue (of which there are many more) must also be principles of wisdom: 
‘everything we called “rules and beacons of the virtues” pertains to wisdom. The more someone 
uses them in living his life and lives his life in accordance with them, the more he lives and acts 
wisely.’ (2.10.29.118) O’Daly again sums up Augustine’s conclusion (in 2.10.29.119): 
 
A single instance of truth (unum verum) perceived by two individuals can be said 
to be common to both. … There seem to several commonly accessible principles 
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or rules (regulae) of this kind … Insight into the rules qua rules is none other than 
wisdom, i.e., perceiving, choosing and acting wisely. It would appear that such 
truths are no less objective and constant than rules of number.136   
 
Thus we see that Augustine has guided Evodius to agreement that there are at least two 
kinds of eternal truth which they are indubitably aware of: wisdom and number. Both have met 
the criteria of being independent of the human mind and unchanging.  
The time has come to add another conceptual element to the embryonic conceptual 
parameter (a) (understanding God as truth). It already stipulates God as eternal and that the 
human apprehension of mathematics indicates an eternal truth (the truth of number) is commonly 
available to rational minds. Now it additionally states that the human pursuit of a good life 
indicates that another eternal truth, one called wisdom, is commonly available to rational minds 
even as there is variability among individual articulations and applications.  
 
One Mystical Vision and a Proof of God 
 
Having identified two sorts of eternal truth—principles of number and principles of 
wisdom—Augustine and Evodius wonder whether they are ultimately the same or thoroughly 
distinct. Perhaps unexpectedly, Augustine does not advance another argument, but instead 
describes his nearly mystical experiences contemplating the truth of number and wisdom: 
 
when I reflect on the unchangeable truth of numbers and their lair (so to speak) 
and their inner sanctuary and realm — or any other suitable name we can find to 
refer to the dwelling-place and residence of numbers — I am far removed from 
the body. Perhaps I even find something to think about, but not something I could 
put into words. Eventually I return in exhaustion to familiar things, so that I am 
able to say something or other, and I talk in the usual way about the things right in 
front of me. This also happens to me when I think as carefully and intently as I 
can about wisdom. (2.11.30.122-3) 
  
 
136 O’Daly, 181-2. 
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Though he cannot demonstrate it, Augustine’s intuition is that number and wisdom are united, 
like the heat and light given off by fire. He says, ‘the brightness and the heat in a fire [are] 
“consubstantial.” Yet the heat affects only what is moved close to it, whereas the brightness is 
diffused far and wide’ (2.11.32.128). Analogously, as many understand math (perceive light) but 
few people are truly wise (feel the heat). Augustine admits that the point is obscure, but 
nonetheless is convinced that the truth of number and wisdom is the same, or, as O’Daly puts it, 
they are ‘of one and the same kind (una quaedem eademque res est), even if numbers are 
commonly regarded as of less value than wisdom’.137 
 There appears to be a unity to eternal truth, but it is at the very limits of human ken to 
apprehend the number, wisdom, or their unity in themselves. At the end of their dialogue on 
these topics, Augustine expresses his dissatisfaction with everything he has said: ‘the truth which 
we have discussed at length without saying anything adequate’ (2.19.52.196). An apophatic limit 
has been reached before the unity of eternal truth can be comprehended.  
The apophatic limit notwithstanding, Augustine has demonstrated that eternal commonly 
perceivable truth exists138 and from this he concludes that God is either this eternal truth (or 
something superior still, since the apophatic intuition of their unity cannot be used in the 
demonstration of God’s existence). Augustine begins the final demonstration with a review of the 
findings so far, saying,  
 
There is unchangeable truth, containing everything that is unchangeably true. You 
cannot call it yours or mine or anyone else’s. Instead, it is present and offers itself 
in common to all who discern unchangeable truths, like a light that is 
miraculously both public and hidden. (2.12.33.130-131).  
 
Next, he shows that this eternal truth is superior to reason, the apex of human 
understanding. (Recall that reason’s ability to understand is not what makes it superior. Rather, 
its superiority consists in the ability to cast judgment, to rule, and determine over the rest of the 
human person.) While reason may apprehend principles of number and wisdom, it cannot judge 
them as their superior; on the contrary, reason deploys its sense of eternal truth in order to make 
 
137 O’Daly, 182-3. 
138 Harrison, 158. 
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judgements regarding worldly things. For instance, one’s sense of numerical truth guides one in 
correcting arithmetic. Hence, something above the mind has been found: eternal truth itself. 
Augustine declares the resounding conclusion, 
 
something more exalted than our mind and reason. Here you have it: the truth 
itself! Embrace it if you can and enjoy it; ‘Take delight in the Lord and HE will 
give you your heart’s longings’ [Ps. 36.4 (37:4 RSV)] What do you long for more 
than to be happy? And who is happier than one who enjoys the unshakeable, 
unchangeable, and most excellent truth? (2.13.35.137)  
 
His obscurity over the precise relationship of number and wisdom does not impede the argument, 
for the burden of proof for God’s existence only required the demonstration of something 
superior to reason and the mind. 
Augustine concludes, ‘There is a God who truly is, in the highest degree. This we now 
not only hold free of doubt by faith, I think. We also reach it by a form of understanding that, 
although as yet very slight, is certain’ (2.15.39.155). He does not purport to comprehend God of 
divine existence but merely to understand as well as believe that God exists. As O’Daly puts it, 
Augustine has demonstrated 
 
that God exists, whether God the truth or superior to the truth. He does not choose 
between the latter alternatives, merely recalling that the name ‘father of wisdom’ 
is given to God, but that the son, the ‘wisdom’ born of the eternal father, is equal 
to the father. We may infer that in knowing wisdom we also know God.139     
 
Once the proof is complete, Augustine launches into a lengthy panegyric in praise of this truth, 
exalting in the many goods it brings those who embrace it and its many illustrious qualities. But 
before following him there, a conceptual parameter will take form.    
This study’s first embryonic conceptual parameter (a) will shortly take on its rightful title 
understanding God as truth because of the developments to it in this subsection. (NB: This 
conceptual parameter will be further developed in light of Confessions.) Thus far, (a) includes: 
 
139 O’Daly, 184. 
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God’s distinction from all that is not God as that which is eternal in comparison to all non-divine 
temporal and bodily creatures; and that the eternal truth of both number and wisdom is 
commonly available to rational minds, even as their apprehension and application varies. From 
this subsection, the constructive theologian chooses to take on Augustine’s intuition that there is 
a single eternal truth which guides human apprehensions of both number and wisdom, that their 
unity is at the mystical limit of human understanding, and that this eternal truth is God godself.  
Taking these four elements together, I will now constructively elaborate the theological 
content of (a) understanding God as truth. When God is named truth, it means that God is the 
standard and measure by which humans judge the world’s truths and realities, from theoretical 
mathematics to the wisdom of various life-style choices. This is possible because despite the 
mind’s inalienable limitations and tendency towards error, it has some awareness, however 
imperfect, of the eternal unchanging reality of number and wisdom, which is divine. God 
encompasses the governing principle of both the purely logical/mathematical truths and the 
wisdom of a good life. Briefly put, divine truth is eternal, accessible to the rational mind but 
above and superior to it, which is to say, it does not alter though the mind’s apprehension can 
wax, wane, or err.  
 
Limitation, Fallibility, Variability, and Diversity  
 
This subsection develops a second conceptual parameter from the material examined in 
the previous three subsections. It regards the human apprehension of divine truth (b) and 
specifies that while humans may apprehend divine truth, their understanding remains limited, 
fallible, variable, and diverse.   
First, I draw on Augustine’s description contemplating the truth of number, finding it 
beyond his comprehension. Second, I note that, nevertheless, the eternal truth of number is not 
entirely beyond his and Evodius’ understanding. After all, their sense of the eternal truth of 
number enables their mathematical judgments. Re-articulating this as a conceptual parameter, I 
would put forward three points. First, divine truth is apprehensible, in that it can be understood 
to some extent, but also that it is incomprehensible, in that it cannot be understood in its entirety. 
The existence of this divine truth was held to be indubitable, but at the same time mystical, 
knowable to a limited extent though not subject to human scrutiny or comprehension. Second, 
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human apprehension of divine truth is clearly fallible, as people often make erroneous 
judgments, both mathematical errors and unwise decisions. Recall, human cognitive fallibility 
was instrumental to Augustine’s proof that eternal truth is superior to the mind; truth is not 
altered by human misunderstandings. This furnishes the third point, that apprehension of divine 
truth is highly variable; humans may be corrected and increase their understanding or they may 
make fresh errors.  
Finally, the human apprehension of divine truth is diverse, at times to the point of mutual 
exclusion. The absolute quality of God as Truth does not carry over to all human apprehension of 
divine truth. This diversity appears in Evodius’ example of individuals judging different mutually 
exclusive goods to live by (leading to incompatible life-choices). Augustine showed that they 
nonetheless judged by the same sense of wisdom. Book 1 of On the Free Choice of the Will 
provides a further example. Here, Augustine states that all temporal laws, humanly devised and 
enacted, are only just if they are derived from the ‘supreme reason’ of the ‘eternal law’ 
(1.6.15.48-1.6.15.49; 1.6.15.50). Two temporal laws can both be just but nonetheless contradict 
each other; what is just under one circumstance is not just in another. The contradictory just laws 
both obey the eternal law, but in different manners under different circumstances (1.6.14.47-48). 
Augustine describes humanity’s common awareness, saying ‘the notion of eternal law is stamped 
on us’, a similar image to the common awareness of wisdom and number (1.6.15.50).140 Even 
though the truth of God never changes, the human interpretation and application of it may differ, 
and even take mutually contradictory forms, in different times, places, and circumstances.       
From these passages, I develop conceptual parameter (b) on human apprehension of 
divine truth: humanity cannot comprehend divine truth, but it may apprehend it even though its 
apprehension is marked by limitation, variability, fallibility, and diversity. To elaborate, divine 
truth remains incomprehensible, but humans may have some understanding (apprehension) and 
grow in their understanding (hence variability). Furthermore, though some disagreements among 
those who seek truth are due to error (hence fallibility), others are due to the diversity in human 
apprehensions of divine truth. For example, Euclidian and spherical geometry, which ascribe 
contrary properties to parallel lines. In Euclidian geometry (on a plane) two parallel lines will 
never meet (like railroad tracks) whereas in spherical geometry (as if on a globe) two parallel 
lines will sometimes meet (as longitudinal lines are perpendicular at the equator but meet at the 
 
140 Cf. Confessions (3.7.13-14). 
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poles). The ultimate veritas et ratio of number has not altered, but informs the judgments that 
support both forms of geometry. When, however, considered in different circumstances, under 
different axioms, what the human mind judges, grasps, and articulates to be true differs. This 
diversity to the point of contradiction does not result in excluding the possibility of error; sound 
mathematical judgments are still made by geometers. Humans can still adjudicate regarding the 
interpretation of divine truth in these different circumstances. Hence, human apprehension of 
divine truth is limited, fallible, variable, and diverse.   
 
Universal Accessibility  
 
Conceptual parameter (b) now receives further development from an analysis of the 
accessibility of divine truth; to whom is it accessible and where may it be found? To all people 
and in all places, comes Augustine’s answer; truth is available and faithful and common to all 
(2.14.37.145). Below, he explains that anyone who wills will find eternal truth will find it lovely, 
lasting, and available: 
 
insofar as the will to enjoy it is steadfastly present, the beauty of truth and wisdom 
… does not pass with time or change places; nightfall does not interrupt it and 
shadows do not obscure it; it does not depend on the bodily senses. It is close to 
all the people in the whole world who take delight in it and have turned 
themselves to it; it lasts forever for all; it is never absent from any place; 
outwardly it counsels us and inwardly it teaches us. (2.14.38.151-152) 
 
Clearly, divine truth is everywhere to be found.  
Note that though Augustine has said truth ‘does not depend on the bodily senses,’ it 
would be misleading to state his position as saying that wisdom and divine truth can never be 
discovered in the created world (which is bodily and temporal). This is misleading, because his 
actual position is that one cannot discover wisdom and divine truth from bodily things alone.  
One instance he provides of finding wisdom in the world is the act of recognising beauty; 
this aesthetic recognition requires judgments which are made with wisdom (2.16.41.163 ). All 
existence is full of numbers, (2.16.42.164), whether in the skill of craftsmen, the rhythm of 
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dancers, or the proportion of sculpture, to name a few, ‘All the loveliness of creation is an 
indication of you’ (2.16.43.168). Even non-living things metaphorically ‘live’ by the eternal truth 
because they are subject to the principles of number (2.17.46.176). One cannot grasp and make 
sense of the material bodily perishable world around us without some appeal to these eternal 
truths.  
Augustine certainly holds that the created world constantly indicates its creator. One 
never encounters bodily things in isolation, apart from one’s sense of divine truth. The human 
awareness, however dim, of the eternal true God always is present in one’s encounter with 
temporal and bodily things. Here, Augustine describes how the truth which is God leaves its 
trace on everything that is created. Wisdom is not only available to all minds, but it can be found 
anywhere and everywhere. 
 
Therefore, if either with bodily sense or with the mind’s consideration you cannot 
get hold of whatever changeable thing you are looking upon, unless you grasp 
some form of numbers (without which it would lapse back into nothing), do not 
doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form! As a result, these 
changeable things … run their courses through time, with measured movements 
and a distinct variety of forms, like poetic verses. This eternal and unchangeable 
form is not contained in and spread out through space; nor is it extended and 
varied in time. But through it, all [changeable] things are able to be given form, as 
well as to fulfill and carry out the numbers pertinent to the times and places 
appropriate to their kind. (2.16.44.171-172) 
 
For our purposes, the pervasive character of eternal truth, that it is apparent to the human mind in 
all aspects of creation, helps Augustine to balance out his point above that eternal truth is not 
apprehended through the bodily senses. Clearly, it means that it is not apprehended through the 
bodily senses alone but also through perception of the eternal. 
From this examination of On the Free Choice of the Will, I offer a further augmentation 
to conceptual parameter (b) human apprehension of truth: in addition to human apprehension of 
divine truth being limited, fallible, variable, and diverse, it is also available to all people and all 
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places, being an implicit contributor to human understanding of sensory perceptions, which one 
may choose to consider, enjoy, and contemplate in its own right.   
 
Benefits of Truth 
 
The final point to which I draw attention in On the Free Will is in Augustine’s rapturous 
praise of wisdom, when he has completed the proof of God’s existence. Augustine waxes lyrical 
about how much happiness is possessed by those who embrace the eternal truth that is God. The 
pursuit and attainment of truth is not an indifferent or purely cognitive matter. It conveys 
happiness, all goods, freedom, and security. Augustine compares it with making love, being fed 
and watered, melodious music, and the beauty of gems and heavenly bodies (2.13.35.138-140). 
Furthermore, truth reveals all other creaturely goods.  
Naturally, one benefit of apprehending divine truth is that one grows in wisdom. This 
cognitive element may involve an increase in knowledge, but it is mainly that one more fully 
apprehends the eternal truth by which one understands all other things. As Augustine says, 
 
No one passes judgments on [wisdom/truth], and no one passes judgments rightly 
without it. And from this it is clear beyond a doubt that it is more valuable than 
our minds, each of which becomes wise by this one thing and passes judgment, 
not on it, but on other things through it. (2.14.38.152) 
 
The appreciation of truth itself is the highest and greatest good. Additionally, the person that 
focuses on truth finds that all other goods are delivered to her/him as well. Augustine exhorts 
Evodius, 
 
since the highest good is known and possessed in the truth, and this truth is 
wisdom, let us recognize and possess the highest good in it and enjoy it 
completely, since anyone who enjoys the highest good is happy. This truth reveals 
all true goods, which people elect for themselves to enjoy — either one or many 
of them — in accordance with their capacity for understanding. (2.13.36.141) 
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Focusing in delight on eternal truth does not diminish one’s delight in the various temporal, 
bodily, finite, created goods: ‘holding fast to it as though it were unmindful of the others, it 
enjoys them all together in the truth itself. For whatever is agreeable in the other truths is surely 
agreeable in virtue of the truth itself,’ (2.13.36.142). Full devotion to divine truth, which is the 
highest good, enables one to truly appreciate all lesser goods.  
Freedom and security are both gifts that follow from this focus on eternal truth. 
Augustine argues that freedom is gained because the God who is truth frees the individual from 
their sins and death: ‘Our freedom is this: to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us 
free from death — that is, from the state of sin. Truth itself, speaking as a human being among 
others, said to those believing in Him: [John 8:31-32]’ (1.13.37.143). Augustine’s argument 
appeals to scriptural support, but his conceptual schema also explains how it is that divine truth 
sets one free from sin, establishing the truth-seeker in joy, freedom, security, and life. For, divine 
truth is the seat of wisdom, which guides one into a good life, which by definition is free from 
sin and its deathly effects. Divine truth also grants security to those who prioritise it.  While all 
creaturely things are perishable and may be lost, only the eternal truth is imperishable. It can 
never be lost. Augustine explains that the freedom and security together increase the happiness 
gained from truth: ‘The soul does not enjoy anything with freedom unless it enjoys it with 
security. Now nobody is secure in goods that can be lost against his will. Nobody loses truth and 
wisdom against his will,’ (2.13.37.143-4). Harrison nicely simplifies Augustine’s points, saying 
that ‘Happiness = enjoyment of truth,’ and ‘Freedom = subjection to truth / Truth cannot be lost 
against will / Truth is common, beautiful.’141 
 From these observations, I draw the beginning of a third conceptual parameter (c) the 
human pursuit of truth. The attainment of truth is not merely intellectually beneficial; it 
establishes the truth-seeker in joy, freedom, security, and life, freeing one from uncertainty, sin, 
and death. This result obtains because seeking divine truth involves the pursuit of wisdom which 
is essentially the pursuit of what it means to live a good life. Thus, eternal truth releases the 
human person from error and moral failing, which is itself freedom. It grants security because 
eternal things are infinitely dependable, in contrast to temporal and bodily creation which only 
offer limited security. 
 
 
141 Harrison, 158. 




Through its examination of On the Free Choice of the Will, this section developed initial 
articulations of three conceptual parameters, accruing material to them gradually. All three will 
be further developed in the next section, being informed by an examination of Confessions. This 
concluding summary articulates their current unfinished state.  
(a) understanding God as truth finds that there is a hierarchical relationship between God 
and that which is not God, in that all creation is temporal and bodily while God is not limited by 
time or space, being eternal. When God is named truth, this means God is the eternal standard 
and measure by which humans judge the truths of mathematics and wisdom.  
(b) the human apprehension of such divine truth stipulates that eternal truth is available to 
all rational minds in all places. It is an implicit contributor to human understanding of sensory 
perceptions, but apprehendable and enjoyable as distinct from sensory experience. This human 
apprehension is always limited, in that it cannot amount to full comprehension. The human 
apprehension of the incomprehensible does not make divine truth its subject. It is also fallible, in 
that one may make errors in judgements or apprehension of truth, and variable, in that one can be 
corrected in one’s errors and grow in wisdom. Additionally, there is a diversity of genuine 
articulations of the eternal truth, some of which conflict with each other.  
(c) the on-going pursuit of truth by humans presents this pursuit as far from being of 
purely intellectual benefit. Seeking truth brings joy, freedom, security, and life because it 
involves an increase in wisdom, not merely in a series of accurate facts. One is freed from moral 
errors as well as inaccuracies, which contributes to living a good life. One’s freedom is also 
secure because it is founded on truth which is itself eternal, and thus utterly reliable. 
 
II.3 Augustine’s Confessions 
 
In the course of further developing conceptual parameters, this section attends to multiple 
aspects of Augustine’s most famous work: Confessions.142 After briefly situating our analysis 
within the broad reception that Confessions has received, the examination begins with general 
qualities of Augustine’s search for truth: his vocative prayerful address to Truth and all-
 
142 In this subsection, references to Confessions appear parenthetically. 
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encompassing pursuit of truth. Next, this study examines the content of two visions, one in Milan 
and one in Ostia. Finally, Augustine’s portrayal of creation as proclaiming God, especially in the 
latter books, receives attention. Conceptual parameters (a), (b), and (c) will each be modified 
gradually, their developments noted at the close of each subsection. Ultimately, it will include the 
insights for (a) that ‘Truth’ is a personal name, for (b) that divine truth conditions the very 
possibility of the human search for truth, and for (c) that the human pursuit for truth never ceases 
but qualitatively changes when one accepts divine truth (who is manifest in Christ) as one’s God.  
 
Reception and Continuity 
 
Today, Augustine’s Confessions is his most read and best known work. It has been 
praised as the first autobiography, the most complete account of an ancient man’s inner life, and 
the first example of the modern human person; it has also been condemned for allegedly 
individualising the journey of Christian faith and denigrating the body (especially sexuality). It is 
the main source material for historical reconstructions of Augustine’s early life and intellectual 
development, though some doubt its reliability. It was written once he became a bishop and 
received immediate attention, giving it popularity and prominence which has never abated, 
extending beyond those interested in Christianity or the ancient world such that it is not 
controversial to name Confessions as ‘world literature.’143 Books 1-10 describe his life’s faith 
journey from infancy through his conversion, baptism, and resolve to return to Northern Africa 
from Italy. The final four books reflect on the current state of his soul, the nature of time, and the 
interpretation of Scripture, with specific attention to Genesis’ opening verses. The sudden shift in 
genres that many perceive, from narratival auto-biography to discursive theological reflection, 
has received much comment and attempts to identify either a unity to the text or a reason for the 
rupture in continuity.   
Our interest in Confessions is neither historical nor chronological, attending neither to 
Augustine’s historical personage nor his intellectual development over time. As such, questions 
of the text’s accuracy as a depiction of Augustine’s youth do not bear on our inquiry; Confessions 
is presumed to accurately describe Augustine’s perspective on and theological evaluation of his 
 
143 Dorothea Weber, ‘Confessiones’, in Karla Pollman, Willmien Otten, et al. eds., The Oxford Guide to the 
Historical Reception of Augustine, 2 vols. (Oxford: OUP 2013), i, 167. 
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younger days at the point of composition. This study explores his understanding of truth as it 
appears and is worked out in the text of Confessions. This topic is not a common focus of 
scholarly attention, but there is a no small amount of relevant material in Confessions. Truth 
could reasonably be described as the text’s unifying object, in that: first, Augustine pursues God 
(who is truth) and the truth about God throughout the autobiographical portions; and second, in 
discursive latter books Augustine continues pursuing truth through scripture and intellectual 
reflection. ‘O Truth!’ is a frequent address to God on his lips, and truth makes a central 
appearance in the pivotal visionary epiphanies he has in Milan after reading Platonist philosophy 
and in Ostia while in conversation with Monica his mother. The work is thus fertile ground for 




Throughout the Confessions, Augustine addresses God directly as ‘Truth.’144 For 
instance, he prays, saying ‘O Truth’ (10.40.65), ‘you are Truth itself’ (1.5.6), ‘God, you who are 
Truth’ (4.16.31), ‘you, who are truly the Truth,’ (3.6.10), and ‘O Truth, in whom there is no 
variation, no play or changing shadow’ (3.6.2). To some ‘Truth’ might be an abstract and 
impersonal name, but for Augustine it infuses his personal relationship with a personal God. He 
seamlessly calls out the appellation while lamenting in his personal and intellectual struggles and 
rejoicing in gifts of grace.  
Nor does addressing God as ‘Truth’ render God into an object of study for Augustine. 
This practice entails an awareness of God’s presence as Creator to his creatures: he addresses 
‘Truth, who is artificer of creation’ (5.3.5), declares ‘truth exists, truth that is seen and 
understood through the things that are made’ (7.10.2), and prays ‘in the light of present truth, the 
Truth which is yourself’ (9.10.23). God’s truth is mysterious and elusive as God is the eternal 
unfathomable creator.    
Addressing God as Truth is not an abstraction but an expression of relationship, which is 
to say, it is only ever expressed in the economy of the creature-God relationship. In Confessions, 
for Augustine to personally vocatively address what others might consider a divine attribute is 
 
144 There are obvious precedents for Augustine’s use of ‘truth’ as a divine name in the New Testament, for instance 
John 8.31. 
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not unusual. For instance, when answering ‘What are you, then, my God?’ he situates God’s 
characteristics within the creaturely experience of God: 
 
You, my God, are supreme, utmost in goodness, mightiest and all-powerful, most 
merciful and most just. You are the most hidden from us and yet the most present 
amongst us, … ever enduring and yet we cannot comprehend you. You are 
unchangeable and yet you change all things. You are never new, never old, and yet 
all things have new life from you, (1.4.4).  
 
As this passage continues, Augustine expresses divine traits such as omnipotence, 
omnibenevolence, eternity, and immortality, all from a creature’s relational and experiential point 
of view of God. For instance, God’s immortality is known through the life God gives and God’s 
omnipotence is known through God’s support, protection, nourishment, and diminution of the 
proud. Augustine’s understanding of God as truth itself is no different – Truth is to be addressed, 
to be spoken to, sought after, longed for, and prayed to.   
Augustine’s prayerful address of God as ‘Truth’ may be taken to modify conceptual 
parameter (a) understanding God as truth. ‘Truth’ is not an impersonal name for an abstract 
entity, but instead a personal name which one may use repeatedly to pray, invoke, entreat, and 
praise one’s God. To the Christian, ‘Truth’ is a personal name, intelligible through the creature’s 
relationship with the steadfast reality of its creator.  
 
Truth the Sought-After 
 
Closely related to Augustine’s depiction of vocative truth in the Confessions is the theme 
of seeking after truth. The young Augustine’s search for truth drives the plot forward and unifies 
the autobiography with the later books’ reflections. Augustine’s description of his varying states 
of distance and estrangement from God, and God’s own activity in searching for and securing 
Augustine, also colour his search.  Augustine’s writing on these matters will add greater detail to 
conceptual parameters (b) the human apprehension of truth and (c) the human pursuit of truth. 
To begin, the search for divine truth is never-ceasing. This is readily apparent in 
Confessions’ plot. Augustine summarises his early years, saying ‘In this lay my sin, / that not in 
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him was I seeking pleasures, distinctions and truth, / but in myself and the rest of his 
creatures’(1.20.1). His first turning point is the decision, after reading Cicero’s Hortensius, to 
abandon vanity and seek wisdom (3.4.1). Unfortunately, he then falls in with the falsehoods of 
the Manichees, and only after many years learned to distinguish between eloquence and truth 
(5.3.3). Seeing the Manichean teachings disproven and Christianity as yet ‘unconquered, but not 
… the conqueror’ (5.14.24), he drops into a deep despair over whether he would find truth before 
he found death; ‘I had been delivered from falsehood, even if I had not yet found the truth’ 
(6.1.1).  At this point, he develops faith in the Christian teachings, though he does not yet 
comprehend them or hold them with certainty. However, as we see in Book 7, reading Neo-
Platonist texts resolves his intellectual uncertainties, and in the following book, after an intense 
struggle of the will, he turns himself fully to God. Then in Book 9, Augustine and his mother 
Monica have a joint spiritual experience, results of their joint contemplation of God as truth 
(9.10.23-25). The apex of Augustine’s recorded spiritual experience is that of God as Truth itself, 
sought after and longed for.  
 If one sees the search for the truth which is God as the narrative’s driving arc, then the 
arc of books 1-9 continues until the end of Book 12. Book 10 mainly consists of Augustine’s 
self-reflection on the state of his soul. Only by entering into God’s truth is he able to know the 
truth about himself. He says ‘what I know of myself I know only because you shed light on me,’ 
(10.5.7). Likewise, Books 11 and 12 are more than exegesis; they treat the continuing pursuit of 
divine truth through scripture within the church community. Even at this point long past 
conversion, Augustine the bishop still seeks divine truth while reading the Bible in prayer and in 
community. Indeed, the composition’s final passage indicates the continuing centrality of his 
search:  
 
What human can empower another human to understand these things? What angel 
can grant understanding to another angel? What angel to a human? Let us rather 
ask of you, seek in you, knock at your door. Only so will we receive, only so find, 
and only so will the door be opened to us. Amen. (13.38.53) 
 
Thus, the search for truth continues indefinitely in this life, even after the acceptance of God as 
‘Truth’ and Christ as Truth-incarnate.  
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Metaphors of distance while seeking divine truth become nicely complicated here. The 
search for divine truth is not simply a matter of closing the spatial distance between the seeker 
and the sought-after, as if one is a hunter approaching one’s quarry. Even when God allows 
Augustine to wander far like the prodigal son, the distance between them is both painfully real 
and illusory. God permits him to depart, and stumble, and take himself far away from God. 
Simultaneously, Augustine maintains, God is with him (within him even) (1.1.2). Additionally, 
from his subjective experiential point of view, Augustine tells the story of his own search for 
truth and portrays God as being the more faithful seeker, enticing him to return to God. Because 
God is both the sought-after truth and the creator/sustainer/enticer of the searcher, divine truth is 
never a merely a sought-after object. God also searches and Augustine is sought-for, at times 
simultaneously far and incredibly near.  
That the search for truth never ends, however, does not mean there is no significant 
change in one’s relationship to truth. There are both heights of genuine insight and depths of 
ignorance and confusion. For instance, compare his Platonist-induced epiphany and his vision 
with Monica to his ensnarement in Manichean falsehoods and despair once disillusioned. His 
meandering approach towards the Truth has watershed moments, as when he fully gives himself 
over to God in the garden. Once Augustine is won over by Christ, the Truth-incarnate, his 
relationship to the Truth undergoes a revolution and the pursuit continues in a qualitatively 
different manner. No matter the heights he reaches, his search for Truth never ceases, even once 
it is found. The significance of these conversion points is not that they complete his search, but 
that having found Truth he may continually rest in God while also seeking to live evermore 
truthfully into the faith while further unfolding God’s teachings. The Truth is never fully 
disclosed because the full Truth can only be spoken to, not about, and then only addressed as 
God. The seeking never ends, though there is a distinct difference between the pre and post-
conversion seeking. I would compare it to the change marriage makes to love between partners; 
the lover does not cease to ardently pursue the beloved once they are wed, but rather, continues 
to pursue intimacy in love now within the security of their union.  
Augustine’s search for divine truth in Confessions provides this constructive theologian 
with material for both (b) the human apprehension of truth and (c) the human pursuit of truth.  
For (b), it reinforces the theoretical point from On the Free Choice of the Will that divine 
truth is not subject to the mind with an experiential articulation of the same notion. God, ‘Truth’, 
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is sought but God also seeks Augustine and is close even when the distance between them 
increases, reaching for Augustine. Divine truth is not an object subjected to human pursuit—it 
seeks one out and is the condition of possibility for any human search. Unlike many theories of 
knowledge where the object of thought is always subjected to the knower (as subject), God is not 
an object or discoverable fact.  
As for (c) the human pursuit of truth, the search for truth never ceases, a notion that 
dovetails well with divine truth’s incomprehensibility. This does not, however, mean that the 
search for truth is always of the same character; it may wax and wane, and there is a categorical 
shift, a watershed moment when one accepts this divine Truth as one’s God with all one’s heart, 
soul, and mind. Hereafter, one abides in truth. It has not become one’s possession, but rather, is 
one’s very life.  
 
The Holistic Search 
 
In addition to the intellectual struggle and problem solving, Augustine’s search for truth 
involves the engagement of his desires, emotions, body, vices, and virtues. Certainly, the intellect 
is crucial, as more than once Augustine laments that his failure to grasp a particular became an 
obstacle to faith. Nevertheless, when he ponders whether God is to be sought through memory or 
desire (10.20.29), desire prevails because desiring happiness drives one towards God who is truth 
itself. All people seek joy, he says, and would prefer to found their joy on truth: 
 
Now the happy life is joy in the truth; and that means joy in you, who are the 
Truth, O God who shed the light of salvation on my face, my God. Everyone 
wants this happy life, this life which alone deserves to be called happy; all want it, 
all want joy in the truth. (10.23.33)   
 
Augustine’s search for truth involves not only desire, but the entirety of his humanity; 
health, life, peace-of-mind, and virtue ensue from embracing the Truth whereas falsehood brings 
with it disease and death, psychologically, physically, and morally speaking. A painful aching 
longing for wisdom fills Augustine until, at the end of Book 8, he finds ‘no sooner had I reached 
the end of the verse than the light of certainty flooded my heart and all dark shades of doubt 
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fled.’ (8.12.29). Likewise, his affect transitions from being wracked with doubt and anxiety to 
joyfully discussing truth (with his friends) and serenely contemplating truth (as with Monica). 
Even the intellect can suffer from corruption as the body does, when one is beset by falsehood. 
‘so too, if the rational mind itself is vicious, errors and wrong-headed opinions can corrupt our 
life,’ (4.15.25). These repercussions extend to his physical life too. It is not a mere coincidence 
that he was beset with illness at the end of his time as a rhetorician and healed following his full 
conversion. In his own words: 
 
But I,’ says the Word of God, ‘shall I depart to any place?’ Fix your dwelling 
there, my soul, lay up there for safe-keeping whatever you have thence received, 
if only because you are weary of deceits. Entrust to Truth whatever of truth is in 
you, and you will lose nothing; your rotten flesh will flower anew, all your 
diseases will be healed, all your labile elements will be restored and bound fast to 
you … binding you to the ever-stable, abiding God.  (4.11.16) 
 
Seeking truth well demands certain virtues and, by the same token, particular vices obstruct one’s 
search. A passionate interest and a sound intellect on their own are insufficient. Vain curiosity 
and pride are detrimental vices when one wishes to find truth. If one searches for knowledge 
without worth, simply to satisfy curiosity or securing needless proofs, this becomes wasteful and 
even sinful (10.35.54). For this reason, humility is indispensable. Furthermore, Augustine 
observes to God ‘Only to those whose hearts are crushed do you draw close. You will not let 
yourself be found by the proud, nor even by those who in their inquisitive skill … trace the paths 
of planets,’ (5.3.3). Charity is also indispensable for seeking Truth; Augustine presents this as the 
crucial teaching of Christ (7.10.26), who is the Truth incarnate, ‘Truth in person’ (7.19.25). As a 
whole human being who seeks after truth, the search and Augustine’s relationship with the Truth 
at any given point is borne in his desire, emotions, body, vices and virtues. 
With this in mind, I develop conceptual parameter (c) the human pursuit of truth to 
reinforce its stance that seeking truth is not merely an intellectual affair. In addition to the hard-
minded element, pursuing and finding truth yields health, life, and peace of mind. The search 
incorporates all of one’s being: intellect, emotions, psyche, virtues, and life itself. 
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Augustine’s Vision in Milan 
 
Augustine’s vision in Milan followed after his reading of certain platonic books and took 
place before his famous conversion in the garden. It furnishes rich material regarding his 
understanding and experience of God as truth, covering the coincidence of divine truth with love 
and eternal being, the nature of its existence, and its distinction from creaturely truths.  
From its beginning, Augustine describes his holy vision as encountering the transcendent 
God who is Truth, Love, and Eternal. He describes turning inward first and that, with divine 
help, he saw an ‘incommutable light far above my spiritual ken, transcending my mind’, one not 
to be mistaken for normal light, for it was the ‘very light [that] made me, and I was below it 
because by it I was made. Anyone who knows truth knows it, and whoever knows it knows 
eternity. Love knows it.’ (7.10.16). Augustine recognises and names this light calling it ‘O eternal 
Truth, true Love, and beloved Eternity, you are my God, and for you I sigh day and night,’ 
(7.10.16).145 In his visionary prayer truth, love, and eternity are not isolated attributes; they 
inextricably qualify each other, such that truth is eternal, love is true, eternity is beloved. One 
cannot be understood apart from the others.  
At this point, Augustine finds the vision overpowering (‘I trembled with love and dread’ 
(7.10.16)). Before turning away he asks God his most pressing question and receives an answer: 
 
I said, ‘Is truth then a nothing, simply because it is not spread out through space 
either finite or infinite?’ Then from afar you cried to me, ‘By no means, for I am 
who I am.’ I heard it as one hears a word in the heart, and no possibility of doubt 
remained in me; I could more easily have doubted that I was alive than that truth 
exists, truth that is seen and understood through the things that are made. 
(7.10.16) 
  
When Augustine encounters the divine, his urgent question is whether eternal truth exists, since 
he realises that it cannot have a bodily form but cannot imagine non-bodily existence. God’s 
reply brings truth and divine existence into a correspondence of identity; they are one and the 
 
145 Note, at the beginning of his account of the Milan vision, Augustine names God as Love, Truth, and Eternal, 
which closely resembles the Old Testament language for God examined in Chapter III (Yahweh, ḥesed and ʾĕmet). 
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same. Through his ardent longing for God and Truth, Augustine has come to see that in the 
divine truth is God’s being.   
Later, Augustine clarifies what this encounter taught him. He recounts advancing beyond 
a material understanding of God which he learned from the Manichees, that a divine substance 
pervades the cosmos (7.14.20). He becomes certain that God exists in that God ‘is infinite but 
not spread out through space either finite or infinite, and that [God] exist[s] in the fullest sense 
because [God] have always been the same [cf. Psalm 101:28(102:27); Hebrews 1:12], unvarying 
in every respect and in no wise subject to change.’ (7.20.26). The greatness of God’s existence is 
not being the biggest or most extensive or most pervasive of all things (even infinitely so), but 
rather, God’s being is God’s constancy, eternality, and invariability.  
Finally overpowered by the vision, Augustine turns his attention to created existence, and 
remarks on its distinction from God’s existence: ‘they do not in the fullest sense exist, nor yet are 
they completely non-beings: they are real because they are from you, but unreal inasmuch as 
they are not what you are. For that alone truly is, which abides unchangingly’ (7.11.17). 
Creaturely existence derives from God’s existence but is not fully like God’s, who alone is 
marked by constancy without diminishment or alteration. Such creaturely existence, though 
lesser than divine existence, is a non-neutral phenomenon; it is good and such goodness 
decreases as a created thing is destroyed. Augustine puts it succinctly: ‘Hence if [created things] 
are deprived of all good, they will be simply non-existent; and so it follows that as long as they 
do exist, they are good.’ (7.12.18). Upon this groundwork of creaturely existence and goodness, 
Augustine builds an account of creaturely truth:  
 
I turned my gaze to other things and saw that they owe their being to you and that 
all of them are by you defined, but in a particular sense: not as though contained 
in a place, but because you hold all things in your Truth as though in your hand; 
and all of them are true insofar as they exist, and nothing whatever is a deceit 
unless it is thought to be what it is not. (7.15.21) 
 
 All things are sustained by God’s Truth and are themselves true insofar as they exist. Thus, just 
as creaturely existence is less than Godly existence, so too is creaturely truth limited by 
comparison. In sum, the existence, goodness, and truth of creatures are all derivative of and 
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dependent upon God’s existence, goodness, and truth, and furthermore. These characteristics 
naturally coincide with each other, and (unlike God) they can be variable or destroyed in 
creatures (e.g. perishing, evil, and deception).  
 As the vision ends, note that Augustine does not describe it as a direct unmediated vision 
of God, but rather: ‘Then indeed did I perceive your invisible reality through created things, but 
to keep my gaze there was beyond my strength.’ (7.17.23) Even though God is in some sense 
‘seen’ (metaphorical sense of light, as he makes clear at the beginning of the vision), the divine is 
decidedly beyond Augustine’s comprehension, or even sustained contemplation. The encounter 
in all its fullness does not last, but the memory of it and the understanding he gained remains.      
Augustine’s Milanese vision can augment parameter (a) regarding understanding God as 
truth. It adopts Augustine’s conviction that the reality of God and of Truth are one and the same. 
The greatness of God’s existence is not in being the biggest or most extensive or most pervasive 
of all things (even infinitely so), but rather, God’s being is Truth: constancy, eternality, and 
invariability. Furthermore, the love, truth, and eternal are not independent divine attributes; they 
inextricably qualify each other. This can be used to specify the significance of saying God alone 
is Truth, in distinction from creaturely truths. All things derive their existence from God, but 
their existence differs in that it can be diminished, altered, and is limited by time and space. 
Likewise, creaturely existence is true but its truth is limited compared to God’s. Thus, for our 
parameter, I would say that the Truth which is God is non-identical with the (shall we say) lower-
case-t ‘truth’ of the created world. Created truths are limited in time and space (being temporal 
and bodily) while the eternal Truth of God is infinite and the source of all created little-t truths. 
 
The Vision in Ostia 
 
The second vision this study draws on focuses on the afterlife, inquiring into the life, 
health, happiness, and joy of the saints. Augustine’s final and climactic vision in Confessions is 
one which he shares with his mother Monica in Ostia, shortly before her death. According to 
Augustine’s autobiographical narrative, a great deal has changed since his vision in Milan. Since 
then, he has become convinced that a mediator is necessary, that Christ is the mediator, and after 
much inner turmoil, turned himself over to God (with God’s help) in the famous Tolle Lege scene 
in his Milanese garden (8.8.19-8.12.30). He left his profession, retired to Cassiciacum for a few 
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months with relatives, friends, and students, returned to Milan for catechesis and baptism under 
Bishop Ambrose, and finally set out to return to Thagaste with his mother and companions.  
Just as in the earlier vision, Augustine begins by naming God ‘Truth.’ He introduces the 
Ostian episode with the phrase ‘we inquired between ourselves in the light of present truth, the 
Truth which is yourself, what the eternal life of the saints would be like,’ (9.10.23). From there, 
the vision commences with a sense of worldly bodily enjoyments, to the celestial heavens, 
reaching up from there to the height of their minds, and reaching beyond towards ‘That Which 
Is’. At the height, they find the life of heaven is Wisdom, who is the unmade God and made all 
things 
 
Life there is the Wisdom through whom all these things are made, and all others 
that have been or ever will be; but Wisdom herself is not made: she is as she 
always has been and will be forever. Rather should we say that in her there is no 
“has been” or “will be,” but only being, for she is eternal, but past and future do 
not belong to eternity. And as we talked and panted for it, we just touched the 
edge of it by the utmost leap of our hearts; …  and returned to the noise of 
articulate speech, where a word has beginning and end. How different from your 
Word, our Lord, who abides in himself, and grows not old, but renews all things. 
(9.10.24) 
 
A rapturous passage follows, where Augustine describes what he might have said if words did 
not escape him (9.10.25). He wonders what it would be to hear the Word speak without 
mediation, or touch Wisdom in a vision without the tumult of the world at hand,   
 
touch that eternal Wisdom who abides above all things; 
 if this could last, 
 and all other visions, so far inferior, be taken away, 
 and this sight alone ravish him who saw it, 
 and engulf him and hide him away, kept for inward joys, (9.10.25)  
 
This is Augustine’s glimpse of eternal life.  
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But what do the joys of eternal life have to do with truth? Everything, as far as Augustine 
is concerned: 
 
 Now the happy life is joy in the truth; and that means joy in you, who are the 
Truth O God who shed the light of salvation on my face, my God. Everyone 
wants this happy life, this life which alone deserves to be called happy; all want it, 
all want joy in the truth. (10.23.33).  
 
He explains that a happy life is joyful in the truth, because joy in the truth is inherently superior 
to joy in falsehood (10.23.33). But truth that lasts and cannot be lost is only found in eternal 
Truth of God. In this way, God is the life of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body: ‘You 
are the life of souls, the life of all lives, the life who are yourself living and unchanging, the life 
of my own soul’ (3.6.10) and again later ‘but your God is to you the life of your life itself,’ 
(10.6.10). The reason people fall short of a happy life is they select a lesser truth than God to be 
the ultimate object of their love (10.23.33).  
 Recalling the Milanese and Ostian visions together, conceptual parameter (b) the human 
apprehension of truth maybe reinforced. Specifically, the apprehensible but incomprehensible 
nature of divine truth can site support in Augustine’s inability to comprehend the divine reality 
on both occasions. That visions nonetheless occurred supports that divine Truth may be 
apprehended, learned, discovered, abided in, held in faith, brought into understanding.  
(c) the human pursuit of truth may also be strengthened. The Ostian vision again shows 
the pursuit of truth is of more than intellectual benefit. Joy is incomplete, is insufficient, until it 
rests in divine truth, making it the object of one’s love, a source of delight, and one’s animating 
life. Since joy is greater when it is in what is true/real than what is false, and it is greater when its 
source cannot be lost, God the eternal Truth above all truths is the only sure source of happiness.   
 
Creation Proclaiming the Divine                  
 
Overall, Augustine’s view in Confessions is that creation proclaims God and refers one to 
God and the truth and wisdom of God—which is made apparent by the created wisdom and truth 
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of creation. Conceptual parameter (c) the human pursuit of truth may usefully draw on these 
views. 
A common refrain is that everything in creation cries out about the existence of God (to 
those who have ears to hear it). For instance in Book 10 Augustine declares his love for God, and 
that everything in the earth and sky tells him—indeed they declare to everyone—that one should 
love God (10.6.8). Their proclamation is perceptible from their mere existence (which they could 
not have given to themselves) and from their beauty, which takes its form from God.   
 
Your creation sings praise to you so that we may love you, and we love you so 
that praise may be offered to you by your creation. Created things have their 
beginnings and their end in time, their rising and setting, their growth and decline, 
their beauty of form and their formlessness; and thus they have their morning and 
evening, though sometimes this is hidden, sometimes plainly seen. (13.33.48) 
 
 Augustine holds that it is manifest from their limited beauty and existence (that they 
have beginnings and ends) conveys that they could not have made themselves. This directs 
human attention towards God.  
He acknowledges that not all people hear creation proclaiming God in this way. He 
allows that creation ‘speaks to all, but only they understand who test the voice heard outwardly 
against the truth within. Truth tells me, “Neither earth nor sky nor any bodily thing is your God.” 
Their own nature avers it.’ (10.6.10) One must consider creation with one’s awareness of divine 
truth, senses within oneself, to recognise its praise of God.  
What Augustine means by the ‘truth within’ becomes clearer in Book 11. He recounts 
how the Word ‘speaks to us’ that believers may ‘seek him within themselves and find him in the 
eternal Truth where he, our sole teacher, instructs apt disciples’ (11.8.10).146 Confessions presents 
divine Truth as instrumental to learning what the created world declares about God. As he puts it, 
‘when some changeable creature advises us, we are but led to that stable Truth, where we truly 
learn as we stand still and listen to him, and are filled with joy on hearing the Bridegroom’s 
voice,’ (11.8.10). The Bridegroom is the eternal Word, who is God’s Son, Power, Wisdom, and 
 
146 This passage has much in common with the view he advances in The Teacher, which after a long discussion of 
the nature of language, uses a similar analysis to advance the view that one can never recognise a truth (and thus can 
never learn) without appealing to one’s inner sense of Truth which is actually God and Christ. 
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Truth, who made heaven and earth (11.9.11). The inner awareness of eternal truth contrasts with 
the sensory experience of the changeable created world; recognising the contrast indicates the 
superior glory of the eternal Truth, God, who creates and sustains the cosmos. From these 
passages, we can see that even though Augustine has consistently indicated that appealing to 
bodily senses and the created world alone will not give one knowledge of divine Truth or God, 
he does believe that bodily senses and the created world can provide assistance in the search.  
These views are taken to augment (c) the human pursuit of truth, adding detail as to how 
creation may enable one to attend to God. God is involved from the beginning. The existence and 
beauty of all things is marvellous, and to those who already recognise the eternal truth who is 
God, it is clear that creaturely things could not have created themselves or given themselves 
form. Their limitation and dependence always points beyond themselves, and those who 
recognise that God’s unwavering existence is beyond changeable creation can see that God is the 
beyond which creation points towards. Realising one always implicitly has a sense of eternal 
truth, in every sensory perception, is crucial. Surely, one cannot come to know God purely 




This section has examined Confessions and from its findings further develops the 
conceptual parameters (a), (b), and (c) gleaned from On the Free Choice of the Will. They do not 
receive greater definition in the following section, which develops two new conceptual 
parameters ((d) the Trinitarian God as truth and (e) the relationship between wisdom and 
knowledge.) For this reason, we will articulate the fully developed form of conceptual parameters 
(a), (b), and (c) here. Their Augustinian quality should be apparent from the preceding two 
sections, in that they are clearly drawn from his work, but the constructive theologian is speaking 
now in her own voice.  
(a) understanding God as truth holds that God godself is eternal truth, that of which all 
humans have an awareness when judging matters of mathematics and questions wisdom 
necessary for a good life. This God, however, is also personal, a Truth one may invoke, pray to, 
confide in, confess to, and so forth. God’s names include ‘Truth’ as well as ‘Love’ and ‘Eternal’, 
each qualifying the others rather than standing independently. Hence, the reality of God and 
   
 94 
eternal Truth are one and the same: the greatness of God’s existence is not in being the biggest or 
most extensive or most pervasive of all things (even infinitely so), but rather, God’s being is 
Truth: constancy, eternality, and invariability. God is the source and sustainer of creaturely 
existence and truth, hierarchically superior to creation which is temporal and/or bodily and thus 
liable to diminish and alter. The lower-case-t ‘truth’ of the created world is inherently limited and 
therefore utterly unlike divine Truth. A precise articulation, or definition of God as truth, 
however, is not possible because comprehension of divine Truth is not humanly possible (as we 
shall see in conceptual parameter (b)). 
(b) the human apprehension of divine truth stipulates that God as Truth itself is beyond 
human comprehension. It may be learned, discovered, abided in, held in faith, brought into 
understanding, but it is never comprehended in this life. Eternal truth is available to all rational 
minds in all places, and human apprehension of divine truth is limited, fallible, variable, and 
diverse. It is an implicit contributor to human understanding of sensory perceptions, but 
distinguishable from sensory experience. The result is an apophatic realist position, such that 
God is mysterious and incomprehensible while yet being knowable and nameable as ‘Truth.’ 
Additionally, the sought-after divine truth never becomes an object, subjected to the searcher, but 
rather, it is the condition of possibility for one’s search. When one seeks for the truth of God, it is 
already present and closer than one is to oneself.  
 (c) on the human pursuit of truth develops in multiple ways. First, it becomes clear that 
the search for divine truth never ceases (in that comprehension is never achieved) but there is 
nonetheless at least one watershed moment, when one recognises divine truth as one’s God and 
accepts God with all one’s heart, soul, and mind. (The divine Truth is none other than the God 
who is incarnate and revealed in Jesus Christ.) This relates to a further emphasis that the pursuit 
of truth is not limited to the intellect; it involves emotions, volition, patterns of life, virtues etc.. 
Likewise, its benefits are not merely cognitive but include health, life, peace of mind, and virtue. 
To explain, one is freed from moral errors as well as inaccuracies, which contributes to living a 
good life. Furthermore, happiness is incomplete until it delights in eternal truth. One’s freedom 
and happiness are secure because they are founded on eternal truth which never fails. Finally, 
those who recognise divine truth, having not confused God with creation, they can realise that 
creation proclaims the beauty, truth, and being of God; creation refers one to the creator. 
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These three conceptual parameters have reached their final forms before being deployed 
in Chapter IV’s constructive theology of truth, leaving the remainder of Chapter II to develop 
two more Augustinian parameters.  
 
II.4 ‘The Trinity’ and Truth 
 
Valuable conceptual guidelines for this study’s theology of truth have been stipulated by 
parameters (a), (b), and (c) as developed in the previous two sections. Some important questions 
remain, however, such as ‘how does naming God ‘Truth’ intersect with the doctrine of the Trinity 
?’ and ‘what are the consequences of divine truth for the pursuit of non-divine truths?’ 
Examining The Trinity147 will provide material to form conceptual parameters treating these 
issues.  
To that end, this study first lays out Augustine’s semantic principles for articulating 
divine names in accordance with the Trinity. The impact of these Trinitarian semantics for 
naming God as Truth will then be made apparent, including its relation to other divine names. 
From this investigation, material will be formed into parameter (d) the Trinitarian God as Truth, 
stating among other things that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each Truth. The second half of 
this section examines Augustine’s account of how humans successfully pursue wisdom and 
knowledge. From this material, conceptual parameter (e) is developed to treat the relationship of 
knowledge and wisdom, specifically their distinguishing traits and complementary relationship.  
 
The Semantics of Trinitarian Language  
 
First, let us consider naming God as Truth in relation to the Trinitarian names. This is an 
important question because this study’s methodology aims to produce a distinctly Christian 
theology. As such, it should not only be congruent with the Bible, but also congruent with the 
Nicene Creed and informed by subsequent Christian tradition. An advantage of using Augustine 
to inform our theology is that he post-dates the agreement reached over the Nicene Creed (in the 
First Council of Constantinople, 381) and The Trinity defends and illuminates the Creed.148 By 
 
147 In this subsection, references to The Trinity appear parenthetically. 
148 Edmund Hill, ‘Introduction,’ in The Trinity, by Augustine of Hippo, trans. Edmund Hill and ed. John E. Rotelle 
(2nd ed., New York: New City Press 1991), 48-9. 
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developing conceptual parameters from views of his that are congruent with the Nicene Creed, 
this study ensures that its constructive theology of truth is congruent with the Creed as well as 
informed by Augustine. Specifically, this study incorporates his explication of the semantics of 
Trinitarian names and other names for God, as outlined below. 
In The Trinity, Augustine spends Books 5-7 parsing out the proper Trinitarian semantics 
for speaking of and naming God. He begins by observing that when one tries to speak of the 
Trinitarian God, it is a task at which one will repeatedly fail:  
 
From now on I will be attempting to say things that cannot altogether be said … 
when we think about God the trinity we are aware that our thoughts are quite 
inadequate to their object, and incapable of grasping him as he is; even by men of 
the calibre of the apostle Paul he can only be seen, as it says, like a puzzling 
reflection in a mirror (1 Cor 13.12). (5.1.1) 
 
That said, despite being unequal to the task one cannot simply sit in silence—ceasing and 
refusing to speak of the Trinity—because the human creature should always contemplate, praise, 
and bless God. For this reason, Augustine asks his reader to acknowledge that whatever he writes 
about the Trinity—‘about the unchanging and invisible nature, that supreme and all-sufficient 
life,’—that these pronouncements and insights ‘cannot be measured by the standard of things 
visible, changeable, mortal and deficient.’ (5.2). Recalling conceptual parameters (b), regarding 
the ultimate ineffability of God, we can take this prolegomena of humility to be another nod to 
God’s incomprehensibility, like that encountered in Augustine’s mathematical, Milanese, and 
Ostian visions. Thus, even as Augustine embarks on providing greater conceptual 
clarity/delineations for Trinitarian thought than ever before, he does so with the firm view that 
whatever clarity they contribute, they will remain deficient.      
 Second to linguistic humility, another key aspect of Augustine’s semantics regarding the 
Trinity is that any description of God in Godself does not attribute a trait to God. Properly 
speaking, this language refers to God’s very substance or being although without delineating it. 
Here, Augustine does not appear to be stringent about which terms are used for God’s being; he 
prefers that the notion of God’s existence is understood correctly to having strict terminology. He 
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provides multiple Latin and Greek words, presents linguistic analogies, and invokes Exodus 3, 
all to indicate the sort of divine existence he means to indicate:  
 
There is at least no doubt that God is substance, or perhaps a better word would 
be being; at any rate what the Greeks call ousia. Just as we get the word 
“wisdom” from “wise,” and “knowledge” from “know,” so we have the word 
“being” from “be.” And who can more be than he that said to his servant, I am 
who I am, and Tell the sons of Israel, He who is sent me to you (Ex 3:14)? (5.2.3)  
 
Augustine does not seek to strictly define God’s ‘being’ but rather evokes a sense of it. He then 
notes that most substances, things, as we encounter them have ‘modifications’ [accidentia] or 
accidents—notable aspects which may change as their substance remains through the change, 
undergoing the change. In contrast to the changeable substances, the constancy and eternality of 
God means that God does not perish, diminish, or change. As a result, whatever is said about 
God’s being always treats God’s substance, God’s very self, and not some changeable aspect or 
trait of God’s being. There are no such changeable aspects.  
Additionally, when God is said to be ‘good’, or ‘great’, or any other term that speaks to 
God’s very substance, these words (good, great, etc.) have a different sense than when used to 
speak of created things. While temporal and creaturely things are called ‘great’ in reference to a 
sense of greatness which is beyond themselves, God is called Great without reference to any 
greatness other than the greatness of God. In Augustine’s own words,  
 
[God] is great with his great self because his is his own greatness. The same must 
be said about goodness and eternity and omnipotence and about absolutely all the 
predications that can be stated of God, because it is all said with reference to 
himself, and not metaphorically either or in simile but properly—if anything, that 
is, can be said properly about him by a human tongue. (5.10.11) 
 
From this, it is apparent that in addition to God being free from changeable accidents, the 
character of God’s being or substance is also complete unto itself, without reference to other 
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greatness, goodness or what have you. Substantive names all speak directly to God’s substance 
without further referential context.149  
Classically, Aristotle described nine categories of accident that a substance may have, a 
conceptual schema with which Augustine was familiar. Again, how God may be understood in 
terms of these categories is not entirely within human comprehension. In a passage thought to 
touch upon all nine, Augustine says,  
 
Thus we should understand God, if we can and as far as we can, to be good 
without quality, great without quantity, creative without need or necessity, 
presiding without position, holding all things together without possession, wholly 
everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without any change in 
himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing. (5.2) 
 
Hill attributes these descriptions to the nine categories in the following order: ‘quality, quantity, 
relationship (that, I think, is what he is referring to when he says “creative without need or 
necessity”), position, habitus (which I translate as possession, but which usually refers to 
clothing, for reasons best known to Aristotle), place, time, action, and passion.’150 All nine 
categories of creaturely attributes are ‘substantive’ for God, with one exception: relationship. Our 
next point justifies the exception. 
Our third key contribution of Augustine’s Trinitarian semantics is that relational divine 
names do not speak exclusively of God’s substance, unlike names drawn from other categories of 
classical attributes. Augustine makes the astute observation that, of these categories, they all 
speak in reference to the being under consideration (e.g. changeable qualities it has or has not), 
except for the category of relation, which speaks in reference to something else (e.g. 
‘friendships, proximities, subordinations, likenesses, equalities,’)(5.6). A being may undergo a 
change of relationship without altering its very existence. It may also have opposite relationships 
simultaneously; ‘above’ and ‘below’ are opposite characteristics, but something may be 
 
149 One might contend that epistemically one must know goodness in worldly things before one can recognise the 
goodness of God. Augustine would quibble with the ‘before.’ He holds that worldly goodness is unrecognisable 
unless one already has some sense of divine goodness (making itself) available to the intellect. Certainly, he holds 
that the good things of this world can aid one’s comprehension of divine goodness, but they are never instrumental 
in and of themselves—only when understood in light of the Good (the True, etc.). 
150 Trinity, fn2 p190. 
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simultaneously ‘above’ and ‘below’ if each is taken as treating different relations (usually to 
different things). God may be named ‘Creator’ in relationship to the cosmos God creates. 
Augustine designates the Trinitarian divine names (e.g. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) as 
relational names, naming their relationships to each other, and thereby solves a number of 
Trinitarian conundrums (e.g. if God is one, how can both the Father and the Son be God without 
the Father and Son being one and the same?). Because relations may differ without a difference 
of substance, one may say different things about the relations of God the Father compared to the 
relations of God the Son without thereby implying that there is any difference between their 
substances; they remain equally God (5.6). Augustine sums up the essentials in this way,  
 
The chief point then that we must maintain is that whatever that supreme and 
divine majesty is called with reference to itself is said substance-wise; whatever it 
is called with reference to another is said not substance- but relationship-wise; and 
that such is the force of the expression “of the same substance” in Father and Son 
and Holy Spirit, that whatever is said with reference to self about each of them is 
to be taken as adding up all three to a singular and not to a plural. (5.8.9) 
 
Do note, however, that the relationships of the Trinity are not changeable. The insight 
regarding relationships being changeable without altering a thing’s substance was merely to 
illustrate that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be spoken of differently (be non-identical in how 
they relate to each other), while yet still being of the same substance (5.6). 
Trinitarian names are not God’s only relational names. Some divine appellations relate 
God to creation. The same principle applies, in that God’s relationship to creation may change 
without the substance of God changing. Augustine makes this point explicitly, saying 
 
Thus when [God] is called something with reference to creation, while indeed he 
begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this does not involve 
anything happening to God’s own substance, but only to the created thing to 
which the relationship predicated of him refers (5.16.17).  
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For instance, God is said to be Creator in relationship to creation, but this is not an aspect of 
God’s very being. Likewise, if God is the ‘friend’ of someone, say a biblical character, Augustine 
explains,  
 
It is however said by way of a modification of that with reference to which God 
begins to be called it. That a just man begins to be called the friend of God means 
that he changes. But it is unthinkable that God should love someone temporally, 
as though with a new love that was not in him before, seeing that with him things 
past do not pass, and things future have already happened. . . . So too when he is 
said to be angry with the wicked and pleased with the good, they change, not he; 
just as light is harsh to weak eyes, pleasant to strong; but it is the eyes, not the 
light, that change. (5.16.17) 
 
In this way, looking forward to the Old Testament in the next chapter, one could say, Yahweh’s 
apparently changing disposition towards Israel, from expressing fearful judgment or loving 
deliverance, is not a change in Yahweh’s character or being, but rather, a change in God’s 
relationship to Israel as a result of Israel’s changeableness.  
To recap, we have identified three important aspects of Augustine’s Trinitarian semantics: 
first, the humble acknowledgment that our language always falls short of God’s glory as we 
attempt to speak of the divine Trinity. Second, anything that is said of God’s very self refers 
properly to his substance, (even though we can only apprehend and not fully comprehend what 
that might be), and not to a secondary additional trait, and that these refer only to God and not 
implicitly to any other. Third, the Trinitarian names are relational names, and since relationship 
may differ while substance remains the same, so Father, Son, and Spirit may differ relationally 
while being equal in their being. God may also have relational names which are said in relation 
to creation, and these names or relations may change as creation changes (whereas the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit as unchanging spoken in relation to God Godself).  
Having set out this much, Augustine finds that a particular passage of scripture appears to 
trouble his framework. 1 Cor 1:24 states that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. 
This worries Augustine because it could be seen to imply that the Father is only Wisdom or 
Power (wise and omnipotent) by virtue of the Son he has begotten (7.1.1). Were this the case, 
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then the Father would not be powerful or wise in his own right, but only in relationship to the 
Son (7.1.1). Given the convertibility151 of the non-relational divine names, if the Power and 
Wisdom of God turned out to be relational names, then all of God’s similarly substantive names 
would be relational. (7.1.1 and 6.2). 
Augustine spends all of Book 7 exploring potential attempts to reconcile 1 Cor 1:24 with 
his Trinitarian semantics. It takes a Creedal phrase to escape the conundrum. The Nicene Creed 
calls Christ ‘God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God’ and Augustine uses this 
precedent to say that Christ may also be Wisdom from Wisdom, Power from Power (6.2). They 
remain substantive names while standing in relation to each other. The name ‘Word’, however, is 
a relational name (a word originates from the one who utters it) leading Augustine to designate it 
as only applicable to the Son. This example allows Augustine to clarify his thinking: 
 
Son is not Word in the same way as he is wisdom, because he is not called Word 
with reference to himself, but only in relationship to him whose Word he is, just 
as he is Son in relationship to the Father. . . (for Word is to be understood 
relationship-wise, wisdom being-wise) let us take it as being the same, when it is 
called Word, as if it were called “born wisdom” and as such it can also be Son and 
image. (7.2.3).  
 
Thus, all three divine persons are properly called wisdom.  
At the beginning of Book 8, Augustine summarises his conclusions from the previous 
three chapters’ inquiry into the semantics of divine names.  To be clear, the impact of Augustine’s 
divine name semantics for the Trinity are as follows. Relational names are properly said of the 
Trinity—meaning each of the persons Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—and anything said of the 
person itself (rather than relationally) is also said of the other two singly and of them as one (e.g. 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each God, and there is only one God). Just as all three are 
one wisdom, the three are also light and one light (7.6). Furthermore, equality is always 
maintained among the persons and with the Godhead (the Father and Son are not together greater 
than the Holy Spirit, nor the Father less great than the Trinity itself), with the caveat that ‘person’ 
does not imply a ‘diversity of being’ but only a placeholder signifying the three ‘whats’ the 
 
151 God’s power is God’s wisdom, is God’s greatness, is God’s very being etc. This principle is explicated below. 
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relational names distinguish (8.1). Having set forth Augustine’s Trinitarian semantics, we may 
now consider how they bear on naming God as ‘Truth,’ but first a provisional conceptual 
parameter is devised. 
From this discussion, I stipulate conceptual parameter (d) on the Trinitarian God as truth, 
asserting that it adopts Augustine’s Trinitarian semantics: the insufficiency of all god-talk, the 
nature and distinction between relational and substantive divine names, the equality of divine 
persons and the unity of God. This will not only serve us when it comes to expounding upon 
Truth as a Trinitarian divine name, it will also ensure that our constructive theology remains 
congruent with the Nicene Creed.  
 
God as Truth Itself  
 
With Trinitarian semantics in place, this study wishes to examine the divine name 
‘Truth’. Remarkably, this is also Augustine’s next move. Immediately upon completing Books 5-
7 treatment of divine names generally, Augustine begins Book 8 by contemplating God as Truth. 
This subsection draws on multiple passages to show that Truth is a substantive divine name 
which is convertible with all other substantive divine names. 
Augustine implores his reader to beseech God for assistance, to ‘open our understanding 
… so that our minds may be able to perceive the essence or being of truth, without any mass, 
without any changeableness’ (8.1). He bids us  
 
come and see it if you can—God is truth. … Do not ask what truth is; 
immediately a fog of bodily images and a cloud of fancies will get in your way 
and disturb the bright fair weather that burst on you the first instant when I said 
“truth.” Come, hold it in that first moment in which so to speak you caught a flash 
from the corner of your eye when the word “truth” was spoken, stay there if you 
can. (8.3).  
 
Because God is truth, and all God’s attributes are also God’s substance, Augustine naturally 
observes that ‘in the essence or being of truth to be true is the same as to be’ (8.2). This almost 
mystical passage and Augustine’s semantics of a Trinitarian God, provide our final conceptual 
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parameter: Truth is, in its essence, being. Thus we see that for Augustine, it follows from his 
belief that God exists and is truth, that ultimately Truth and Being are one. But more than this, 
Augustine warns, is difficult to articulate, for God’s being is not to be confused with the 
creaturely existence to which we are accustomed: ‘A flesh-bound habit of thought . . . while it 
perceives as far as its powers extend true things that have been created, it cannot gaze upon the 
truth itself which they were created by.’ (8.1.2). Yet, this divine truth is beyond our 
comprehension, if not beyond our acquaintance. Specifically, one may say that God’s being is 
Truth, and that Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each Trinitarian person is truth, as they all share in 
the same substance.  
We have already seen Augustine say that in God, truth and being are one. The 
coincidence of these two divine names applies not only to them, but to all non-relational names 
of God. The point is made while pursuing the Trinitarian semantics:  
 
God however is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, true, 
and anything else that seems not to be unworthy of him; but greatness is identical 
with his wisdom (he is not great in mass but in might), and his goodness is 
identical with his wisdom and greatness, and his truth is identical with them all; 
and with them being blessed is not one thing, and being great or wise or true or 
good, or simply being, another. (6.6.8) 
 
This is a point that recurs throughout The Trinity, and one which is founded on God’s simplicity, 
unity, and unchangeability. For instance, when Augustine explains why all three persons are 
Wisdom but only the Son is Word, he explicitly says that God’s simplicity means that wisdom is 
the same as being (7.2). Likewise, earlier in the text, the point comes out more poetically, where 
Augustine has each of three central traits describe each other: ‘For God’s essence, by which he 
is, has absolutely nothing changeable about its eternity or its truth or its will; there truth is eternal 
and love is eternal; there love is true and eternity true; there eternity is lovely and truth is lovely 
too.’ (4.1). Here, God’s will is correlated to God’s love and he weaves God’s Truth, Eternal 
being, and Love together, as we saw in Confessions.152  
 
152 Augustine’s triad of Eternal, Love, and Truth for divine names bears a striking resemblance to yhwh, ḥesed, and 
ʾĕmet in the next chapter. 
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Note, however, the complete identity of being and truth, and other substantive names in 
God does not obtain in creation. Augustine can observe that while greatness and truth are the 
same in God he notes that greatness and truth do not coincide perfectly in creation (8.1.2). He 
offers gold and man’s spirit as examples, by which he means that what makes each of these great 
is not the same as what makes them true: ‘In both cases the reason is that the essence of being of 
body and of spirit is not the being or essence of truth; but the trinity is, which is the one, only, 
great God, true, truthful, truth.’ (8.2.3).153    
The most magnificent display of the unification and convertibility of substantive divine 
names comes in the final book of The Trinity. After completing a grand summary of the previous 
fourteen books, Augustine wonders if it is possible to see the Trinity through understanding as 
well as faith. In the process, he describes the reducibility of all substantive divine names. To this 
we now turn.  
The first salient point is that God’s immortality is the same as God’s unchangeableness, 
for perishing is its own form of change. Augustine expands upon this coincidence, saying, 
‘therefore one and the same idea is being said, whether you say God is eternal or immortal or 
incorruptible or unchangeable; and again’ he continues ‘whether you say  he is living or 
understanding, which is the same as wise, the same thing is being said.’ (15.5.7). To drive the 
point home that all substantive divine names are convertible with each other, he then carefully 
takes nine things one would say about God, that God is ‘Eternal, immortal, incorruptible, 
unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, just, good, happy, [and] spirit’ (15.8) and shows how they 
may all be reduced to ‘wisdom.’ To begin, while among these terms, only ‘spirit’ is substantive 
and the rest are attributive, because in God all attributes are God’s very being, each should be 
treated substantively. Then, he argues that ‘eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable’ may 
all be conveyed under the heading ‘eternal’. Likewise, ‘living, wise, powerful, [and] beautiful’ 
are categorised under ‘wise’. So too, ‘just’, ‘spirit’, ‘happy’, and ‘good’ may be subsumed by 
‘happy.’ Finally ‘eternal, wise, [and] happy’ may be expressed with the single word ‘wisdom.’ 
Any substantive name, he adds, could sum up them all. Augustine’s aim is show that none of 
these triads are identical with the Trinity, but for our purposes this underlines the complete 
 
153 As O’Daly points out, Augustine adumbrates his view ‘The true I consider to be what is’ in Soliloquies, and 
makes similar points in numerous other compositions (O’Daly, 186-7). 
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convertibility of the substantive divine names. Succinctly put, God’s ‘wisdom is not one thing 
and his being another, seeing that for him to be is the same as to be wise’ (15.6.9).  
Our examination of Augustine on the divine name ‘Truth’ may now inform and complete 
(d) the Trinitarian God as truth. It holds that ‘Truth’ is a substantive name for God, identical 
with God’s eternal being. Furthermore, in God all substantive names coincide and are reducible 
to any other substantive name. This coincidence does not hold in created things, though some 
general association of the substantive names of God with each other does carry through. 
Involved with this, are the corollary points that God as Truth itself continues to be beyond human 
comprehension, but not acquaintance.       
 
Knowledge and Wisdom: Their Distinction 
 
The final Augustinian conceptual parameter draws from Augustine’s understanding of the 
relationship between wisdom and knowledge, to which we now turn. In current-day English, 
‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’ are commonly used as if they mean something similar but belong to 
different registers, comparable to how we use the words ‘light’ and ‘lustre’. One may study light 
with scientific rigour, but interjecting a mention of lustre would be incongruous, as if one joined 
a debate about whether light is a particle or a wave, by interjecting a bit of verse, saying, ‘the 
lustre of facility / increases with humility.’ ‘Light’ and ‘knowledge,’ in this common view, are the 
more basic terms and ones suitable for technical registers, while ‘lustre’ and ‘wisdom’ are 
secondary derivative terms, at once evocative but imprecise. This contemporary presumption 
about the centrality of knowledge and the woolly marginality of wisdom, is evident in the 
centrality of epistemology within philosophy and the relative lack of scholarship on the nature of 
wisdom. 
Augustine, however, would consider this a misapprehension. The Trinity treats 
knowledge and wisdom as two terms within the same register, and uses them to precisely 
designate two mental phenomena which are distinct and yet intrinsically-related. Scientia and 
sapientia signify two complementary forms of knowledge, distinct rational functions maintaining 
a ‘helpful partnership’ ‘embraced in the one nature of the mind’ (12.3.3). Rather than relating 
like lustre and light, he describes the wisdom-knowledge dynamic as like that of ‘understanding 
and activity, or counsel and execution, or reason and reasonable appetite’ (12.3.3). Knowledge 
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and wisdom differ, however, in what each focuses on: ‘wisdom [Augustine says] is concerned 
with the intelligible cognisance of eternal things and knowledge with the rational cognisance of 
temporal things’ (12.25, cf. 12.2.2, 12.3.3). In this view, knowledge focuses on what is bodily 
and temporal as perceived through the senses, while wisdom attends to what is eternal. Bodily 
and temporal things, as already discussed, categorically belong to creation; hence, all divinely 
created existence falls under the purview of knowledge. The eternal is unchanging and 
transcends both time and space; this is divine truth, encompassing mathematics, wisdom, and 
God. 
Augustine adopts these two terms from 1 Cor 12:8, which names wisdom and knowledge 
as two distinct gifts of the Spirit. He does not mean to imply that these two terms always have or 
ought to have the meaning he ascribes to them. Scientia and sapientia are not absolute 
terminology; they are meant to explicate a real distinction he perceives between reason’s 
dealings with what is eternal and its dealings with what is temporal. Augustine also refers to 
these dealings as ‘higher reason’ and ‘lower reason’ respectively, but is firm in pointing out that 
higher and lower reason are not two different things but two different functions of the same 
reason (12.4.4).  
To clarify Augustine’s distinction I will elaborate an example drawn loosely from On the 
Free Choice of the Will. Wisdom is the cognisance of eternal things and knowledge is cognisance 
of temporal things. For instance, all countable things are potentially a focus of knowledge, while 
wisdom concerns number itself. The category ‘countable things’ covers both material and 
immaterial created phenomena, including physical objects, historical events, musical rhythm and 
spiritual beings like angels. One gains awareness of these through the senses. But in addition to 
its awareness of countable things, the mind also possesses an awareness of number itself — of 
individual numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4 et cetera, and, more fundamentally, of numericality. If a mind had 
no awareness of numericality, or, as Augustine would say, of ‘number’ it could not interpret the 
sound of the syllables ‘wun’, ‘too’, ‘thrree’, as signifying sequential integers: rational awareness 
of number is necessary for anyone to count or quantify anything. Augustine goes further, 
however, arguing that number itself is mind-independent because while one can comprehend, 
conceptualise, and apply numbers more or less accurately, one’s rational faculty has no ability to 
alter the nature or properties of number itself. The truths of mathematics are eternal, and persist 
apart from the mind or any material instantiation of number in countable things. For this reason, 
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number is unchanging and eternal. Applying these criteria elsewhere — to things of which we 
have a mental awareness, but whose truths persist unchangingly and independently of our minds 
— Augustine holds much else to be eternal as number is, such as goodness, truth, power, and 
beauty, even as we encounter them in temporary bodily instances. Furthermore, he holds that 
what is eternal is ipso facto divine. Thus, to put it simply, knowledge concerns creation, and 
wisdom attends to God. 
Wisdom’s engagement with the divine does not render it non-rational or mystically 
intuitive. Augustine insists that reason is preserved and engaged in wisdom. Both knowledge and 
wisdom, he maintains, are rational functions of the mind — wisdom being a higher function of 
reason and knowledge being the lower function of reason (12.1.1-12.4.4). Augustine justifies 
knowledge and wisdom’s joint rationality in that they are not separate faculties; they are the 
same reason attending to different objects. Furthermore, they are neither separate nor 
independent of each other, for in the human mind, knowledge is impossible without some 
measure of wisdom, and wisdom is impossible without some substance of knowledge. Augustine 
explains,   
 
 while [knowledge] is carried on with sensible things and with what the 
consciousness has imbibed from them through the senses of the body, [it] is 
nonetheless not without its share in reason, and so is not common to man and 
beast. But it pertains to the loftier reason [wisdom] to make judgments on these 
bodily things according to non-bodily and everlasting meanings [in Latin, 
rationes]; and unless these [the everlasting meanings] were above the human 
mind they would certainly not be unchanging, and unless something of ours were 
subjoined to them we would not be able to make judgments according to them 
about bodily things. But we do make judgments on bodily things in virtue of the 
meaning of dimensions and figures which the mind knows is permanent and 
unchanging. (12.2.2) 
 
This passage brings into focus the intimate relationship between wisdom and knowledge. As 
Augustine has just observed, awareness of the ‘non-bodily and everlasting meanings’ enables our 
rational faculty to make judgements about bodily temporal things.  
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 He illustrates this with a thought experiment. Calling to mind a beautiful architectural 
arch, he notes its material proportions and qualities and finds that more than pure sensory 
awareness is engaged when he enjoys the memory. He explains, 
 
 but with the mind I observe something else, in terms of which I take pleasure in 
this work of art, in terms of which I would put it right if it displeased me. Thus it 
is that we make judgements about these things according to that form of truth, and 
we perceive that by insight of the rational mind. … our shaping the images of 
bodies in our consciousness or our seeing bodies through the body is one thing; 
quite another is our grasping by simple intelligence the proportions, the 
inexpressibly beautiful art of such shapes, existing above the apex of the mind. 
(9.11) 
 
Remembering and appreciating the arch simultaneously involves sensory knowledge of the 
arch’s bodily existence and wisdom’s awareness of its beauty. Thus, through wise awareness of 
the eternal, one can make knowledgeable judgements about the temporal. There can be no 
knowledge without at least implicit wisdom. One cannot judge a quantity without a sense of 
unchanging number and measure. One cannot judge the truth of statements without having a 
sense of what it would mean for something to be true or false, that is, without having an 
apprehension of ‘truth’ itself. One cannot make moral judgments without an awareness that there 
is ‘goodness’ in some sense. In this way, Augustine believes that all human knowledge, all 
awareness of temporal and bodily things, depends upon wisdom’s awareness of the eternal.  
The reverse, that knowledge is necessary for wisdom, is also true, because as bodily 
temporal creatures human beings cannot directly encounter the eternal. Augustine believes that 
attempting to understand the eternal objects of wisdom apart from bodily and temporal form is 
practically impossible for human beings. In his own words, ‘Few have the acuteness of mind to 
reach these ideas, and when someone does manage as far as possible to attain them he does not 
abide in them, because his very acuteness of mind gets blunted so to say and beaten back, and 
there is only a transitory thought about a non-transitory thing’ (12.23). As in the case of 
mathematics, he says, ‘The non-bodily and unchanging idea of a square body, for example, may 
abide for ever the same; but a man’s thought does not abide in it in the same way, if that is to say 
   
 109 
he could ever attain to it without a spatial image.’ (12.23). As embodied mortal beings, humans 
can only encounter what is eternal through what is temporal.  
To summarise, Augustine calls knowledge the rational apprehension of what is bodily and 
temporal, and he calls wisdom the rational awareness of what is eternal. Knowledge requires 
wisdom because wisdom’s eternal meanings (rationes) are necessary for making judgements 
regarding the created world. Vice versa, wisdom requires knowledge because humans cannot 
conceive of that which is non-bodily apart from bodily terms.  
This study draws this material into conceptual parameter (e) the relationship of 
knowledge and wisdom as follows:  human wisdom is the rational cognisance of eternal things 
(which is to say, God), while knowledge is the rational cognisance of bodily and temporal things 
(which is to say, creation/creatures). Humans cannot advance in their understanding of one 
without the other, for the world is unintelligible apart from the eternal truth which is God (their 
maker in whom trace indications of their origin are inalienable; also, remember that God’s Truth 
includes number) and humans in their bodily, temporal, finite, fallen state are not capable of 
gazing upon divine truth directly, but need the assistance of bodily temporal creation to come to 
know divine truth more truly. 
 
Knowledge and Wisdom: Their Relationship 
 
Having established the distinction between knowledge and wisdom, their relation to the 
divine truth will be examined from both a metaphysical and a practical standpoint. Knowledge 
and wisdom are distinct functions of the rational mind, focusing on creation and the eternal 
respectively, and as we have seen, one function never takes place in isolation from the other. 
Metaphysically, the explanation for this is that as God’s creation, all bodily and temporal things 
are related to God such that they can declare God’s existence and glory. We already encountered 
this view in Confessions, when Augustine spoke of all creation declaring God’s existence and 
praising God. It reappears in Trinity Book 11. Here, worldly triads have once again fallen short 
of depicting the divine Trinity’s dynamic relations, but nevertheless, Augustine finds they are not 
entirely dissimilar. He comments that the triad in question ‘is not altogether unlike God’ and 
takes the opportunity to explicate creation’s likeness to its creator:  
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Is there anything, after all, that does not bear a likeness to God after its own kind 
and fashion, seeing that God made all things very good for no other reason that 
the he himself is supremely good? Insofar as anything that is good, to that extent 
it bears some likeness, even though a very remote one, to the highest good, and if 
this is a natural likeness it is of course a right and well-ordered likeness; if it is 
faulty, then of course a faulty and perverted one. Even in their very sins, you see, 
souls are pursuing nothing but a kind of likeness to God with a proud topsy-turvy 
and, if I may so put it, a slavish freedom. (11.8) 
 
As this passage indicates, Augustine sees that even in limited (bodily and temporal) things, there 
is similarity to God. Moreover, some similarity remains even when creatures are fallen, that is, 
faulty, sinful, and/or perverted.  
The similarity of all things to their Creator illuminates why wisdom enables one to see 
suggestions of God in worldly things. In Book 12, Augustine describes how one ‘must get 
accustomed to discovering the traces of spiritual things in bodies’ so that one then ‘turns upward 
from here and starts climbing with reason as his guide in order to reach the unchanging truth 
itself through which these things were made (John 1:3)’ (12.5.5). This metaphysical explanation 
further corroborates the epistemic point above (involving the arch) that the human encounter 
with bodily and temporal things also involves an (at least implicit) wisdom, which is a human 
awareness of the eternal. Knowledge and wisdom, within the human mind, are collaborative 
functions of the rational faculty.  
Before moving on, one final metaphysical point needs to be made, so one does not 
confuse human wisdom with divine wisdom. Augustine views human wisdom as intimately and 
dependently linked to divine wisdom while also being utterly different and always distinct from 
it. One sees this, first, in that human wisdom is by definition oriented towards divine wisdom: 
‘man’s wisdom, true wisdom of course which is in accordance with God and is in fact the true 
and principle worship of him’ (14.1.1). God’s wisdom is the foundation of genuine human 
wisdom, but so-called human wisdom can turn out to be ‘folly’ (see 1 Cor 3:19) when it makes 
reference only to created things of this world and not to God (14.1.1).  
In the lengthy passage below, Augustine goes on to say that human wisdom is in a sense 
also God’s, in that it is only genuine wisdom when it derives from love, understanding, and that 
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is worship of God, but it is not God’s in that God’s wisdom in no way relies on anything from 
humanity or creation at all. This complex, potentially confusing, relationship of wisdoms is 
clarified by the cognitive linguistic category of ‘sense facets’, where a word has two 
ontologically distinct senses that are frequently spoken of at once. To illustrate, the word ‘book’ 
has two ontologically distinct senses (the physical tome and the immaterial story) which are so 
intimately related in reality (immaterial stories are recorded in physical tomes) that frequently 
‘book’ is used to convey both senses at the same time—despite their clear ontological difference. 
In the same way, ‘wisdom’ sometimes refers at once to both human and divine wisdom despite 
their complete ontological distinction. In the following passage, Augustine speaks of wisdom this 
way while also explaining the metaphysical connection between human and divine wisdom that 
creates the necessary intimacy for them to be referred to at once (as sense-facets):  
 
Let [the mind] then remember its God to whose image it was made, and 
understand and love him … For this is called man’s wisdom in such a way that it 
is also God’s. Only then is it true wisdom; if it is merely human it is hollow. I do 
not mean it is God’s wisdom in the sense of the wisdom by which he is wise; he is 
not wise by sharing in himself, as the mind is by sharing in God. But I mean it in 
the same sense as we call God’s justice not only that by which he is himself just 
but also that which he gives to man when he justifies the godless (Rom 4:5). This 
is the justice the apostle sets before us when he says of some people, Not knowing 
the justice of God and wishing to establish their own, they did not submit to the 
justice of God (Rom 10:3). In the same way it could be said of some people, ‘Not 
knowing the wisdom of God and wishing to establish their own, they did not 
submit to the wisdom of God’ (14.15).  
 
Augustine uses the example of justice to explain that human wisdom is truly wisdom when it 
understands and loves God, who is Wisdom in himself apart from any relations.  
Returning to the relationship between human wisdom and knowledge, there is a priority 
between the two; wisdom ought to always take pre-eminence. The superiority of eternal things to 
the temporal and bodily makes this obvious to Augustine: 
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If then this is the correct distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that wisdom 
is concerned with the intellectual cognizance of eternal things and knowledge 
with the rational cognizance of temporal things, it is not hard to decide which 
should be preferred and which subordinated to the other. (12.25) 
 
He also, however, draws on scriptural support, taking Job 28:28 as his emblem of this central 
principle: ‘behold piety is wisdom, while to abstain from evil things is knowledge’ (12.22). This 
priority of wisdom is not an either/or, but an ordering of two necessary components.  
Whether humans give wisdom its rightful pre-eminence affects the character and value of 
knowledge they pursue. For knowledge and wisdom to flourish, rather than become corrupt, 
wisdom must always have priority. True knowledge is not merely any trivial fact which a person 
might know—that would include ‘a great deal of superfluous frivolity and pernicious 
curiosity’— but on the contrary, genuine knowledge is ‘anything that breeds, feeds, defends, and 
strengthens the saving faith which leads to true happiness’ (14.3). If love of wisdom is secondary 
to the pursuit of knowledge, than the resulting knowledge becomes detrimental: ‘If you neglect 
to hold dear in charity the wisdom which always remains the same, and hanker after knowledge 
through experience of changeable, temporal things, this knowledge blows up instead of building 
up.’ [1 Cor 8:1] (12.11.16). Knowledge is good only when love of eternal things overcomes its 
blowing-up tendencies—virtues are needed to get to heaven, after all (12.21).  
Certainly, this is not to disparage temporal knowledge, which Augustine readily admits is 
necessary to live one’s temporal life. But if temporal knowledge is isolated from attention to 
wisdom it no longer supports a good life. After all, knowledge’s proper goal is to reason about 
bodily things so that they may be ordered ‘to the highest good as their end’: when it fails to be 
used for this purpose knowledge can only provide the ‘illusory happiness’ of temporary goods. 
(12.12.17). Wisdom must direct knowledge for it to have good effect. In this way, Augustine 
describes a view of knowledge which necessarily involves moral value—if one tries to 
understand the things of this world apart from the good which is their end, sustains them, and 
created them, then it is not genuine knowledge, but something pernicious.   
The priority of wisdom over knowledge brings this examination of The Trinity back to 
our interest in divine truth. Setting one’s sights on divine Truth (Wisdom) allows one to better 
pursue the creaturely little-t truths (knowledge) of the cosmos. It is of instrumental value to 
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orient one’s search for wisdom, truth, and knowledge towards the Truth which one cannot 
comprehend, or else one cannot even properly know the truths one can comprehend. Augustine 
ties these themes together as follows, 
 
It is clear that when we live according to God our mind should be intent on his 
invisible things and thus progressively be formed from his eternity, truth, and 
charity, and yet that some of our rational attention, that is to say some of the same 
mind, has to be directed to the utilization of changeable and bodily things without 
which this life cannot be lived; this however not in order to be conformed to this 
world (Rom 12:2) by setting up such goods as the final goal and twisting our 
appetite for happiness onto them, but in order to do whatever we do in the 
reasonable use of temporal things with an eye to the acquisition of eternal things, 
passing by the former on the way, setting our hearts on the latter to the end. 
(12.21) 
 
In this way, humans are meant to know this world while continually also looking beyond this 
world, it in order to understand this world better and attain what is beyond it. Human wisdom, as 
we have seen, concerns that which is eternal, what simply is and does not pass in and out of 
existence with a past present and future, and which likewise is not bodily or limited in space, but 
rather always present in an unlocalised way (12.23). For God to be Love and Truth means one 
can never find a fullness or definition of either in this creaturely world; one must always look 
beyond earthly things. No earthly thing is the standard for what is love, truth, or being.  
In practice, the result is a constant mix of activity and contemplation. Augustine explains, 
‘action by which we make use of temporal things differs from contemplation of eternal things, 
and this is ascribed to wisdom, the former to knowledge’ (12.22). His ideal life does not remove 
oneself from the world, but is to live in it even better, through a combination of action and 
contemplation: ‘So we have been looking for a kind of rational couple of contemplation and 
action in the mind of everyman, with functions distributed into several channels and yet the 
mind’s unity preserved in each’ (12.19). In this way, the distinction between wisdom and 
knowledge can be seen to have robust metaphysical underpinnings as well as practical 
implications for the human pursuit of knowledge and life more generally.  
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In conclusion, conceptual parameter (e) the relationship of knowledge and wisdom takes 
on the following additional points: it is the likeness of creation to Creator that enables the 
mutually informing relationship between human wisdom and knowledge. Furthermore, human 
wisdom is so intimately inseparable with divine wisdom that they are often spoken of at once, 
though upon reflection they are entirely ontologically distinct and divine wisdom is utterly 
independent. In order for these two functions of the single rational mental faculty to develop 
properly, wisdom (that is, the devotion to God, to divine truth) must always be preeminent above 
knowledge—otherwise both become warped. The incomprehensible God who is Truth and 
Wisdom ultimately grounds all activity and contemplation that human wisdom and knowledge 




From this study’s scrutiny of The Trinity, two final Augustinian conceptual parameters 
have been developed. In the next chapter, biblical conceptual parameters will be developed, but 
first, the most recent Augustinian ones in their final form.  
(d) Trinitarian God as truth stipulates the three principles identified in Augustine’s 
approach to speaking about the Trinity. First, is the humble admission that all attempts to speak 
of the Holy Trinity are insufficient. Second, divine names which appear to attribute a particular 
trait to God always describe God’s very substance and being rather than a changeable or 
separable trait. Third, the exception to the substantive name principle are relational names that 
name God in relationship to Godself or something else. Relational names include both the names 
of the divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) and the divine names that relate God to 
creation (e.g. Creator). One great benefit of this conceptual parameter to constructive theology is 
that abiding by it ensures that the theological proposal will be in keeping with the Nicene Creed. 
Within this framework, our parameter continues, God is called ‘Truth’ as a substantive name, in 
that God is Truth in God’s very self. As a substantive name, it is also convertible with all other 
substantive divine names, such as Love, Goodness, and Being. This means that in God, divine 
Truth, Goodness, and Being are one and the same, and they are God Godself, even though in 
creation these traits do not always coincide.  
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(e) the relationship of knowledge and wisdom articulates a distinction between human 
wisdom and knowledge, where knowledge is rational awareness of temporal and bodily things 
(i.e. creaturely things and the cosmos) whereas wisdom is rational awareness of eternal things 
(i.e. divine things, God). Humans cannot advance in either wisdom or knowledge without the 
other (for the world is unintelligible apart from the eternal truth which is God), a situation 
explained by the resemblance of creation to its Creator. Creation’s dependence and resemblance 
to its Creator while yet being utterly ontologically distinct is especially apparent in the intimate 
relation between human wisdom and divine wisdom. When the pursuits of human wisdom and 
knowledge are properly integrated, wisdom ought to always take priority. Incomprehensible 
divine Wisdom and Truth which is God must be given pre-eminence or else genuine knowledge 
(let alone wisdom) will not be found.  
 
II.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has succeeded in drawing five conceptual parameters suitable for 
constructive theology regarding the relationship between truth and divinity from historically-
sensitive readings of three compositions by Augustine of Hippo. The first three, which are 
detailed at the conclusion of II.3 were developed from On the Free Choice of the Will and 
Confessions. They concern (a) understanding God as truth, (b) the human apprehension of truth, 
and (c) the human pursuit of divine truth. The final two Augustinian conceptual parameters were 
derived from his tome The Trinity, and they treat (d) understanding the Trinitarian God as truth 
and (e) the relationship between wisdom and knowledge.  
In the course of developing these five conceptual parameters, this chapter has also 
demonstrated the application of its methodology. A responsible interdisciplinary engagement 
with historical theology has been employed. The judgement of the constructive theologian has 
been displayed in the articulation of conceptual parameters that are intelligibly related to the 
historically-sensitive reading of the texts. The goal of being informed by rather than congruent 
with Augustine’s corpus has been apparent when aspects of his thought have been selectively 
omitted from the conceptual parameters that are developed. The development of a single 
conceptual parameter from multiple texts has also been on display. In this way, this chapter 
contributes to demonstrating the viability of this study’s methodology.  
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It would be possible to elaborate here the connections and implications of these 
conceptual parameters for a constructive theology of truth, but this study will delay their 
synthesis and elaboration until Chapter IV for the following reason. To begin the process now 
before developing the biblical conceptual parameters would impede the integration of the two 
sets, as it would develop two separate systems that would then need to be related, rather than 
taking a number of conceptual parameters together on equal standing with each other and then 
subsequently develop them into a coherent theology of truth.  
Additionally, this chapter has shown that the topic of approaching God as truth is a lively 
one for Augustine. In three of his cardinal works, we have found extensive explicit treatment on 
God in relationship to eternal truth, recurrent practice of naming God ‘Truth’, and detailed 
discussion of its significance and metaphysical particulars. In this way, the contribution of 
Augustine’s work to the Christian understanding of truth has received attention that has not 
previously been accorded in contemporary debates over the nature of truth. This uncovering of a 
previously under-utilised resource for theological considerations of truth and divinity is in itself a 
contribution to the field. Clearly, naming God as truth has thick metaphysical content to 
Augustine’s mind, as well as epistemological consequences. He squares it with Trinitarian 
orthodoxy in a theoretically sophisticated manner while also displaying its potent use in devotion 
and mystical encounters with God. It is also decisive in the proof he offers for God’s existence, 
indicating potential apologetic and philosophical significance of this divine name. All this 
indicates that considering God as truth is a robust vein of thought in Augustine’s work, and thus a 
fruitful area worthy of further more detailed treatment, by historical as well as constructive 
theologians.  
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Chapter III: The Old Testament 
 
 This thesis intends for its constructive theology of truth to be based upon an ancient 
Christian practice of naming God as truth. For that reason, we will examine and discern 
conceptual parameters from the most ancient, central, and authoritative texts in the Christian 
tradition: those codified as the Bible.154 Some parts of the Old Testament appear to convey a 
sense of God as truth. If one adopted the King James Version, prime examples would be Exodus 
34.6 when Yahweh self-identifies to Moses as ‘abundant in goodness and truth,’ (34.6 KJV155) 
and the Psalms’ praise and invocation God’s truth, e.g. ‘thou has redeemed me O LORD God of 
truth’ (Ps 31.5 KJV).156 From these verses alone, one could attempt to develop conceptual 
parameters regarding God as truth. But this thesis has no intention of drawing contemporary 
meanings from deracinated phrases in modern translations, thereby ignoring their linguistic, 
textual, and historical context. Our goal is to excavate, as much as possible, ancient conceptual 
parameters.  
In order to discern conceptual parameters about the nature of truth and divinity in the 
biblical text, this thesis will draw on biblical linguistics, cognitive linguistics, historical criticism, 
and do so within a historical canonical approach to scripture. This will produce five conceptual 
parameters, whose letters and titles are as follows. Parameter (f) that truth is thick rather than 
thin indicates that that ‘truth’ includes the senses 'faithfulness', 'reliability', and ‘firmness/solidity’ 
alongside a thin sense of truth as ‘veracity.’ Parameter (g) that all existing things may be truth 
bearers states that all things, persons, and actions may bear truth. Parameter (h) understanding 
Yahweh as truth articulates that Yahweh’s truth is normative, constant, and united with God’s 
active presence, steadfast love, and faithfulness. Parameter (i) that truth may be substantial, 
relational, and transferable, portrays that that the truth one bears may pertain to one’s substance 
and/or in relation to another, and that truth may be transferred from one truth bearer to another.  
Finally, parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth presents that divine 
truth cannot be understood apart from divine law, word, and wisdom. As in the previous chapter, 
 
154 NB: Chapter III begins afresh with the Old Testament, bringing no Augustinian lens to its analysis. 
155 Quoting the KJV here shows how deracinated English translations exhibit apparent relevance. 
156 The versification of the Hebrew Bible frequently differs from English translations, e.g. Ps 31.5 KJV/NRSV is 
31.6 in the Masoretic text. Due to this chapter’s interest in the Hebrew text, throughout Chapter III, when the 
versification differs, the English chapter and verse is followed by the Hebrew one in parenthesis. 
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these parameters will be gradually developed over the course of our examination of the Old 
Testament.  
This process of examination will have six stages. Following the presentation of method 
and interdisciplinary considerations (III.1), this chapter then considers the many senses 
associated with the Hebrew word ʾĕmet (III.2) and draws its first conceptual parameter (f). From 
here, the chapter considers what is described as ʾĕmet in the Old Testament, developing 
parameter (g) from this analysis. Next it elucidates the relationship ʾĕmet has with its cognates 
and other associated terms (III.4 and III.5), noting the implications for parameters. The final two 
analytic sections (III.6 and III.7) consider three contexts in which ʾĕmet is used (devotional, 
legal, and wisdom contexts) and then what are the domains of thought in which the use of ʾĕmet 
is couched in the Old Testament, focusing on the use of language, God, the word of God, and 
wisdom. The chapter concludes with III.8 which summarises the six conceptual parameters that 
are developed through its analysis.  
 
III.1 Method and Interdisciplinary Considerations 
 
Before turning to the Old Testament itself, we need to consider several important 
methodological principles regarding the role of textual meaning, sense relations, biblical studies, 
cognitive linguistics, and the development of conceptual parameters from variegated texts. In 
order to develop conceptual parameters from sense relations and textual meanings, we will have 
to employ two additional fields of inquiry: biblical studies and cognitive linguistics.157 This 
chapter will set forth the rationale for our engagement with each of these disciplines (as per the 
responsible interdisciplinary method outlined in I.5).  In order to discern conceptual parameters 
about the nature of truth and divinity in the biblical text, this study will draw on biblical 
linguistics, cognitive linguistics, historical criticism, and do so within a historical canonical 
approach to scripture, as will shortly be explained. 
 
Textual Meaning and Sense Relations 
 
 
157 This study’s main source regarding cognitive linguistics is William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive 
Linguistics, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). 
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The first chapter named two sources of conceptual parameters: textual meaning and sense 
relations (I.5). Whereas the development of Augustinian conceptual parameters only examined 
the textual meaning of various compositions, both sense relations and textual meanings will be 
examined in the Old Testament for the following reasons. 
Developing conceptual parameters with the Old Testament as their source material is a 
more complicated task than it was when Augustine’s compositions served as source material. 
Augustine explicitly treated the topic of God as truth at length on multiple occasions, and often 
in a highly nuanced theoretical manner. With the assistance of historical theologians and other 
scholars, it was straightforward for a constructive theologian to interpret the textual meaning of 
relevant passages. On the other hand, while the Old Testament includes passages that relate an 
intimate connection between God and truth, the topic of God as truth does not receive the same 
explicit, sustained, and academically amenable attention as Augustine’s compositions provide. 
Fortunately, explicit examinations and lengthy treatments are not the only forms of alethiology. 
As was explored in I.1, alethiology is implicitly embedded in all discussions of the nature of 
knowledge (epistemology), which in turn is implicitly embedded in all pursuits of truth 
(scholarship). Similarly, the biblical canon contains implicit understandings of truth. For 
instance, by seeing what things are described as ‘true’ we can determine what are truth-bearers 
(to borrow an analytic term) in the biblical text. This is essentially a sense-relation. The 
relationships among different senses of different words are essentially conceptual boundaries, 
which is a form of conceptual parameter. Sense relations can be inductively gathered from 
linguistically sensitive examination of texts. Textual meaning is taken from the interpretation of 
passages themselves. Clearly, sense relations and textual meaning are distinguishable but not 
separable: each helps to constitute the other. As a result, considering both textual meaning and 
sense relations together will yield a more thorough account of truth and divinity in the Old 
Testament than if we only attended to textual meanings.  
A second challenge adds to the usefulness of attending to sense relations in the Old 
Testament. This further challenge arises because ʾĕmet, the ancient Hebrew word which is most 
acceptably translated as ‘truth’, is also frequently translated as ‘faithfulness.’ Because English 
translations vary in their judgment as to how ʾĕmet ought to be translated, it is not immediately 
apparent which Old Testament passages are relevant to this study (since they treat ‘truth’) and 
which ones are of less or negligible importance (since they treat ‘faithfulness’ instead of ‘truth’). 
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The impact of this translation conundrum is that the various senses of ʾĕmet must be investigated 
in order to determine the relevant biblical passages for this study. Furthermore, determining the 
various senses of ʾĕmet and how they relate to each other will also indicate conceptual 
distinctions in how truth is understood and spoken about in the Old Testament, which will itself 
provide material for conceptual parameters. For this additional reason, both textual meaning and 




Interdisciplinary engagement with biblical studies for the purposes of developing 
conceptual parameters from biblical texts requires sufficient awareness of the field’s basic 
concepts and controversies and a clear methodology to delineate the boundaries between it and 
constructive theology (see I.5). To this we now turn. 
  Biblical studies includes, among many other things, biblical linguistics, hermeneutics, 
and the historical-critical method, all three of which bear upon our development of biblical 
conceptual parameters. From the nineteenth into the mid-twentieth century, establishing a 
biblical concept was considered straightforward: a biblical linguist identified the relevant word, 
determined its etymology, and thereby revealed the core concept. The terminal shortcomings of 
this approach were persuasively demonstrated by James Barr in his highly influential book The 
Semantics of Biblical Language.158 His central contention is that sentences—not words or 
lexemes—are the primary bearers of theological meaning.159 Significantly for our purposes, Barr 
excoriates Herbert’s explication of ʾĕmet (often translated ‘truth’) and T. F. Torrance’s accounts 
of dābār (‘word’ or ‘thing’) and alētheia (‘truth’). Barr criticises them and others for (a) 
conflating diachronic semantic development with synchronic semantic meaning (i.e., confusing 
the origins of a word with its current significance); (b) presuming that words and concepts exist 
in a one-to-one correlation, such that each word conveys a single concept and each concept is 
conveyed by a single word (leading to a confusion of linguistics with theology) and (c) over-
emphasising supposed contrasts between Greek and Hebrew thought and language. Accepting 
 
158 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: OUP, 1961). 
159 If one were to use Saussure’s distinction, this would be to say that instances of parole, not the particularities of 
lange, bear theological meaning. 
   
 121 
and building on these critiques, scholars such as Silva,160 and Cotterell and Turner161 have 
accordingly rehabilitated biblical linguistics. Instead of explicating biblical concepts purely 
through linguistic study, they work to clarify the relationship between concepts, words, and 
sentence-utterances.  
If interpreted sentences, not individual words, are the primary conveyors of theological 
meaning, then hermeneutical questions, regarding how to interpret texts, become inescapable. 
Consequently, over the course of the twentieth century’s final decades, interest in biblical 
linguistics waned while biblical hermeneutics waxed, a shift which built on scholarship 
originating with Schleiermacher and coincided with the hermeneutical turn in certain 
philosophical and literary circles. Today, biblical hermeneutics proliferate, including Hans Frei's 
narrative hermeneutics, John Barton’s re-development of historical criticism, Brevard Child’s 
canonical criticism, or Anthony Thiselton and Andrew Louth’s invocations of philosophical 
hermeneutics within theological discourse162—not to mention, of course, the huge strides in 
feminist, queer, post-colonial, and reader-response hermeneutics.163      
Which immediately raises the question, how does this thesis intend to determine the 
textual meaning of biblical passages? The choice of hermeneutics is determined by the nature of 
our question: Can the ancient Christian approach to God as truth be given a contemporary 
articulation? In order for ancient conceptualisations to inform a contemporary truth-theory, the 
biblical text’s historical context must remain in view. This is in keeping with the values of 
biblical linguistics and cognitive linguistics, both of which hold that it is imperative to consider, 
as far as possible, authorial intent, her/his context, the broader textual context, and the situation 
of the anticipated reader when interpreting pericopes.164 This aspect of our question rules out 
interpretations based on reader-response theory and other hermeneutics which consider the 
‘meaning’ of a text apart from its historical context. As John Barton acknowledges, historical 
criticism has come under a cloud of late;165 nevertheless, its distinguishing trait among 
 
160 Moisés Silva, God, Language and Scripture: Reading the Bible in the Light of General Linguistics (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan 1990); Moisés Silva, Biblical Words and their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983). 
161 Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation (London: SPCK 1989). 
162 Jens Zimmermann, Hermeneutics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 96-7. 
163 Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009) provides an insightful 
overview. 
164 Croft, 98; Cotterell, 68. 
165 John Barton, ‘Historical-critical approaches,’ in J. Barton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Biblical 
Interpretation (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 9. 
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hermeneutics—interpreting texts within their original context as far as possible—is indispensable 
for our aim.  
There is additionally a canonical element to our investigation, because we are not 
reconstructing an ancient concept per se—for which many non-biblical texts, archaeological 
considerations, and so forth would of course be relevant—but rather discerning biblical 
conceptual parameters. We seek to discern what conceptual parameters are possible when the Old 
Testament texts are considered together, as a whole. For ecumenical reasons, we consider the 
‘canon’ to be those texts on which Protestant, Roman, and Eastern churches agree. In effect, this 
is the Protestant canon, as it is the most restricted. Deutero-canonical books will not make unique 
contributions to our conceptual parameters, though we occasionally note when they augment or 
support points made regarding the canonical texts. Deutero-canonical and non-biblical texts (e.g. 
Philo) do of course inform historical criticism’s interpretations of particular canonical passages, 
which accord with our commitment to understanding these passages in their historical context. 
Extra-canonical texts, however, do not directly inform the biblical conceptual parameters, i.e., 
they are omitted from the set of interpreted biblical texts from which we derive conceptual 
parameters. Thus, questions of external influence or conceptual origin are immaterial. This 
distinguishes our inquiry from much biblical scholarship on ʾĕmet and alētheia, which delineates 
‘Greek’ and ‘Hebrew’ views of truth and then surmises their influence upon various biblical 
texts. For us, if canonical utterances evince particular conceptual parameters, that is all that 
matters.  
For these reasons, deploying historical criticism within a canonical approach is uniquely 
well suited to further our inquiry.  By a canonical view, we do not mean to imply that we are 
adopting the principles of Childs’ canonical criticism. Rather, by ‘canonical’ this study means it 
will only consider passages from texts codified in the Protestant Bible, and it will interpret their 
textual meaning with the aid of historical criticism. Taking a canonical view of which texts to 
consider is most appropriate given our aim of being congruent with the Bible specifically. 
Consulting historical criticism when we determine textual meaning is the most hermeneutical 
approach because of our aim to develop conceptual parameters from an ancient approach to 
truth.   
 




To develop conceptual parameters from the biblical texts, this study will inquire into 
sense relations implied by biblical texts, drawing inferences about conceptual boundaries and 
distinctions. Of all linguistic disciplines that could aid in this endeavour, this study employs 
cognitive linguistics because it is the most applicable to our study’s aims. Since cognitive 
linguistics presumes that language, as a mental faculty, is fundamentally conceptual and not 
innately distinct from other faculties (contra the Chomskian school of linguistics, i.e. generative 
grammar), it has increasingly refined its description of the relationship between a word and its 
senses and those of other words, which is to say, of concepts and their relation to words. This 
proves useful for determining conceptual parameters of a given set of texts, such as the Bible. 
Cognitive semantics was developed in opposition to ‘truth-conditional semantics’, proposing an 
alternative understanding of grammar as ‘conceptualisation.’ As a result, it usefully does not 
require that natural language be altered before it can be analysed. Of special importance to our 
study is that cognitive linguistics does not presume a particular theory of truth (as formal 
semantics does); if it did, that could undesirably prejudice our inquiry. Its rejection of truth-
conditional semantics does not entail rejecting correspondence theories of truth. An utterance 
whose meaning is understood in terms of cognitive linguistics could nonetheless have the 
veracity of its meaning evaluated according to a correspondence theory of truth. By 
implementing its insights, we do not adopt its philosophical presuppositions regarding the nature 
of language, but rather, mean to make use of its insight into the relationship between words and 
concepts in natural language.  Finally, cognitive linguistics agrees with key tenets of historical 
criticism, e.g. the relevance of textual context, historical/cultural context, authorial intent, the 
interpreter’s frame, and working with the original language rather than exclusively translations. 
For these reasons, we will make use of cognitive linguistics to supplement the insights already 
gleaned from biblical linguistics post-Barr.  
Because there is no universal agreement on linguistic terminology, this sections also 
explains the significance of several key terms for cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics aims 
to describe the relationship between concepts and words as they are used in natural language, 
concurrently refining descriptions of the relationship in natural language between a word, its 
senses, and the senses of other words. This means that certain terms such as ‘denotation’ and 
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‘reference’ which connect language use and meaning to the extra-linguistic world do not play a 
significant role (which is well suited to our study because it is examining the meaning of a text to 
determine conceptual parameters, not to determine the text’s referents or their accuracy). We will 
most closely attend to meaning, sense, and purport—as understood below—and also engage 
some of cognitive linguistics’ more refined distinctions between sense relations, such as full 
sense-boundaries, facets, micro-senses, and types of opposites.  
Important work has been done to define and when necessary distinguish words, lexemes, 
word forms, types, and tokens. The level of specificity needed for this study is not so great as to 
need all these. We will use ‘word’ interchangeably with ‘lexeme’ to indicate a linguistic symbol 
or sign, (e.g.  ‘run’) including its various morphemes (e.g. ‘runs,’ ‘to run,’ ‘running,’ ‘ran,’ etc.). 
Each and every word has a purport. We use ‘purport’ to signify the entire ‘body of conceptual 
content’ that is associated with a word, which is another way of saying that a word’s purport is 
the set of all the senses associated with that word.166 What we call ‘purport’ Barr presents as one 
way to understand the ‘meaning’ of the word, describing it as the ‘total series of relations in 
which the word is used in the literature.’167 For instance, the purport of ‘bank’ includes the senses 
of a riverside, a financial institution, the building housing a financial institution, and so forth. 
Purport is a cloud of primordial potential-meaning associated with a given word before its use in 
a particular utterance determines which sense(s) are invoked.  Croft and Cruse describe purport 
as an ingredient for meaning, like an egg in an omelette or flour in bread.168 A word’s purport is 
not its most abstract sense but rather encompasses all its senses at once. 
Turning to ‘sense,’ a dictionary’s numbered entries beneath a word intend to designate 
senses, but they are rarely so codified in practice. When a word is used in a sentence, usually 
only some of its purport (one sense), is relevant to the sentence’s meaning; some senses of 
purport apply in some contexts, others in others. Sometimes a word can have senses which are 
mutually exclusive, such as bank in the sense ‘financial institution’ and bank in the sense ‘the 
edge of a stream or river.’ At other times senses overlap without being identical, as with love in 
the sentences ‘I love my husband’ and ‘I love my dog.’ Cognitive linguistics has made 
impressive strides in distinguishing different types of sense relations, a few of which will be 
mentioned below, and will be instrumental in discerning sense relations in the biblical text. 
 
166 Croft, 100). 
167 Barr, Semantics, 218. 
168 Croft, 101. 
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As our use of the phrase ‘textual meaning’ has already shown, ‘meaning’ indicates the 
overall import of a specific text, passage, or utterance, rather than that of individual words.  With 
this terminology, if I state ‘Lloyds is my bank’ then the sense of ‘bank’ is of a financial 
institution, and the meaning of the sentence is that I conduct my personal financial dealings with 
the financial institution Lloyds. The meaning of the word ‘bank’ is Lloyds while its sense is a 
financial institution. The word only has meaning within the meaning of the sentence, not as it 
exists abstractly within a lexicon; there it only has a purport (its collection of senses). Thus, 
sentences have meanings while words have purports and senses. 
With these terms so defined, this study fully acknowledges both Barr and Croft and 
Cruse’s insistence that sentences, not words, are the primary bearers of meaning. As Barr says, 
‘It is the sentence (and of course the still larger literary complex such as the complete speech or 
poem) which is the linguistic bearer of the usual theological statement, and not the word (the 
lexical unit) or the morphological and syntactical connection.’169 The context in which a sentence 
is made intelligible can extend to the passage, whole text, the cultural and historical context and 
beyond to include all of existence, or at least the view of it. Croft and Cruse make this clear, 
saying ‘Above all, many word concepts cannot be understood apart from the intentions of 
participants or the social and cultural institutions and behavior in which the action, state or thing 
is situated.’170 This attention to the impact of context (including historical context) is part of what 
makes cognitive linguistics amenable to use alongside historical criticism, as this study uses 
textual meaning and sense relations to develop conceptual parameters.  
Finally, cognitive linguistics’ distinctions between types of sense relations will aid us as 
we gather the biblical utterances and their scholarly interpretations, as we attempt to discern 
what are the conceptual categories that can be gleaned from their meanings. There distinctions 
include: dividing polysemy into full sense boundaries, facets, microsenses, ways of seeing; 
hyponymy, taxonymy and meronymy; the profile-domain distinction; metaphor; and sub-
categorisations of opposites. Rather than fully delineating all these here, each distinction will 
only be explained if and when it becomes relevant to the discussion at hand. This vast 
typologising of sense relations greatly expands the constructive theologian’s repertoire from a 
classic threefold distinction of univocity, analogy, and equivocity.  
 
169 Barr, Semantics, 263. 
170 Croft, 11. 





In order to develop conceptual parameters about the nature of truth and divinity in the 
biblical text, this study will draw on biblical linguistics, cognitive linguistics, and historical 
criticism, and do so within a canonical approach, in that it only attends to texts within the biblical 
canon. Conceptual parameters will be developed both from textual meaning and from sense 
relations. Biblical linguistics and scholarship will be depended upon to substantiate any points 
made regarding the ancient languages, Hebrew and Greek. Biblical studies (in the school of 
historical criticism) will furnish interpretations of specific passages’ textual meaning. As this 
study seeks to determine the purport and senses of key terms based upon sentence-level meaning, 
it will consult biblical scholars’ analysis of word-senses and concepts. Where agreement is 
lacking, the principles from biblical and cognitive linguistics may determine the point. 
Additionally, historical criticism and descriptive forms of biblical theology will provide the 
theologian with relevant historical factors and biblical frames of thought. Based upon these 
findings, the theologian articulates what conceptual parameter s/he discerns from the biblical 
text, that is to say, what conceptual guidelines and limits have been determined.  
In order to focus our search, we will begin with the cardinal terms translated as ‘truth’ in 
the Old Testaments: ʾĕmet. Though we shall examine the use of ʾĕmet in the Old Testament our 
approach will not be a narrow linguistic word-study of the kind Barr anathematises. In his attack 
on word-studies in the pursuit of theological concepts, Barr specifically alights on God as Truth 
to exemplify this approach’s failings.  
 
The reason for this attempt is a confusion about the units of thought. To the word 
‘truth’ there may presumably correspond a mental or psychological reality of 
‘concept’ of ‘truth’. To the sentence ‘God is truth’ there also corresponds a mental 
or psychological reality. But these are different kinds of thing. The ‘inner thought-
world’ of the early Christians would be formed in the main by notions of the ‘God 
is truth’ type. But notions like ‘God is truth’ cannot be lexicographically handled, 
in the way which words like ‘truth’ can be listed and handled. They are not 
linguistic functional units but formulations; they are not interchangeable like 
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words, and do not fit freely into contexts as words do. It is a presupposition of 
doing any lexicography at all that words differ in this way from formulations such 
as ‘God is truth’ or ‘Christ is risen.’171   
 
Now, how will these adjacent fields/disciplines and key terms discern conceptual 
parameters, within the biblical text, without devolving into an outdated word-study? 
Fundamentally, there are two sources of conceptual parameters: textual meaning and sense 
relations. Identifying sense relations is more involved than gleaning textual meaning. Sense 
relations occur within a single word’s purport as well as among different words’ purports. The 
purport of a word is the sum of sense associations so far given to it in context. As Croft and 
Cruse tell us, ‘Purport is some function of previous experiences of (construed) occurrences of the 
word in specific situations. As such, it is continually developing: every experience of the use of a 
word modified the word’s purport to some degree.’172 Using his own terminology to express the 
same idea, Barr says that ‘meaning’ is the ‘total series of relations in which the word is used in 
the literature.’173 It follows that determining a lexeme’s purport in a given discourse is an 
inductive process—rather than deductively derived from etymological and morphological 
analysis—such that one gathers the many individual meanings of the word used in context. From 
these one may infer the conceptual content which is the word’s purport, including its sense 
relations, a task for which the typology of sense relations provided by cognitive linguistics will 
be especially illuminating. Thus, the meaning of numerous Old Testament utterances must be 
considered.  
Thus, from attention to relevant passages, I develop conceptual parameters based on both 
the content of individual passages and the sense relations inductively drawn from numerous 
passages. Textual-meaning and sense relations mutually inform each other, and are not entirely 
separable, but we shall focus our attention mainly on one, and then the other, dividing our 
inquiry into stages III.2-6. In this way, we attend to sense relations and textual meaning in the 
Old Testament, informed by cognitive linguistics and biblical studies, in order to develop our 
conceptual parameters, their final articulation being a matter of judgment on the part of the 
constructive theologian. Rather than being objects of a linguistic word study, the appearance of 
 
171 Barr, Semantics, 245-6. 
172 Croft, 101. 
173 Barr, Semantics, 218. 
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the word ʾĕmet directs our attention to relevant passages. This study interprets the meaning of 
these passages with the support of biblical scholarship. Our inquiry will always turn on the 
content of entire sentences, as we develop conceptual parameters from sense relations and textual 
meaning.  
 
The Question of Conflict, Congruence, and Coherence 
 
Additional care has to be taken because this study aims to be congruent with the biblical 
text, not merely informed by it as it was with Augustine, as shall shortly be explained. To review, 
being informed by a source text only requires that some conceptual parameters were drawn from 
the source text, making it possible to reject, omit, or overlook aspects of the source text which 
the theologian judges not to include within the conceptual parameters s/he developed. To be 
congruent with a source text, on the other hand, one’s conceptual parameters are not only 
informed but also limited by the source text (which is not the same as being identical with the 
source text). As was explained earlier, a scholarly proposal is congruent with a source text if it 
can present a case that it has not contravened the source text. As a result, the conceptual 
parameters developed from the Old Testament will be limited as well as informed by the biblical 
text.  
Two new challenges emerge once one wishes to be congruent with rather than merely 
informed by a source text. The first challenge arises when there is a vast swath of material, 
especially when much of it permits a variety of interpretations. How does the constructive 
theologian account for being congruent with the whole source text? One effect is that the 
judgment to omit and contravene elements of one’s source material is no longer appropriate. The 
constructive theologian should endeavour to either account for all of her/his findings with her/his 
conceptual parameters, or at the very least, not contravene the source material. To turn to our 
preferred example, if one were developing conceptual parameters that were congruent with the 
Nicene Creed, one could not omit elements of the source text such that the parameters 
contravene elements of the Creed. For instance, one could not omit the emphasis on One God, 
and instead go in a tri-theistic direction through an emphasis on the unique traits of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit. The result is that there are fewer sets of conceptual parameters 
which may be developed that are in congruence with the source text, but this does not mean that 
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there is only one set of possible conceptual parameters. An open-endedness remains. The 
development of conceptual parameters is still a judgment call on the part of the constructive 
theologian, and different theologians may articulate their congruent conceptual parameters 
differently.  
There are multiple ways conceptual parameters can be developed without contravening 
the source text. The addition of the filioque may serve as another example, if one were to 
consider it as a subsequent conceptual parameter added to the Nicene Creed. To say that the Holy 
Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son does not contravene the Nicene Creed in its earlier 
form (though, of course, the Orthodox position is that it does contravene the inherited faith and 
biblical text). Likewise, to insist that the Holy Spirit proceeds exclusively from the Father is an 
amendment to the original creed, which is congruent with it. With this in mind, the conceptual 
parameters developed in this chapter from the Old Testament are meant to be informed by the 
biblical text, limited by it, and not to contravene it, while yet allowing that their articulation is 
the judgment call of this constructive theologian.  
The second challenge arises when there are multiple strains of thought in the source 
material with notable differences between them. How does one allow the differences to stand 
without forcing it to be one text, as this would have a distorting effect? Here the method of 
explicitly drawing out conceptual parameters is helpful, because it distinguishes clearly between 
the different strands of the text and how the theologian means to make sense of them. The 
constructive theologian literally makes sense. S/he creates sense where it did not appear before. 
Or more precisely, creates an account of how texts can make sense together where there was not 
a harmonising account before. Like any good harmony, the notes remain distinct but a greater 
pleasing chord is heard.  
The Nicene Creed again provides an example. If the Creed is viewed as an example of 
constructive theology in its own right, then it can be seen to draw conceptual parameters from 
the New Testament texts. Early Christians were in great disputes over how to make sense of the 
various accounts of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit in the New Testament, some passages taken 
to contradict each other, the Nicene Creed is a constructive theological articulation of how the 
ecumenical council determined to make sense out of the new testament and experience of 
faith/God of the early church.  To many early Christians and their detractors (among early 
Christian disputes) over Christ’s divinity and the nature of God, relationship to the Hebrew Bible 
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etc. resulted from what were seen to be major discrepancies among different holy texts. The 
Nicene Creed attempts to make sense, to present guidelines for understanding which purport to 
harmoniously interpret the various disparate texts. But in order to do this, something new needed 
to be developed. Likewise with the conceptual parameters. In the same way, the constructive 
theologian does her/his best to make sense of the at times disparate strands in the Old Testament.  
 
III.2 The Thick Truth of ʾĔmet 
    
Now that the methodological approach of this chapter has been laid out, the analysis can 
begin in earnest. It was mentioned above that one of the challenges to examining how truth is 
understood in the Old Testament is that the Hebrew word most commonly translated as ‘truth’ is 
also often translated as ‘faithfulness’, which is a distinct concept in English. This challenge is 
addressed in this section. This variability in translation means we must determine whether or not 
all passages involving ʾĕmet are relevant to our inquiry. By applying criteria set forth by Croft 
and Cruse to data gathered from biblical scholarship the sense relations of ʾĕmet will be 
established. I will evidence that ʾĕmet’s sense of ‘thin truth’ is associated in the biblical text with 
its sense of ‘faithfulness’, ʾĕmet’s root word ʾmn, and ʾĕmet’s cognates (other words with the 
same root). This allows the conclusion that ʾĕmet’s root, its cognates, and senses translated as 
faithfulness or similar are all relevant to its thin sense of ‘truth’. From this analysis comes the 
first biblical conceptual parameter: (f) that truth is thick rather than thin, meaning the concept of 
truth includes senses of faithfulness and reliability as well as the ‘thin’ sense of truth.  
 
The ʾĕmet Conundrum 
 
It is widely agreed among biblical scholars that ʾĕmet is the ancient Hebrew word most 
appropriately translated as ‘truth’, correlating to the ‘thin’ sense of truth as I described it in I.2. 
Truth in a ‘thin’ sense is a simple and largely unreflective notion, an idea left unencumbered by 
philosophical analysis. Piper hits upon this sense, when he says ‘To most modern people, truth is 
the agreement between the intended subject matter of a word or sentence, on the one hand, and 
   
 131 
the nature of the fact to which the word or sentences refers on the other.’174 Quell locates this 
sense most clearly in the legal circumstances, when ʾĕmet describes the ‘actual truth of a process 
or cause’ (he glosses Deuteronomy 22.20 as ‘if the matter rests on authentic facts’).175 Moberly 
locates this sense of ʾĕmet in the histories as well, where it ‘is often used of speaking the truth, as 
when the Queen of Sheba acknowledges that the report she had heard of Solomon’s wisdom was 
indeed true,’ (2 Kgs 10.6).’176 A volume revised and edited by Moisés Silva finds this sense in 
the prophets too, noting Jeremiah’s complaint “Friend deceives friend, / and no one speaks the 
truth [ʾĕmet]. / They have taught their tongues to lie” (Jer 9.5 (9.4)).177 That in numerous biblical 
utterances ʾĕmet has a sense of ‘thin truth’ is uncontroversial. 
‘Truth’, however, is not ʾĕmet’s only English translation. For instance, Scott commends 
‘faithfulness’ and ‘trustworthiness’ as viable translations and Piper expands the list to include 
‘steadiness,’ ‘unchangeableness,’ ‘stability,’ ‘soundness,’ ‘faithfulness,’ ‘constancy,’ ‘truth,’ 
‘loyalty,’ or ‘justice.’178 Furthermore, there is no consensus regarding which passages to translate 
as ‘truth’, as ‘faithfulness’, or as another word. The same variable translation occurred in the 
LXX, which translates ʾĕmet as alētheia (truth) 80% of the time, but twelve times as dikaisunē 
(righteousness)179, and several times as pistis (faith).180 The English translations vary (and do not 
match the LXX’s use of alētheia). Some passages that the King James Version rendered ʾĕmet as 
‘truth’ have been altered in revised versions to read ‘faithfulness’ or otherwise (e.g. 1 Samuel 
12.24 KJV says ‘serve him truth’ whereas NRSV says ‘serve him faithfully’).181  The question 
arises, how does ʾĕmet’s sense of ‘thin truth’ relate to its other senses translated as faithfulness, 
trustworthiness, and so forth?  
To answer this, we must first acknowledge distinction between a word's purport, its 
senses, and its translation. How a word may be translated is not a sure indication of how many 
 
174 O. A. Piper, ‘Truth,’ in George Arthur Buttrick et al. eds., The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, 4 vols. (New 
York: Abingdon Press, 1962), iv, 713. 
175 Gottfried Quell, ‘A. The OT Term תֶמֱא ,’ in Gerhard Kittel ed. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 
trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), i, 233. 
176 R. W. K. Moberly, ‘ ןמא .’ in eds. Willem A. VanGemeren and et al., The New International Dictionary of Old 
Testament Theology and Exegesis, 5 vols. (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1996), i, 428. 
177 Moisés Silva, rev. ed. ‘Ἀλήθεια,’ in New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology and Exegesis, 5 
vols. (2nd edn, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), i, 228. 
178 Ian W. Scott, ‘Truth,’ in ed. Katharine Doob Sakenfield et al., The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, 5 
vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006) v, 682; Piper, ‘Truth,’ IDB, 714. 
179 Piper, ‘Truth,’ IDB, 714. 
180 Silva, ‘Ἀλήθεια,’ NIDNTTE, 225. 
181 Piper, ‘Truth,’ IDB, 714. 
   
 132 
senses the word has in its original context, because the purport (the total recognised senses of the 
word) of two words is rarely identical, even when one is regularly translated as the other. Silva 
provides instructive examples of the difference between a translation and a sense, and the peril of 
equating them. The Greek word amartanō may be translated as both ‘sin’ and ‘do wrong’, but are 
these, he asks, ‘two distinct senses of the Greek verb or, as we have suggested, two possible 
ways of translating a word that should be regarded as having only one sense?’182. Even un-
mysterious words whose purports coincide so closely as to be considered equivalents may have 
discrepancies in their purports, as with the Spanish tomar and the English ‘to drink’: tomar is 
used for soup and ice cream, but an English speaker does not normally ‘drink’ ice cream or 
soup.183 The conceptual maps of different languages are rarely identical, and the concepts 
associated with a word substituted in translation are unlikely to be identical with the associated 
concepts in the original language. Therefore, when a foreign word has multiple translatable 
terms, this does not necessarily imply different senses in the original language. For this reason, 
stipulating which English words may be used to translate a given Hebrew or Greek word is not 
equivalent to describing the original word’s sense divisions, let alone the full shape of its 
concept(s) as informed by other related words, texts, and domains of understanding.          
Thus, before we can consider the theological meaning of biblical passages about truth, we 
have to overcome the ʾĕmet conundrum: are passages where ʾĕmet isn’t translated as ‘truth’ or 
‘true’ still related to the sense of thin truth?  
 
Proposed Solutions: All Truth, All Faithfulness, strict polysemy  
 
There have been multiple attempts by biblical scholars to reconcile contemporary 
conceptual categories with the diversity of ʾĕmet’s senses in biblical texts and its incongruity 
with English terminology. Some see (what I call) ‘thin truth’ as ʾĕmet’s conceptual core, others 
see dependability and firmness as the conceptual core, and the remainder say ʾĕmet is 
polysemous such that it has two distinct and fully separate senses.  
Some insist that (thin) truth is ʾĕmet’s fundamental sense and that all other applications 
are extrapolations or metaphorical uses derived from this sense. For instance, Scott takes the 
 
182 Silva, Biblical Words, 174. 
183 Ibid., 175. 
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fundamental concept of ʾĕmet to be the correspondence of words to reality, as when used in true 
speech, and claims that all uses of ʾĕmet accord with this sense. When an action or person is 
called ʾĕmet, this is because their deeds correspond to their words; God is ʾĕmet because divine 
action always corresponds to divine command, promise, covenant, and proclamation.184 
Wildberger, on the other hand, rejects ‘truth’ as the essential sense of ʾĕmet, looking 
instead to its Hebrew root ʾmn, which is widely taken to have the purport of dependability and 
firmness. He clarifies that this ‘does not mean that [Hebrew] does not have a concept of truth, 
but that its concept of truth is indissolubly joining with the notion of dependability … understood 
as truth [ʾĕmet] means the dependability of a thing or word. In this sense, only that which 
corresponds to reality or is fully appropriate to it can be dependable.’185   
If Scott and Wildberger each attempt to subsume all of ʾĕmet’s purport under a single 
dominant sense (respectively, correspondence truth and firm reliability, e.g. thin truth emphasises 
truth as correspondence; firm dependability emphasises truth as that which is reliable), Silva is 
representative of those who instead take ʾĕmet to be polysemous; it has two distinct and separate 
senses, and never implies both at the same time.186 Though he allows that one may theorise a 
connection between faithfulness and truth (e.g. the God who speaks truthfully is also faithful), 
they remain two distinct and separate senses of ʾĕmet.          
These three accounts not only differ in how they divide up the senses of ʾĕmet, they also 
disagree over whether one should consider ʾĕmet’s root ʾmn to be relevant. It is apparent that two 
questions must be answered to resolve the ʾĕmet conundrum. First, is ʾĕmet’s purport related to 
its etymological root ʾmn? Second, does ʾĕmet have multiple independent senses—in which case 
certain ones will be irrelevant to this study—or are its senses related such that all should be 
considered? The rest of III.2 will be concerned with these questions.   
 
Linguistic Guidelines for Appeals to Etymology 
 
This thesis accepts as authoritative the insight of Barr and others that a word’s purport is 
synchronically rather than diachronically based—that is to say, the meaning a word in a given 
utterance is determined by its current linguistic and textual context, rather than its etymological 
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origin or morphology.  In some instances, however, the (perceived) etymology or morphology of 
a word is synchronically apparent, meaning that those using the word perceive the origin or form 
of the word to impinge on its meaning. This perception influences their interpretation of the 
word. Silva terms this ‘transparency,’ when etymology is readily perceived, whereas a word is 
‘opaque’ when it origin is not synchronically apparent (apparent to those using the word).187 For 
example, ‘afterlife’ ‘watchdog’ and ‘downstroke’ are all transparent to most English speakers, 
while terms like ‘undertaker’ ‘backwater’ ‘butterfly’ ‘pineapple’ are comparatively opaque.188  
One might say the etymology and morphology of ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ are entirely opaque. If one 
compares the transparency of ‘hangover’ and ‘overhang’ or ‘blackbird’ and ‘ladybird,’ it is clear 
that merely having discernible components does not make a word transparent.189 As Silva rightly 
states, ‘The priority of the synchronic approach demands that we pay regard to etymology only if 
it can be shown that the biblical writers intended the word to be taken in its etymological 
sense.’190 For this reason, while etymology is not unconditionally exiled from all discussion of 
semantics and interpretation, the synchronic considerations always determine its relevance. Silva 
reiterates ‘the ultimate importance of context’ whether it warrants an appeal to etymology in the 
sense of the passage at hand.191 The methodological implications are as follows: the root of ʾĕmet 
is only relevant to its purport if transparency can be demonstrated between it and its 
morphologically related terms. The next subsection argues that ʾĕmet is transparent to its 
etymological root and cognates.  
 
The Transparency of ʾĕmet to its Root ʾmn and its Cognates  
 
It is well known that in Hebrew all words can be categorised according to a three letter 
root. It is widely accepted that the morphological root of ʾĕmet is ʾmn. This particular root family 
includes five words of significant theological OT use: two verbal forms—ʾmn in hiphil form, that 
is heʾĕmîn and ʾmn in niphal form, that is neʾĕmān —and two substantive/noun forms—ʾĕmûnâ 
and ʾĕmet—and the adverbial ʾāmēn. Of these, ʾāmēn is undoubtedly the most familiar, as it is 
still used to conclude prayers today. ʾĔmet is by far the most frequently used in the Old 
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Testament, appearing over 121 times192 which is over twice as often as heʾĕmîn, the second most 
frequent.193 Is there transparency between ʾĕmet and its ʾmn root, its verbal cognates heʾĕmîn and 
neʾĕmān, its fellow substantive ʾĕmûnâ, and the adverbial ʾāmēn? That is to say, does the biblical 
text deploy these words in sentences where their meaning overlaps with each other? The answer 
appears to be yes. 
Close examination of the use in the Old Testament by biblical scholars has shown that 
these connection are apparent in the textual meaning. When the appearance of ʾĕmet in Old 
Testament utterances is compared to its fellow substantive ʾĕmûnâ, there is evidence of semantic 
transparency between the terms. They are both treated as antonyms of šeqer (deceit). This leads 
Wildberger to observe that ʾĕmûnâ ‘must involve the realm we designate as “truthfulness, 
honesty” (e.g. Jer 7.28),194 which I argue relates ʾĕmûnâ’s purport to the ʾĕmet’s thin sense of 
truth. Likewise, ʾĕmûnâ and ʾĕmet are both frequently used in conjunction with ḥesed (steadfast 
love) in passages with similar meanings.195 Even beyond ḥesed and šeqer,  ‘the word field 
surrounding [ʾĕmet] coincides quite precisely with that of [ʾĕmûnâ]’ and their purports ‘overlap 
to a great extent.’196 This implies transparency between the terms, though not synonymity, for 
ʾĕmet alone is applied to words.  
The use of ʾāmēn overlaps with ʾĕmet’s thin sense truth. The adverbial ʾāmēn, Wildberger 
tells us, ‘intends to indicate that something which has been said stands firm, is “true.”’197 Taking 
as examples Deuteronomy 27.14-26 and Nehemiah 5.13, Moberly clarifies that ‘The basic sense 
of [ʾāmēn] is “let it be so,” “may it come true.”’198 It is a good example of the nature of religious 
language as self-involving. To say [ʾāmēn] genuinely is an act of self-commitment, for it implies 
appropriate action on the part of the speaker.’199 Thus there is transparency between ʾĕmet and 
ʾāmēn regarding a ‘thin’ sense of truth.  
Finally, the verbal forms of the ʾmn, the hiphal form heʾĕmîn and the niphal form 
neʾĕmān, demonstrate some amount of transparency. Heʾĕmîn has the sense ‘to endure’ or to be 
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‘stable and reliable’, and this is plausibly conceptually related to some senses of ʾĕmet as 
faithfulness and reliability, though this does not appear to overlap in a thin sense of truth. The 
second verbal form, however, does show transparency to sense of ‘thin truth’: Wildberger 
explains that neʾĕmān  is often taken in sense of ‘duration,’ or ‘permanence,’ (‘the notion of 
firmness’ with ‘an element of dependability and faithfulness’) and more importantly in the sense 
“to be true, become true, prove true” because ‘the concept of the lie occasionally appears in the 
world field of [neʾĕmān].’200 He argues further that ‘these antitheses establish the affinity of 
[neʾĕmān] for the truth concept: one may translate “true” in many passages’ (e.g. Gen 42.20).201 
This is evidence that the OT utterances show synchronic awareness of transparency between 
neʾĕmān and the thin truth sense of ʾĕmet. 
Jepsen provides a succinct summary of the root ʾmn and the cognates’ most common 
senses. He describes the ʾmn root as possibly having the purport ‘faithful’ ‘secure’ or 
‘enduring.’202 As for the cognates,  
 
[neʾĕmān] means “to endure,” and thus the participle means “enduring, lasting,” 
and when applied to persons “stable, reliable.” Then [heʾĕmîn] means “To become 
stable (steadfast),” “to acquire stability,” and is used especially of a person or his 
word: to build steadfastly on someone, or to rely on his word. From “stability” 
through “reliability,” [ʾĕmet] acquires the meaning of “truth,” while [ʾĕmûnâ] 
conveys more the idea of “conduct that grows out of reliability,” i.e., 
“faithfulness.” Finally, [ʾāmēn] has gotten its meaning through a specific function 
[that of assenting and committing oneself to another’s statement or 
declaration].Thus, in spite of the different ways in which the words derived from 
[ʾmn] developed, generally speaking the meaning of the root was retained 
throughout.203     
  
His analysis provides clear conceptual relations between the senses of these five words.  
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This brief report on biblical scholarship regarding ʾĕmet’s cognates demonstrates that 
even if ʾĕmet’s purport had only the thin sense of truth, one can still demonstrate transparency 
between it and other words that derive from the same ʾmn root. Specifically, antonyms of ʾĕmet’s 
thin sense of ‘truth’ (such as šeqer) appear in contrast to ʾĕmûnâ and neʾĕmān, even though these 
words’ purport are predominated by the sense ‘stability’ or ‘firmness’. Likewise, the adverbial 
ʾāmēn indicates one’s giving of assent to the truth of words, which entails a thin sense of truth 
that is reality being in accordance with verbal utterances. For this reason, even if one adopted 
Scott’s position, that ʾĕmet is always a sense of correspondence construed one way or another, 
the transparency between ʾĕmet and other words derived from its root is demonstrable. It follows 
that the sense of ʾmn (root) in terms of firmness, stability, and reliability is be included in the 
purport of ʾĕmet when used in Ancient Hebrew texts, because its writers would sense that the 
words are semantically related. ʾĕmet’s etymological root and morphological cognates are 
synchronically transparent, and so are relevant to considerations of its sense relations.  Thus, a 
position which takes all senses of ʾĕmet to derive from a concept of correspondence truth does 
not appear to be borne out by the text’s use of ʾĕmet and its cognates.  
 
Disproof of Strict Polysemy (or Full-Sense Boundary) 
 
Having ascertained the legitimate relevance of ʾĕmet’s root and cognates to its purport, 
we turn to the second question of the ʾĕmet-translation conundrum: are truth and faithfulness 
separate senses of ʾĕmet, as Silva argues, such that they are distinct and do not semantically 
entail each other? This is a question about sense relations, which is to say, of how differing 
senses of a word or words relate to each other. Cognitive linguistics provides the tools to 
evaluate this question. 
When it comes to types of sense-relation, polysemy, synonymy, and opposites are well 
known. To these Wittgenstein added a ‘family resemblance’ between senses, such as a deep well 
and a deep soul, where the sense of ‘deep’ is neither synonymous nor fully polysemous but 
remains some connection between the senses of ‘deep.’ Theology classically distinguishes 
between equivocal, univocal, and analogical uses of words. Cognitive linguistics has advanced 
the conversation by detailed multiple types of sense relations which are clearly distinct (e.g. 
sense-facets, micro-senses, ways-of-seeing, hyponymy, and meronymy) but would be indistinctly 
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gathered beneath the ‘family resemblance’ or ‘analogical’ categories of word-use (in that the 
sense relation is neither univocal nor equivocal). In their terminology, if there is a ‘full-sense 
boundary’ between two senses then they have complete autonomy from each other.204 If there is a 
full sense boundary between the thin truth and faithfulness senses of ʾĕmet (as Silva argues) then 
all passages concerning ʾĕmet as faithfulness would be superfluous to our inquiry into truth. 
When researching river banks one need not be concerned with financial banks.  
When there is a full-sense boundary, Croft and Cruse say, the two senses are entirely 
autonomous from each other, to the point of being antagonistic. This means that in any given 
utterance only one sense can contribute to the meaning of the sentence. Full sense boundaries can 
be identified by the ‘antagonism,’ that the two senses exhibit; ‘the two units are mutually 
exclusive foci of attention,’ which is to say, in a given utterance the word cannot convey both 
senses simultaneously, and on the rare occasions it does, a pun or zeugma occurs—an exception 
that proves the rule.205 Thus, if one can show there are instances where both senses are present in 
the sentence’s meaning, this will disprove that the senses are fully autonomous; some sort of 
‘family resemblance’ obtains, be it sense-facets, micro-senses etc. When we consult biblical 
scholars, we find them recognising biblical utterances where the meaning of ʾĕmet appears to 
include senses of truth and faithfulness together.  
The entry Silva revised maintains that ʾĕmet means 'truth' in some contexts and 
'faithfulness in other contexts’ but he also acknowledges that there are times when both are 
relevant to a passage’s meaning.206 Take the following, where he says, 
 
Even in a passage like Exod 34.6, where Yahweh renews his covenant with 
Moses, declaring himself, indeed pledging himself, to be “the compassionate and 
gracious God, slow to anger, abounding in love and faithfulness” the context may 
suggest the idea of truth in the sense of both veracity and integrity, since the next 
verse sets side by side the promise of mercy for thousands and the warning of 
punishment for the guilty. But there is no question that, as a rule, the combination 
of these two terms focuses on loyalty and faithfulness.207 
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Similarly, he insists that in many passages ʾĕmet takes on the sense of both reliability and 
factual correspondence, say in Deuteronomy 13.14 (13.15) and 17.4, where the injunction is 
given to check whether or not the report that citizens have been seduced into idolatry is actually 
true. Whether the report is reliable depends on whether it accords with fact.208 Likewise, while 
Quell divides ʾĕmet between legal and religious contexts, he says the word has an ‘adaptability to 
the context’ and citing Psalm 31.5 (31.6): ‘This passage is one of several in the OT which bring 
out the supreme significance of [ʾĕmet] by linking the legal with the ethical meaning or by going 
beyond both to make it a mark and goal of the divine action.’209 Often ‘reliability’ is used as a 
bridge term by biblical scholars between senses of faithfulness and truth in ʾĕmet, since the 
faithfulness of a person and the thin truth of a person’s speech can both be thought of in terms of 
reliability.  
These examples show that there are simply too many cases where biblical scholars find 
that both senses are active to a greater or lesser degree. Thus, the two senses (if they even are two 
distinguishable senses) cannot be entirely polysemous. As Croft and Cruse show, the absence of 
antagonistic autonomy between senses does not imply that the word in question has a single 
sense. It is possible for a word’s purport to embrace two senses who are semi-autonomous in 
their relations (e.g. ‘book’ has the senses of both a physical object and of the immaterial story 
that appears in many places). If the more finely tuned distinctions of polysemy had been 
available to Silva from cognitive science, he may well have recognised this himself. But for now, 
it is clear that instances where one would translate ʾĕmet as ‘faithfulness’ are not categorically 
irrelevant to our investigation into how the Old Testament treats truth and divinity. 
 
Conclusion 
     
In this section, we have found that ʾĕmet is the cardinal OT word translated as ‘truth’ in 
the sense of ‘thin’ truth, but at the same time, the range of ‘truth’ in contemporary English does 
not mirror that of ʾĕmet (judging by scholarly contemporary English translations), nor does 
alētheia (judging by the LXX). Otherwise, translators would not have felt it prudent at times to 
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translate ʾĕmet as ‘faithfulness’ and other words. It was also shown that ʾĕmet’s etymological root 
ʾmn and its cognates (the morphologically related words ʾāmēn, ʾĕmûnâ, neʾĕmān, and heʾĕmîn) 
are relevant to our semantic analysis of ʾĕmet because there is semantic transparency among 
them. Since biblical texts evidence an ancient awareness of semantic similarity in the ʾmn word 
group—a root which is taken to have a purport of firmness, steadiness, reliability, constancy and 
so forth—these various senses are also associated with ʾĕmet’s thin sense of truth. Furthermore, it 
was demonstrated that attributing the strictest form of polysemy to ʾĕmet is untenable: since there 
are numerous utterances in which ʾĕmet evokes both ‘truth’ and ‘faithfulness/constancy’ they 
cannot be two distinct separate mutually exclusive senses. To this, scholars often add a sense that 
bridges the two in English: ‘reliability’, which we saw in evidence in ʾĕmet’s etymology.  
These findings directly affect our pool of Old Testament passages. Going forward, 
utterances where ʾĕmet has been taken by scholars to have the sense of ‘faithfulness’, 'reliability' 
or similar cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to our inquiry into the biblical understanding of 
‘truth.’ This renders all instances of ʾĕmet pertinent to our thesis.     
  Thus, from an English-language point of view, ʾĕmet has at least two centres of gravity 
in its purport: the senses of truth and faithfulness. To this, from ʾĕmet's transparency to its root 
and cognates, is added the sense of 'reliability' with connotations of firmness/solidity and 
enduring constancy. Whether in Old Testament usage these are distinct or unified senses (or 
something in between) we have not yet determined. They must have some degree of family-
resemblance.  
From these findings, the first Old Testament parameter of this study is developed. (f) that 
truth is thick rather than thin indicates that the sense of ‘thin’ truth is insufficient to convey the 
full significance of ‘truth’ in our constructive theology. Only ‘thick truth’ which involves other 
senses as well will suffice. Truth involves not only ‘thin’ truth but also 'faithfulness' (including 
the sense of honesty and trustworthiness) and 'reliability', (involving firmness/solidity and 
enduring constancy).  
 
III. 3 ʾĔmet Bearers 
 
Having determined that all instances of ʾĕmet are relevant to our inquiry, not merely those 
translated as ‘truth’, this study may examine any and all utterances involving ʾĕmet to develop 
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conceptual parameters about truth and divinity. This section investigates what ʾĕmet is used to 
describe. From scores of instances, this study devises three categories which will now be 
considered: ʾĕmet applied to things (encompassing words and objects), persons (encompassing 
humans and God), and actions (speaking ʾĕmet, doing ʾĕmet, and doing an action with ʾĕmet). 
These categories are meant to guide our inquiry not prejudge the boundaries of ancient Hebrew 
conceptual divisions (e.g. it is purely programmatic at this point to distinguish words and objects, 
for reasons that become apparent in III.7). This section concludes by developing conceptual 
parameter (g) that all existing things may be truth bearers and indicating the first elements of (h) 
understanding Yahweh as truth.  
 
 Words and Objects: the ʾĕmet of Things 
 
The Old Testament refers to objects and things in the everyday world as ʾĕmet on 
multiple occasions. For instance, in Genesis 24.48 Abraham’s servant tells Laban and Bethuel 
that God lead him to obtain their daughter by the ʾĕmet path. Jeremiah 2.21 criticises the 
apostasy of Israel as being like an ʾĕmet seed which then grew into a wild vine. Proverbs 11.18 
promises that the one who sows righteousness will have an ʾĕmet reward. One scholar, Quell, 
considers these instances to be extrapolations of ʾĕmet’s legal sense, that ‘truth’ is determined by 
a legal process or cause.210 On this account the proof of a true path is in the walking, and of a 
true seed in the growing. Piper disputes the legal basis of ʾĕmet’s application to things, arguing 
that ʾĕmet most basically ‘designates a property of things’ when it is a ‘reality which is firm and 
unchanging,’ usually when they are ‘right, correct, genuine, moving toward their intrinsic 
goal.’211 Jepsen agrees with Piper that ʾĕmet may properly characterise objects, but emphasises 
reliability rather than endurance. Taking the example of Rahab in Judges, he says she asks for an 
ʾĕmet sign, that is, one ‘on which she can rely.’212 Their disparate views do not prevent insightful 
conclusions. 
We can provisionally conclude that biblical conceptual parameters allow ʾĕmet to be 
predicated of material objects and abstract realities. It is debated whether this is a basic or 
marginal sense of the word, but either way it is among the senses in ʾĕmet’s purport. Predicating 
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ʾĕmet may mean that an object is genuinely itself (i.e. normatively as it ought or subjectively as 
one expects), that it is reliable (or with a more personal construal, it is faithful), or some 
conceptual combination thereof.  
Unsurprisingly, ʾĕmet is also often applied to reports, statements, words etc., such as 
when the Queen of Sheba declares the report of Solomon’s wisdom to be ʾĕmet (e.g. 1 Kgs 10.6). 
Two questions arise, which cognitive linguistics will help resolve. First, when ʾĕmet indicates 
thin truth, is it because the words correspond to reality or because they are reliable? These senses 
are conceptually distinct: Scott favours ‘reliability’ as the core sense while Silva favours 
‘whether statements accord with the facts and are therefore correct’; both allow for the other’s 
sense to be present at least as an implication.213 Jepsen shows how thin truth and reliability 
implicate each other, observing that ‘words are dependable, and therefore trustworthy, if they 
recount a circumstance accurately, i.e., if they are true.’214 We shall see that the mutual-
implication of ‘thin truth’ and ‘reliability’ is why this study takes both senses to be present in 
ʾĕmet.  
The second question emerges over passages such as Proverbs 14.25 and Jeremiah 42.5 
which concern witnesses: Does the phrase ‘witness of ʾĕmet’ designate the (upright) speaker, 
their (truthful) speech, or (true) circumstances attested to as ʾĕmet?  Wildberger laments ‘one is 
frequently unable to decide with certainty whether [ʾĕmet] means “uprightness” in reference to 
the [subject] or “truth” in reference to the [object].’215 He explains this uncertainty by noting ‘the 
distinction between (subjective) uprightness and (objective) truth was not so apparent to the 
Hebrews as to us.’216 
Cognitive linguistics illuminates these dilemmas (object or subject oriented ʾĕmet; and 
verbal correspondence or verbal reliability) with the concept of sense facets. When two possible 
senses of a word are conceptually distinct but frequently unified within the sentence’s meaning, 
then they are called facets. Just as a physical book’s pages and the story they tell are 
intellectually distinguishable but rarely so in experience, so too are the ʾĕmet of the witnesses 
and the ʾĕmet of their testimony. In this way, what is a great struggle for the biblical scholar or 
translator—translating an ambiguous foreign word where English does not allow ambiguity—is 
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a great boon for the theologian. The irresolvable translation problem provides a conceptual 
parameter: there is no full sense-boundary between an individual’s subjective uprightness and 
their speech’s objective truth. The integrity of an individual and the truth of her/his words are not 
divisible. By the same token, neither is the thin truth of a statement and its reliability.  
To conclude, in the OT concrete and abstract things as well as speech may bear ʾĕmet. 
Some see a sense of ‘reliability’ as well as ‘being genuine’ and ‘enduring constancy’ in the ʾĕmet 
of things. Two senses of ʾĕmet speech are reliability and thin truth. At times the text does not 
clearly distinguish between (a) the uprightness, honesty, or integrity of an individual, (b) the 
truthfulness/reliability of their testimony, and (c) the circumstances of which they speak. The 
cognitive linguistic category of sense facets illuminates how these three senses may be 
conceptually distinct and yet frequently invoked together in speech because they appear together 
in experience. Though in individual passages the ʾĕmet of things and that of speech may not 
always be identical, by considering the overarching purport they contribute to, we can see a 
sense of ‘reliability’ is shared. As a result, this means the Old Testament exhibits no absolute 
conceptual disjuncture between truth in words and truth in things or persons.  
 
People and God: the ʾĕmet of Persons 
 
When ʾĕmet is applied to humans, as we have just seen, it is often elided with their 
truthful speech. Again, there is often disagreement over whether ‘truth’, ‘trustworthiness’ or 
‘faithfulness’ is the best translation. In Genesis 42.16 Joseph doubts his brothers, questioning 
whether they have ʾĕmet. Quell says, ‘it is an open question whether we should translate: 
“Whether the truth is as you say,” or: “Whether there is any truth in you,” i.e. veracity.’217 In 
other passages ʾĕmet is a persistent quality of character like honesty, as when in Exodus 18.21,  
Jethro advises Moses to appoint men of ʾĕmet as judges and Nehemiah 7.2 describes his brother 
Hananiah as ʾĕmet. Passages such as Proverbs 3.3 and Zechariah 8.16-17 make the normative 
demand that Israelites possess ʾĕmet. Nevertheless, the ʾĕmet of humans is frequently lacking. 
Hosea 4.1 declares God’s judgment because the land’s inhabitants have no ʾĕmet. People ought to 
be ʾĕmet and sometimes are, though rarely. 
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The variable translations for ʾĕmet regarding people continue for the divine realm. Unlike 
humans, God is constantly ʾĕmet. Indeed, Psalm 31.5 (31.6) names him ʾelʾĕmet: God of Truth. 
The Psalms frequently invoke divine ʾĕmet (37 times), as do Isaiah (12 times), Jeremiah and 
Proverbs (11 times each).218 The cardinal Old Testament passage on God’s truth is Exodus 34.5-
7, where Yahweh (yhwh) declares himself “abounding in love [ḥesed] and faithfulness [ʾĕmet]” 
(34.6b). As the most extensive passage on God’s name, and one spoken by Yahweh (yhwh) 
himself, Exodus 34.5-7 is ‘the very heart of God’s self-revelation within Israel.’219 Once again, 
Wildberger finds that one cannot make a totalising statement as to whether divine ʾĕmet is 
‘[subject]-oriented “dependability, uprightness, faithfulness,”’ or ‘[object]’oriented “something 
dependable, truth.”’220 On the one hand, he finds Psalm 25.10 is best translated ‘“guide me 
according to your faithfulness”’ demurring from those who translate 25.5 as “guide me according 
to your truth [ʾĕmet], teach me,” because it requests instruction.221  Although subject-oriented 
‘faithfulness’ may seem more appropriate for a personal God, Quell points out 2 Samuel 7.28 
appears to defines god using what I have termed a ‘thin’ sense of truth: ‘Thou art the God, 
namely, thy words be true.’222 Surmounting the subject-object ambiguity, Quell muses that ʾĕmet 
in religious language may not be a metaphorical application of its (in his view) essentially legal 
sense; it could stem from a fundamental experience of God, a ‘religious perception.’223 ʾĔmet 
then would serve ‘rather to express the reality immediately accessible to religious feeling, 
something which all unsought impresses itself upon man, the attitude corresponding to it.’224 
Where Wildberger distinguishes ‘truth’ from ‘faithfulness’ and Quell divides the 
subjective spiritual experience from the forensic process for establishing of facts, Spicq happily 
unites these senses. Viewing God’s ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ together, to him they suggest  
 
consistency and solidity and therefore fidelity. Hence Yahweh is called “God of 
truth” on the basis of his unchangeableness, the solidity and stability of his works, 
the certain that his promises will be fulfilled: what he says comes to pass. His 
utterances and actual events coincide. God does not lie and never fails (Ps 
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132.11); the principle of his speech is truth (Ps 119.160). All his gifts are 
characterized by stability, fixity, perseverance, continuity.225 
 
Scott further distils this idea, to ‘dependability: ‘A “person of ‘[ʾĕmet]” is one whose actions can 
be trusted, and the “God of  [ʾĕmet]” is the one on whom Israel can depend.’226    
According to these biblical texts, ʾĕmet is always found with God and though ʾĕmet ought 
to be found with humans, it often is lacking. As for the purport of ʾĕmet, it has been variously 
interpreted as dependability, uprightness, faithfulness, thin truth, unchangeableness, solidity and 
stability in action, fulfiller of promises, truth-speaker, or the almost ineffable feeling of God’s 
presence. Human ʾĕmet lacks the stability and sublimity, but when it is present also has 
connotations of truth/honesty, dependability, and faithfulness.  
It is entirely possible that the sense relations among the English words used in translation 
could obscure the original sense relations as the texts were composed. Biblical scholarship is 
fractured over whether to unify or divide the various senses that ʾĕmet has applied to God in 
numerous utterances. Some possibilities, however, can be ruled out: between any sense of 
‘faithfulness’ or ‘truth’ there cannot be a full sense boundary since even Wildberger’s distinction 
between them (subject vs. object) holds they have ‘dependability’ in common. Additionally, one 
cannot unite divine ʾĕmet under a single sense ‘dependability’ because pericopes like Psalm 25.5 
(‘guide me into your truth, and teach me’) retain a sense of thin truth even when the main sense 
is taken to be ‘faithfulness.’ Thus, we find that the God of ʾĕmet encompasses a broad purport, 
including dependability, ‘thin’ truth, honesty, faithfulness, and the sublimity and stability of 
divine presence, senses whose relations are neither completely division nor unification.         
 
Speaking and Action: the ʾĕmet of Deeds            
 
 It has been shown that things, words, people and God may be ʾĕmet; this subsection 
considers ʾĕmet speech and action. Naturally, a person may ‘speak ʾĕmet’, as is readily apparent 
in Psalm 15.2 and Zechariah 8.16. Wildberger accurately notes such phrases refer to the 
‘pronouncement’s dependability’ more than the speaker’s, but personal ʾĕmet is also in view, as 
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shown by the elision observed earlier between the ʾĕmet of the speaker and the ʾĕmet of what is 
spoken.227 As with ʾĕmet of persons, ʾĕmet speech is uncommon but God’s speech is always 
ʾĕmet. There is often a ring of surprise in biblical texts when utterances turn out to be true; e.g. 
Deuteronomy’s demand that one determines whether accusations of apostasy or promiscuity are 
‘really true’ presupposes a dubious stance towards testimony.228 In contrast, God’s speech is 
always ʾĕmet. See 2 Sam 7.28 where Yahweh words are ‘true’ (KJV and NRSV, Jepsen says 
‘reliable’) and Psalm 119 which ‘emphasizes the reliability of the divine word (119.43, 119.160), 
divine instruction (119.142), and divine commandments (119.151).’229 The Old Testament 
exhibits scepticism towards ʾĕmet in human utterances and confidence in the constancy of ʾĕmet 
in God’s speech, words, and commands. 
In addition to being spoken, ʾĕmet can be done. Examples are so numerous that Scott 
suggests that ʾĕmet is ‘primarily a characteristic of actions rather than words.’230 Bethual does 
ʾĕmet when he grants his daughter to be Isaac’s wife (Gen 24.49). Israelite spies enact ʾĕmet 
towards Rahab (Josh 2.14) and God enacts ʾĕmet towards his people (Mic 7.20). There are 
multiple patterns of actions for ʾĕmet. In Psalm 146.6 ʾĕmet is ‘kept’ while in Joshua 24.14 
serving God with ʾĕmet is a pattern of action performed over time, and in Proverbs 29.14, legal 
judgments are rendered with ʾĕmet. Scott finds that ʾĕmet actions are usually ‘helpful or 
beneficial’ to others (e.g. Ezek 18.9) though not always—as when God does ʾĕmet by punishing 
Israel (e.g. Neh 9.33, cf. Exod 34.6-7). Often obligations are fulfilled (1 Sam 12.24), but again 
not necessarily, for in Genesis 32.10 ‘Jacob emphasizes that he is not deserving of God’s 
merciful blessings, God’s acts of [ʾĕmet].’231 For this reason, Scott takes ‘reliability’ as ʾĕmet’s 
central sense when applied to actions (not helpfulness or obligation-fulfilling), stating that ʾĕmet 
properly ‘characterises an act on which one can depend,’ whether its the action of a trusty friend 
or a God who punishes the wicked and delivers the righteous, without obligation.232 
Scott’s proposal describes a single sense of ʾĕmet for non-verbal action, but Wildberger 
distinguishes two of ʾĕmet’s verbal applications. He separates out shʾĕmet—to exercise ʾĕmet—
from beʾĕmet, an adverbial phrase. As for beʾĕmet, this phrase functions adverbially, translating 
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as ‘faithfully,’ ‘uprightly,’ and ‘with integrity,’ such that ‘it describes the dependability of the 
person’s behavior (not the certainty of the state of affairs)’.233  However, there are also instances 
where beʾĕmet has the sense of ‘in truth, actual, really’ (e.g. Judg 9.15).234 To my eye, these 
senses are related; one who acts beʾĕmet not only acts faithfully but also actually, really 
performing the action. Turning to shʾĕmet, both God and humans may exercise ʾĕmet as seen in 
Nehemiah 9.33 and 2 Chronicles 31.20.235  Enacting ʾĕmet is sometimes combined with ḥesed 
(steadfast love). Beyond the Psalter, this phrase (shʾĕmet and ḥesed) is characteristically applied 
to God’s ‘just guidance of people’ (e.g. 2 Sam 2.6).236 Here, both patterns of behaviour across 
years and an isolated task may enact ʾĕmet and ḥesed together. Notably, honesty is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to do shʾĕmet. For instance, in Gen 24.49 Laban would have 
answered honestly—but without ʾĕmet and ḥesed—if he refused to give his daughter in marriage 
to be Abraham’s kin. Likewise, one scholar observes that ‘Calling on the Lord “in truth”  (ps. 
145.18) is not contrasted with hypocrisy, but rather … refers to a devotion in which the God of 
the covenant is worshipped—i.e., which is in accordance with what God has done for his 
people.’237  Enacting ʾĕmet is more than mere honesty. 
We may conclude the following when it comes to ʾĕmet and actions, which includes 
speaking words, non-verbal deeds, and patterns of behaviour. First, speaking ʾĕmet foremost 
indicates the ʾĕmet of one’s speech, but has the ʾĕmet of the speaker in view as well. Second, 
God only speaks ʾĕmet but when humans speak ʾĕmet it comes as something of a surprise. 
Relatedly, God acts with ʾĕmet towards his people, who are expected to do so in return, though 
they often fall short. Third, one may do ʾĕmet, which often includes but does not entail 
connotations of being beneficial or fulfilling obligations—these actions are not always obviously 
positive, as when God acts with ʾĕmet by punishing Israel. Scott finds the reliability of ʾĕmet 
actions is consistent. Since one may refrain from doing ʾĕmet without being dishonest (as in the 
case of Laban), this would suggest that being reliably obstructive or recalcitrant would not be 
ʾĕmet. Wildberger maintains more senses, from ‘in truth, actual, really’ to ‘faithfully, uprightly’ 
or ʾĕmet as something which may itself be done. Finally, when it comes to acting with ʾĕmet, its 
meaning in context spans both action which is faithfully upright and action which is done ‘in 
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truth, actually, really’. From this we may conclude that within ʾĕmet’s purport there is a sense of 
reality or being (as truth) which is conjoined to that of moral uprightness, honesty, reliability, and 
faithfulness. Again, the precise nature of these sense relations are not clear, but we can rule out a 
hard full-sense boundary between the sense of an action’s actuality and the sense of its 
faithfulness. Complete division between senses is not apparent, nor have we identified a single 




From the Old Testament passages and the scholarly commentaries gathered here, we have 
inferred a number of things about ʾĕmet’s purport and possible sense relations, which were noted 
within each subsection. We will first summarise what we have found and then will constructively 
advance conceptual parameters drawn from these findings. 
First, the regularity of ʾĕmet’s application to things, words, humans, God, speech and 
action indicates that these uses are not metaphorical applications; they are within the 
conventional use of the word. For concrete and abstract things, ʾĕmet’s purport includes: 
genuineness, reliability, and enduring constancy. For speech ʾĕmet may indicate thin truth, 
reliability, or both. The senses held in common between the ʾĕmet of things and of speech 
indicates that one need not posit a full division of sense. There also does not appear to be an 
absolute division between (a) the ʾĕmet of a witness, (b) the ʾĕmet of their testimony, and (c) the 
circumstances which are spoken of (an elision obscured by the tendency of English to require a 
choice between ‘uprightness, honesty, or integrity’, ‘truthfulness/reliability’, and ‘actuality’). 
This may be a case of sense-facets, where in usage the senses are not distinguished, while upon 
reflection they refer to clearly distinguishable things, though (as is usually the case with sense-
facets) they are rarely if ever found apart from each other.  
As for the ʾĕmet of humans and God, there continues to be a debate over whether ‘truth’, 
‘trustworthiness,’ or ‘faithfulness’ is the best translation, no doubt because honesty in speech, 
reliability in action, and devotion in character are conceptually related and usually encountered 
together. One division which is maintained throughout, however, is that the ʾĕmet of God is 
constant and that of humans is normative but uncommon. The senses which God’s ʾĕmet is taken 
to convey is more diverse than for humans, encompassing a broad purport, including 
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dependability, ‘thin’ truth (usually associated with God’s speech), honesty, faithfulness, and the 
sublimity and stability of divine presence. These senses can neither be completely divided (e.g. 
faithfulness vs. thin truth) nor completely unified (e.g. under ‘dependability). 
Finally, ʾĕmet may be considered an aspect of both action and speech. We found that the 
ʾĕmet of a speaker is in view when the ʾĕmet of speech is mentioned, and that there is a 
dichotomy between divine and human ʾĕmet, in that divine speech is perpetually ʾĕmet while 
human speech rarely is. As for doing ʾĕmet, God acts with ʾĕmet towards his people, who ought 
to respond in kind but often do not. Doing ʾĕmet is often beneficial, obligation-fulfilling, and 
verbally honest, but not universally so. The reliability of ʾĕmet action appears to include a sense 
of devotion and not simply honest consistency. Finally, actions done with ʾĕmet may be done 
‘faithfully,’ ‘uprightly,’ and ‘with integrity,’ and sometimes it simply indicates that something 
was really (truly) done. Once again, the sense of ʾĕmet actions being really or truly done is 
conjoined with the sense of their being morally upright, honest, reliable, and faithful. 
As for the development of conceptual parameters, it bears noting that the first biblical 
conceptual parameter (f) that truth is thick rather than thin has gained further support in this 
section. Many sense divisions in English which are independent to the point of mutual exclusion 
(one must pick between English options: truth, faithfulness, reliability etc.) appear not to be so in 
Hebrew usage of ʾĕmet. Truth is indivisibly thick and includes senses of uprightness, honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, the sublimity and stability of divine presence, genuine, real, and actual (as 
well as 'thin truth', 'faithfulness', 'reliability', and firmness/solidity with enduring constancy). 
Next, I develop the conceptual parameter (g) that all existing things may be truth bearers, 
i.e. the category of truth-bearers is all inclusive. Concrete and abstract objects, utterances, 
humans, God, and both verbal and non-verbal actions may each be said to be truth-bearers. No 
category of existence, however construed, appears to have been left out. Additionally, there does 
not appear to be a sharp conceptual division among creaturely truth bearers, as the truth of a 
person, their speech, and that which they speak of is may be treated, elided, as almost one and 
the same thing. This lack of complete division does not prevent different truth-bearers from 
bearing truth in subtly different manners, depending upon context.  
While (g) is the main parameter developed in this section, note that (h) understanding 
Yahweh as truth is also beginning to develop, now in an embryonic form. Of all that is called 
ʾĕmet, God alone is constantly ʾĕmet and Yahweh’s superiority in this regard is especially clear in 
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comparison to humanity, which ought to be but falls short. Indeed, truth appears to be hard to 
find among created things, words, actions in general.  
In this way, analysing what is referred to as ʾĕmet in the Old Testament has lead to the 
development of more detailed conceptual parameters.  
 
III.4 Cognates of ʾĔmet 
 
In III.2 we established that there is synchronic transparency between ʾĕmet and its 
cognates— i.e., the interpreted meaning of biblical utterances indicates perceived semantic 
commonalities among ʾĕmet and its cognates (ʾĕmûnâ, neʾĕmān , heʾĕmîn, and ʾāmēn, all coming 
from  the root ʾmn) at the time of composition. This indicates that passages which contain ʾĕmet’s 
cognates could be relevant to the biblical articulations about truth and God, since concepts 
extend beyond single words. For that reason, this section considers what biblical texts and 
biblical scholarship say regarding ʾĕmet’s four cognates and its root. After examining ʾmn, 
ʾĕmûnâ, neʾĕmān, heʾĕmîn, and ʾāmēn, a new conceptual parameter will be developed: (i) that 
truth may be substantial, relational, and transferable.  
 
The Root ʾmn 
 
 Even though three biblical scholars, Silva, Piper, and Jepsen, each characterise the root 
ʾmn with different words, they ultimately drive towards the same purport. Silva characterises ʾmn 
with the substantive attribute ‘firm’, elaborating ‘that which is solid, firm, valid, durable,’ and 
includes the relational ‘notion of reliance.’238 This relational sense is also noted by Piper, who 
roughly translates ʾmn as ‘to sustain, to support.’239 Jepsen’s language combines the substantive 
sense (‘firm’) with the relational (‘to sustain’) by characterising ʾmn with words that have both 
interpersonal and ontological connotations: ‘to be constant, permanent, faithful.’240 ʾMn thus 
evokes a reliable sustaining constancy (or words to that effect), including the quality of firmness 
and its relation to others as sustaining/reliable. Considering the root’s conceptual relation to 
‘truth’, Jepsen hypothesises that ʾĕmet—in the sense of ‘thin truth’—developed from the root 
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ʾmn because ‘truth is that which is constant and unchangeable.’241 While some dispute Jepsen’s 
speculation, this study can conclude that the transparency of ʾĕmet and its root ʾmn suggests that 
truth was conceptually related to a quality of existence (lasting, firm, constant) and a quality of 





ʾĔmûnâ and ʾĕmet are the two substantive nouns which derive from the root ʾmn. As with 
ʾĕmet, one can detect in ʾĕmûnâ the sense of ‘firmness’—from its root ʾmn—informing its basic 
meaning.242  ʾĔmûnâ usually characterises a person’s ‘conduct that grows out of reliability’ or 
‘faithfulness.’243 Moberly adds that it ‘conveys the attractiveness of moral life … [and] 
“faithfulness” in the sense of integrity, trustworthiness, and dependability.’244 As we saw in III.3, 
ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ’s purports ‘overlap to a great extent.’245 Indeed, this contributed to our 
conclusion on ʾĕmet’s transparency in III.2.  
If ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ have purports with a great deal in common, then what is the nature 
of their distinction? Despite the similarities, ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ cannot be fully synonymous 
because ʾĕmûnâ is never applied to speech or objects.246 This leads Wildberger to criticise those 
who hold ‘truth’ to be ʾĕmûnâ’s primary sense.247 Jepsen, for one, argues that,  
 
[ʾĕmûnâ] is not so much an abstract quality, “reliability,” but a way of acting 
which grows out of inner stability, “conscientiousness.” Whereas [ʾĕmet] is 
always used in relationship to something (or someone) on which (or whom) one 
can rely, [ʾĕmûnâ] seems more to emphasize one’s own inner attitude and the 
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This emphasis on internal conscientiousness explains why ʾĕmûnâ is not used in reference to 
speech. As Jepsen explains, ʾĕmûnâ ‘never refers to speech only, but to the conduct of the whole 
person, who, determined by [ʾĕmet], acts in [ʾĕmûnâ].’249 Wildberger makes a similar point, 
noting that though ʾĕmet sometimes includes an element of assuredness or of reliability (cf. Prov 
11.18), it still ‘more than any other derivative of ʾmn, … has acquired the meaning “truth.”’250   
From the ʾĕmet—ʾĕmûnâ comparison, we can see that ʾĕmûnâ lacks the broad application 
to words, things, people, and action that ʾĕmet has, and instead specially describes a person’s 
character and conduct as ‘conscientious’ and marked by integrity and trustworthiness. It 
emphasises the quality of character in itself rather than how it may be relied upon. ‘Reliability’ is 
a more central sense for ʾĕmet. It would appear that the relational element attributed to ʾmn is 
present in ʾĕmet’s sense of reliability (as assured presence), whereas ʾĕmûnâ more aptly indicates 
the personal ethical aspect of ʾmn’s steady firmness: fidelity, trustworthiness, honesty, 
faithfulness, and so forth. This distinction allows the theologian to posit that while ʾĕmet may be 
found in anything, it uniquely gives rise to the quality of ʾĕmûnâ in persons.  
 
Considering neʾĕmān  
 
Neʾĕmān  is one of the two verbal forms derived from the root ʾmn, taking a passive 
verbal form of the simple aspect of the verb (Niph’al, the seventh Binyan, being the passive form 
of the Pa’al, the first Binyan, also called Qal). In Piper’s opinion, neʾĕmān  has the clearest 
semantic relation to the ʾmn root, because its purport includes the senses of ‘firm, solid, reliable’, 
‘faithful, tested’, ‘perceptible’, ‘true’, and ‘lasting.’251  Wildberger agrees, saying that neʾĕmān , 
‘can unequivocally describe duration, permanence’ (e.g. Isa 33.16) and ‘in an ethico-religious 
perspective, the element of dependability and faithfulness’ (e.g. Prov 25.13).252  Silva’s 
translation ‘to be faithful, trustworthy’ also highlights the personal element of neʾĕmān’s 
senses.253 Jepsen observes that neʾĕmān is usually found in participial form and is predominantly 
applied to God and humanity, though occasionally also to things.254 Thus, he translates it as 
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‘constant’ as this English word ‘can include both the permanency of things and the stability and 
reliability of persons.’255 
In terms of neʾĕmān’s semantic relation to the cognates already considered, Moberly 
detects no shift in theological use from ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ to neʾĕmān, except that as a verb it can 
also mean “established,” “made firm.”’256  ʾĔmûnâ draws out neʾĕmān’s sense of ‘dependability, 
faithfulness’ (e.g. 1 Sam 26.33), while ʾĕmet draws on the sense of ‘permanence, security, 
duration’ (e.g. Isa 16.5).257  Thinking along similar lines, Piper stipulates that ʾĕmet ‘designates a 
reality, which is firm and unchanging.’258 Neʾĕmān  is the cognate most closely resembling the 
senses of the root ʾmn in that it conveys that the subject is being that is firm, unchanging, and 
constant, and it corroborates the sense of ʾĕmet as firm unchanging reality. Its significance will 




Heʾĕmîn is the root ʾmn in the hiph’il verbal form (the third Binyan), conveying the 
causative aspect of the root, i.e. the subject causes something else to perform the verb (though 
the ‘causative’ aspect has almost entirely vanished from heʾĕmîn’s purport, as it has similarly 
with hishmin, ‘to become fat’). 259 This verb has enjoyed much scholarly attention because of its 
place within the Hebrew semantic field for the senses ‘believe, trust, have faith in.’260 At its most 
basic, heʾĕmîn ‘has the sense of putting confidence in something or someone, and is used of 
trusting God’ as in Deuteronomy 1.32 which criticises Israel for not having done so towards 
God.261   Occasionally, the ‘original concrete-physical meaning “to stand fast, hold still” ’ is 
detectable (cf. Job 39.24), but it is overshadowed by the senses “to have trust, be dependable” 
(e.g. Ps 27.13).262 Two prepositions, ‘lĕ’ and ‘bĕ’, are used to modulate the senses of heʾĕmîn. Lĕ 
conveys senses of ‘to believe’ and ‘accept a report as true’ (1 Kgs 10.7) while, to this recognition 
of the truth, bĕ indicates that the believer has also responded with trust or obedience (Job 39.11-
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12).263  This is, however, a tendency not a technical distinction, as some passages use both 
prepositions with heʾĕmîn without any apparent difference in sense (Ps 106.12, 24).264    
The most striking aspect of heʾĕmîn is that it focuses on the ‘subject of the act of trust’ 
instead of ‘the personal or impersonal object of trust,’265 to the extent that the object of trust is 
sometimes omitted entirely from the sentence.266 Thus, Jepsen paraphrases heʾĕmîn as “to gain 
stability, to rely on someone, to give credence to a message or to consider it to be true, to trust in 
someone,” which he simplifies as “to become steadfast (stable).”267 
We may conclude that the purport  of heʾĕmîn retains the sense ‘firmness’ from the root, 
but this sense is not applied to the object which is considered true—rather it indicates the 
firmness of the subject who takes the object as true. As one scholar writes, ‘to make a man true, 
[heʾĕmîn] means the same as to rely on him. It implies confidence in his having the will and 
power to maintain the claims of the covenant …. they make him ‘true,’ i.e., firm, sure, and 
strong”; “to consider a soul firm and thus to contribute to its firmness, that is to ‘make true,’ to 
believe in it.”268 In other words, if heʾĕmîn has a causative element, one could say it means (for 
instance) that Ashley takes Sam to be a true friend, but is really pointing out that by trusting Sam 
to be a true friend (provided Sam is), Ashley becomes true as well, at least in regards to Sam. 
Speaking imaginatively, it is as if there is a gathering firmness both in the one who trusts and in 
that which is trusted; analogously, a structure built on a firm foundation is itself steadied as a 
result. ʾĔmet, I would venture, has transferred from object doing neʾĕmān to subject enacting 
heʾĕmîn (though without becoming absent from the original). Heʾĕmîn particularly picks out the 
gathering firmness in the one who trusts.  Interestingly, there is again a relational aspect to the 
heʾĕmîn, which is unlike that seen in the in neʾĕmān, in that an object is implied but is peripheral 
enough that it need not always be specified.  Neʾĕmān  speaks to the active constancy, being 
established and firm, while heʾĕmîn speaks to the burgeoning firmness that is enacted by the one 
who trusts that which is trustworthy. This dynamic will be developed into the idea that truth is 
transferable through relationships.  
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Finally, the last ʾĕmet cognate is ʾāmēn. It has the distinction of being the most widely 
known Hebrew word today, as the end to prayers in innumerable languages. Morphologically 
ʾāmēn is an adverb, but ‘no certain conclusions can be drawn’ from this regarding its meaning.269 
In the Old Testament it only occurs in liturgical, doxological, and theological contexts.270 It also 
always appears as ‘a word of response to what has been said by someone else.’271 ʾĀmēn 
essentially means ‘let it be so’ or ‘may it come true’ and commits its speakers to avoid (Deut 
27.14-26) or follow (Neh 5.13) ‘a particular course of action.’272 When a person declares ʾāmēn, 
s/he means both that something ‘stands firm, is “true”’ and also that it is ‘obligatory for the 
speaker’ because of its truth.273 In a devotional context, with an ʾāmēn the speaker all at once 
‘affirms the wish that God may act, places himself under divine judgment, and joins in praise to 
God.’274 For this reason, it is fair to say that ʾāmēn is thus ‘self-involving religious language.’275 
As a theologian drawing several themes, I would say ʾāmēn’s formalised affirmation of a 
declaration’s truth is no disinterested observation; it involves oneself and makes one party to the 
matter at hand. The ʾĕmet of a speaker and his/her speech extends to those who declare ‘ʾāmēn’ 
in response because the ʾāmēn declares one’s recognition of ʾĕmet and one’s intention of ʾĕmûnâ 
towards it. The social function of ʾāmēn, then, is to name one’s own action of heʾĕmîn towards 
what was said. A similar English word-play is possible with the word ‘determine.’  When to 
determine a fact is also to determine oneself, to become determined in relation to it that the fact 




It is widely agreed that the significance of a concept is not necessarily restricted to a 
single word. This section has examined ʾĕmet’s cognates because earlier it was shown there is 
semantic transparency between them (III.2). This indicated that passages which contain ʾĕmet’s 
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cognates could be relevant to the biblical articulations about truth and God. Taking the senses 
and sense relations attested to by biblical scholars, the theologian will now develop conceptual 
parameters based upon them.  
To summarise, this section found: the root ʾmn has senses of a substantial quality 
(firmness, solidity, lasting, constant) and of relational quality (reliable, sustaining, faithful). Both 
of these qualities appear in the largely overlapping purports of ʾĕmet and ʾĕmûnâ, though the 
latter de-emphasises the relational quality. Their difference lies in that only ʾĕmet can convey a 
‘thin’ sense of truth and be applied to speech on its own applies to language. ʾĔmûnâ, on the 
other hand, specifically emphasises a personal and ethical sense of conscientiousness, honesty, in 
character and conduct of humans or God. The verbal form neʾĕmān conveys the constancy of 
persons (incl. God), and occasionally of non-personal things, and is the closest in its purport to 
the ʾmn root, with its senses of being ‘established’, ‘made firm’, and of ’permanence, security, 
duration.’  Heʾĕmîn, the other verbal form, is used to describe a subject coming to the 
determination that a person, thing, message, or similar is established, firm, reliable, true, etc., and 
(most importantly) the subject becomes firm, sure, reliable, and true in his/commitment to the 
determination. Finally ʾāmēn is a formalised phrase for pronouncing that one has done this and 
the ongoing committed involvement it implies, especially in relation to God. This dynamic of 
sense relations between the ʾmn cognates provides material for conceptual parameter (i).  
In my view, the sense relations found in the ʾmn word-family creates a rather elegant 
series of relationships, a gathering of firmness and reality on material, personal, and ethical 
levels. The ʾmn root evokes senses of firm solidity that is lasting, constant, and so is also reliable 
for continuing to be what it is. ʾĔmet speaks to this quality in (as we have seen) material and 
abstract things, speech and testimony, humans and God, and even actions. ʾĔmûnâ appears to be 
a related quality, but only found in the character and conduct of persons (human and divine), and 
so is more fit to be translated as ‘faithful’, because of the personal connotations, while ʾĕmet is 
more fit to be ‘truth’, even when applied to persons, because its purport includes senses applied 
to speech as well. With the verb neʾĕmān, we have a way of saying that something gains the 
qualities of firmness, reliability, whether in the very material sense of a stone pillar or the 
dependable faithfulness of a person. We could say, in English, that such a person is true. Heʾĕmîn 
is when a person takes something else to have these qualities of ʾĕmet or ʾĕmûnâ, for a something 
to be neʾĕmān, but it speaks most strongly to how, when one takes another thing to be firm, one 
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too gains firmness. To depend on the dependable makes one also reliable, but it also engenders 
the conscientious and faithful character of one who is ʾĕmûnâ. The word ʾāmēn serves a social 
function, as a declaration of one’s intention to do so, in regard to specific pronouncements and 
persons.    
Turning now to the task of conceptual parameters, it is first of all readily apparent that 
ʾĕmet not only has more senses than merely ‘thin’ truth, but also that its other senses are 
meaningfully connected to, rather than divided from, thin truth. This further reinforces (f) that 
truth is thick rather than thin (III.2).  The main harvest of conceptual parameters, however, is 
developed from the lovely interweaving of cognates’ senses; it is called (i) that truth may be 
substantial, relational, and transferable. By this I mean, first, that truth can refer to the 
substantial quality of something, that it is firm, enduring, constant and so forth. Second, truth’s 
substantial quality which entails a relational aspect as well; one may rely, depend upon, trust, or 
treat as true that which as substantive truth. Third, the substantial quality of truth may be 
transferred from one thing to another when the relational quality of truth is acted upon. When 
this relational possibility is enacted one thing takes another thing as true (or as a truth), an act 
that may be characterised as an act of trust, belief, faith, reliance, or making true. It is self-
involving, not a mere disinterested recognition of veracity, because one has not only determined 
the truth of a thing but also determined for oneself to be true to that truth—to live and act in 
accordance with its reality. This act transfers or extends the truth of that which is trusted to the 
one who trusts; this one too becomes firm, reliable, etc. This transferable aspect has a creative 
aspect to it as well. It involves creativity in that further trueness has been added to the world 
through the act of taking something as true, and maintaining it as so. It is like building a house 
on a rock, or the growth of crystals where molecules position themselves in line with and thereby 
extend the solid crystalline structure. In this way, thick truth is substantial, relational, and 
transferable. 
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The previous sections (III.2, III.3, and III.4) have focused on gathering material for 
conceptual parameters from sense relations detected surrounding ʾĕmet in Old Testament texts. 
This section and the following turn from sense relations to focus on textual meaning. Of course, 
sense relations and textual meanings mutually implicate each other (see I.5 and III.1), so this 
chapter complements the work of the previous. The interpretation of individual passages is 
guided by historical critical biblical scholarship. The organisation of which passages to attend to 
is influenced by cognitive linguistics, specifically, the cognitive linguistic distinction between a 
concept's profile and its domain (explained below). This section and the next identify and 
investigate multiple domains of thought and activity which contextualise the understanding of 
truth in the Old Testament. First, this section focuses on three domains of action in which ʾĕmet 
plays a notable role: namely, devotional contexts, legal contexts, and wisdom-seeking contexts. 
The following section, III.6, focuses on four conceptual domains that importantly inform 
understandings of truth in the Old Testament: words and things, Yahweh, the word of God, and 
wisdom. From these sections two conceptual parameters will be developed in great detail. First, 
parameter (h) understanding Yahweh as truth will be developed considerably. Second, the final 
conceptual parameter of this study will be given form and articulation as (j) the relation of divine 
law, word, and wisdom to truth. Once these are in hand, the thoroughly constructive work of 
Chapter IV will commence.  
Before turning to study ʾĕmet's domains in earnest, the profile-domain distinction drawn 
by cognitive linguistics should be clarified. A concept's 'profile' is comparable to what most 
dictionary definitions list in their entries; its ‘domain’ is the ‘knowledge or conceptual structure 
that is presupposed by the profiled concept.’276 For instance, the profile of 'radius' is 'the distance 
from the centre to the circumference of a circle', and its domain is the concept of a circle. 
Without understanding the domain, one cannot understand the full significance of the profile. 
Sometimes, a word’s different senses are analysable as the same profile being applied to 
difference bases. For instance, ‘mouth’ has the same profile of 'an opening' across the differing 
domains of ‘bottle’, ‘face’, ‘cave,’ and ‘river’—a case which shows the necessity of clarifying 
domains to make sense of the profile.277 Furthermore, conceptual domains often differ between 
cultures, explaining some issues that often arise in translations which are technically correct and 
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yet misleading. For instance, the English word 'lukewarm' and the Japanese 'nurui' have the same 
profile; they both indicate a liquid at room temperature. 'Nurui', however, is only used for liquids 
that should be hot, whereas 'lukewarm' could describe liquids meant to be hot or cold; their 
domains are different.278 If someone took the statement 'The man from Alabama was 
disappointed that his sweet tea was lukewarm' and translated 'nurui' for 'lukewarm', it would 
mislead the Japanese reader into thinking that sweet tea in the American South is expected to be 
hot, when it is usually cold.  
The distinction between a concept's profile and its domain reveals the deficiency of any 
attempt to explicate the understanding of truth in the Old Testament if one only offers English 
translations of ʾĕmet's senses. Over the course of III.2-4, a prodigious collection of individual 
senses has established in ʾĕmet's purport. But in order to ascertain a discourse’s concept, one 
must cast one's net beyond key words and examine passages which lack the key word but are 
nonetheless relevant to understanding the concept's domain. 
In my research, I have identified seven relevant domains for ʾĕmet and divided them into 
two categories designated ‘scripts’ and ‘frames’. Scripts, a cognitive linguistic term, ‘is often 
used for a frame/domain with a sequence of events’, or when it is a ‘dynamic concept extending 
through time.’279 For instance the concept behind ‘purified’ involves a notional account of a 
purifying sequence of events. In that spirit, this study calls ʾĕmet's action-oriented domains the 
three ‘scripts’ of devotional, legal contexts, and wisdom-seeking contexts. These are ‘scripts’ of 
my own designation, meant to categorise the many observations in biblical scholarship regarding 
ʾĕmet and do not indicate either distinctions of genre or sitz im leben. Cognitive linguistics often 
uses ‘frame’ interchangeably with ‘domain’, but this study will use it to refer to conceptually-
oriented domains. I have identified four frames, each of which is picked out by a key term: 
words and things (dābār), God (yhwh), the word of God (dəbar yhwh), and wisdom (ḥokmâ). 
This section examines the three scripts (action-oriented domains) and the following takes up the 
four frames (conceptually-oriented frames).  
 
Devotional Contexts of ʾĕmet 
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The script of ‘devotional contexts’ pertains to passages which treat ʾĕmet in relation to 
God or human devotion to God. One cardinal devotional encounter is between Moses and God in 
Exodus 33-4, in which God proclaims Godself to be Yahweh ‘a God merciful and gracious, slow 
to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness [ḥesed and ʾĕmet]’ (34.6) Here, 
Yahweh has chosen to renew the covenant with Israel despite their unfaithfulness in worshipping 
the golden calf.280 In this narrative, God’s faithfulness (ʾĕmet) endures regardless of the 
vicissitudes of his chosen people. Similarly, Nehemiah 9.33 ‘confesses of the past: “Thou hast 
been just in all that has come upon us, for thou hast dealt faithfully [ʾĕmet] and we have acted 
wickedly.’281 Clearly, God has no obligation to be faithful, but nevertheless is, as is elsewhere 
widely attested (see Ps 86.15; cf., 2 Tim 2.13)). In these passages, God’s ʾĕmet is characterised 
by an enduring commitment to Israel through all time (past, present, future) even in the face of 
Israel’s apostasy and wickedness.  
The phrase ḥesed and ʾĕmet—‘steadfast love and faithfulness’ or ‘grace and truth’ 
deserves greater attention because it appears dozens of times in the biblical text, making it a 
‘veritable refrain’, especially in the Psalter (e.g. Ps 25.10).282 Our attention will be rewarded with 
the knowledge of how ʾĕmet is intimately related to ḥesed, especially in devotional contexts 
where God’s ʾĕmet is overwhelmingly understood in conjunction with God’s steadfast love or 
grace.   
A cottage industry of scholarship has emerged around ḥesed, because it is at the heart of 
Yahweh’s character and action, and is often thought to be a uniquely ‘covenantal’ word, speaking 
to covenantal faithfulness. Put briefly, ḥesed is ‘a theologically significant word that has a broad 
range of meaning (“kindness, favor, love, loyalty, grace”), though when applied to God it is often 
rendered with such combinations as “steadfast love” (NRSV) and “unfailing love” (NIV).’283 
When paired with ḥesed, ʾĕmet is often translated in the NRSV as ‘faithfulness’, with overtones 
of ‘honesty’, and ‘integrity’ (e.g. Gen 24.49), but it is acknowledged that ‘thin truth’ in the senses 
of ‘veracity and integrity’ is also sometimes present. For instance, Silva explains that in Ex 34.6 
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‘since the next verse sets side by side the promise of mercy for thousands and the warning of 
punishment for the guilty,’ God’s veracity and integrity are included in ʾĕmet.284 
Though some have argued that ʾĕmet is used to modify ḥesed—as if to say ‘lasting 
mercy’ rather than ‘love and faithfulness/truth’—evidence of parallelism in adjoining half-verses 
and the use of plural verbs mitigates against reading ʾĕmet adjectivally. 285 This suggests that 
ʾĕmet and ḥesed were spoken of as ‘separate attitudes of God, who manifests himself in active 
kindness and protective faithfulness respectively.’286 Ps 85.11 is a strong example, in that ḥesed 
and ʾĕmet are treated almost as independent hypostases or cosmic entities.287 They are 
distinguishable but rarely separable.  
ʾĔmet’s near constant association with ḥesed shows that God’s ʾĕmet is not dispassionate 
objectivity, but overwhelmingly understood in conjunction with God’s steadfast love, grace, etc. 
At times divine ʾĕmet and ḥesed are spoken of independently as that which supports God. Ḥesed 
and ʾĕmet may be found in humanity, but are preeminently in God; they may be done as well as 
possessed, and there is in God’s ḥesed and ʾĕmet the sense of ‘truth’ as well as the sense of 
‘faithfulness.’ 
As for what God’s ʾĕmet means for God’s people, it is more than an attitude of 
faithfulness. The devotional Psalms show it alters daily life, is meant for all people especially the 
oppressed, and is found in all God’s works. First, that they request or praise God’s ʾĕmet in the 
form of identifiable actions make this clear. In Psalm 69.14 the psalmist ‘implores Yahweh 
specifically to grant an audience “in the faithfulness of your aid”.’288 The ʾĕmet of yhwh in Psalm 
54.5 (54.7) includes protection from one’s enemies and elsewhere leads the psalmist to compare 
divine ʾĕmet to a sword and buckler (Ps 91.4).289 Yahweh’s ʾĕmet can even be a source of 
guidance, leading one to where God resides (Ps 43.3, cf. 138.2). Thus, God’s ʾĕmet, faithfulness 
despite infidelity, manifests in quotidian existence outside of liturgical contexts, as protection, 
aid, and guidance.  
How far does God’s ʾĕmet extend? On Wildberger’s reading, Psalm 146 views God’s 
ʾĕmet (146.6) as ‘faithfulness eternally’, praising Yahweh ‘as the helper of all who are oppressed. 
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Yahweh himself is, indeed, called the God of Jacob (v 5), but he is described as the creator God 
and the God of Zion (146.10), who will rule eternally.’290 This brings God’s ʾĕmet to all people, 
most especially those in need of divine ʾĕmet’s guidance and protection. Jepsen notes that Psalm 
111.7 characterises all the words of yhwh as ‘faithful [ʾĕmet] and just’, and that it follows that 
God’s precepts are “executed, faithful [ʾĕmet] and just’ (111.8). These and similar passages 
support the parameter that all God’s words and works are expression of his ʾĕmet. This is a third 
universalising of God’s ʾĕmet; in addition to it being for all time, for all people, it finally applies 
to all of God’s works, categorically not incidentally.  
Some biblical scholars have considered the implications of divine ʾĕmet for God’s nature. 
Spicq reasoned that God’s reliability is related to God’s constant nature, which is to say, God’s 
truth and being are bound up together.291 Jepsen likewise connects divine truth with divine being 
and reliability of presence: Jeremiah 10.10 holds the ‘true’ God is living and potent. As he puts it 
‘the God on whom one can rely and he alone is the true God’ (e.g. Ps 54.5, Ps 57.4).292 The 
Bible’s concrete metaphors support this connection of God’s truth with God’s being, especially 
given ʾĕmet’s transparency to its root ʾmn, which has the sense ‘firm;’ ‘Thus he can rightly be 
called a fortress, a refuge, or a rock, and his “truth” is the reason why people can trust him. In a 
universe which is constantly in flux and change (it “floats upon the waters”), he proves to be the 
only unchanging reality.’293 These biblical scholars have connected God’s truth with God’s being 
through their attention to biblical passages, rather than philosophical categories. To be constant, 
reliable, present, engaged and so forth is simply how God exists; it is Yahweh’s un-altering 
character as experienced and reflected upon in the Old Testament texts.   
To know God’s ʾĕmet towards humanity has the implication that one’s conduct should 
also be ʾĕmet. Quell finds that Ezekiel 18.8, 19 (cf. Ps 15.2) holds that devotion to God leads one 
to execute true judgment among men, and Hosea 4.1 excoriates the reverse, that without 
knowledge of God, there is no ʾĕmet in the land, concluding that ‘truthfulness grows from 
knowledge of God.’ 294 Jepsen makes a similar point, noting that ‘walking before God (1 Kgs 
2.4), calling upon him (Ps 145.18) or swearing his name (Jer 4.2) must always be done with 
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ʾĕmet, that is ‘honestly, genuinely, reliably.’295 Joshua 24.14 and 1 Sam 12.24 both contain the 
injunction “Fear the Lord and serve him [with ʾĕmet].” In these texts, the normative demand for 
humans to serve with ʾĕmet derives from God’s abiding ʾĕmet which precedes it. Such human 
ʾĕmet includes both devotional practices towards God and displaying ʾĕmet to one’s neighbour.   
At times, the devotional script overlaps with judicial and wisdom-seeking scripts. The 
judicial coincides with the devotional where Yahweh’s commandments are concerned, as they are 
the basis of law and are repeatedly called ʾĕmet. Wildberger maintains their ʾĕmet is not 
restricted to a ‘thin’ sense of truth, but also dependability and eternal quality (cf. Ps 19.10, 
119.152).296 This is yet another occasion where ʾĕmet contains both a sense of the thin truth 
alongside senses of constancy and dependability. The mutual involvement of godly devotion and 
wisdom-seeking appears in Psalm 51.6 (51.8), though the text is difficult to interpret. Textual 
uncertainties notwithstanding, it is apparent that ʾĕmet here clearly ‘parallels [ḥokmâ] “wisdom,” 
and like [ḥokmâ] it can be taught.’297 God’s desire for the psalmist to have inward ʾĕmet 
correlates to God instructing the psalmist in wisdom.  
To conclude, this subsection’s findings on ʾĕmet in a devotional context serve to develop 
conceptual parameter (h) understanding Yahweh as truth. In this study’s view, God’s Truth 
consists of constant devotion despite apostasy and wickedness, throughout time, manifesting in 
concrete aid, protection and guidance, meant for all those in need, and that categorically all 
God’s words and works are true in this sense.  Likewise, all of God’s self and character is ʾĕmet, 
creating a coincidence between God’s truth and God’s being as experienced by Israel as God’s 
constancy and abiding presence. Additionally, this divine form of truth is marked by its 
conjunction with steadfast love (ḥesed). The appropriate human response is to act truly (with 
ʾĕmet), importantly towards others as well as God. The thin sense of divine truth is apparent in 
that God’s commandments are ʾĕmet (being true and valid/dependable) and that cultivating 
human truth involves instruction in wisdom.  
 
Judicial Contexts of ʾĕmet 
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ʾĔmet’s judicial contexts include courts of law, political systems, and paths of 
righteousness. The first of these, legal or forensic contexts, is believed by some scholars to be 
where the term ʾĕmet first developed to indicated that ‘truth’ as has been determined by a legal 
proceeding or cause (e.g. Deut 13.14 (13.15) and Zechariah 8.16).298 In such cases, ʾĕmet 
designates ‘truth’ which is ‘the actual fact over against mere contentions, particularly in a trial’ 
and an ʾĕmet judgment is one which is based upon established facts and cannot be disputed.’299 
In these situations, ʾĕmet is defined by a certain procedure or  ‘script’. The ʾĕmet of witnesses, 
testimony, and judgments are crucial elements of the legal process. In Isaiah 43.9 witnesses 
preface their testimony with ‘this is the truth (ʾĕmet).’ Recall from III.3 that one may parse 
‘ʾĕmet witness’ either as ‘a witness on whose testimony one can depend’ or ‘one who “speaks 
truth”’. This highlights the indivisibility of a witness’ ʾĕmet and the ʾĕmet of their testimony. The 
one who passes judgment also has a duty to judge with ʾĕmet, (e.g. Ezek 18.8f.).300 Clearly, there 
is a concern in the biblical text that in order for ʾĕmet to result from the ‘script’ of a legal process, 
there must be ʾĕmet in the actors and their actions as it proceeds.  
This judicial script is intimately related to the political. Old Testament kings sit in 
judgment, so it is unsurprising that the ʾĕmet is also demanded of royal rulers. The throne of a 
king who judges the poor with ʾĕmet lasts forever (Prov 29.14). ʾĔmet and ḥesed preserve the 
king (Prov 20.28) and, in Psalm 89.14 (89.15), ʾĕmet and justice preserve God’s throne.  From 
these passages we can see that the impartial judgment of judges and kings is highly valued, 
considered normative, and a source of prosperity for those reigning and those ruled.  The king, 
however, is not the apex; God is the ultimate judge and whose judgments are always ʾĕmet (Isa 
42.3; Ps 96.13).301  
Furthermore, the laws and decrees established by God and (secondarily) monarchs ought 
to be ʾĕmet. The law was instituted by God in the first place and Yahweh’s Torah and 
commandments are celebrated for being ʾĕmet (Ps 111.17, throughout Ps 119). Moberly and 
Scott both hold that the psalmist means both that the commandments are true not false and that 
they  are trustworthy reliable guidance for living one’s life.302  
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This guiding quality connects the truth of God’s law with the recurrent phrase ‘walking in 
truth’ and its variations (e.g. Ps 86.11). Scott says God's ʾĕmet is a ‘reliable path in which to 
walk, a lifestyle that mimics God’s own reliability.’303 Similarly, Quell considers ‘walking in thy 
truth’ as reducible in meaning to ‘solid rules of life which are called truth and which are the 
theme of divine instruction.’304 It is readily apparent that this walking in truth coincides with the 
way of the righteous.  
Piper speculates that God’s commands have ‘“truth” in them because they are an 
expression of God’s ‘true’ will, and he continues, ‘such usage implies that the OT standard of 
justice is not found in an abstract sociological or ethical principle but in God’s way of dealing 
with this world.’305 I would say, God’s ḥesed and ʾĕmet towards Israel teaches God’s people the 
nature of law and justice, with political implications that the king who rules must show ʾĕmet to 
the ‘true’ commands as do all subjects of the kingdom. ‘Thus,’ Piper concludes, ‘while “truth” 
implies veracity, truthfulness, it is not confined to it, but rather designates the whole field of 
religious and moral life, as it agrees with God’s will.'306 
From this analysis of ʾĕmet in judicial contexts, I now venture to begin developing our 
final conceptual parameter: (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth, focusing on 
law at this point. Thick truth (including thin truth, honesty, trustworthiness, reliability etc.) is 
normative in judicial and political systems for their proper functioning. God is the apex of these 
human institutions, as the ultimate law-giver and judge and it is implied that the divine 
commandments and Torah are ʾĕmet both because they correspond with God’s will—being 
perhaps united with or derived from the divine ʾĕmet—and because they are dependable guides 
to a good godly life. Thus, justice, piety, and moral patterns of life are derived from God’s very 
character as ḥesed and ʾĕmet, and Israel’s experience of God’s abiding active presence as such. 
To follow in God’s way is to walk in the way of truth, which certainly includes truthfulness but 
encompasses more broadly all moral and pious ways of life.  
 
Wisdom-Seeking Contexts of ʾĕmet 
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ʾĔmet is frequently mentioned in relation to wisdom the search for which is a dominant 
theme in Proverbs and other biblical wisdom literature. The pursuit of wisdom (ḥokmâ), in which 
ʾĕmet is involved, is a dynamic process and hence a script. Most obviously, the ethical demand of 
ʾĕmet is made clear. Proverbs exhorts its reader to acquire truth (23.23), that ʾĕmet is a source of 
atonement (16.6), and that ʾĕmet should be bound around one’s neck (3.3). Lady Wisdom only 
speaks ʾĕmet (8.7) and the sage explains he teaches ʾĕmet (22.21).  
ʾĔmet has a programmatic role too, in that it is strongly associated with fear of the Lord, 
which is a primary step to seeking wisdom. For instance, Nehemiah 7.2 immediately follows an 
accolade for Hanani’s ʾĕmet by adding that ‘he feared God.’ Likewise, when the covenant is 
renewed at Shechem, Joshua delivers the injunction to fear yhwh and directly adds ‘serve him in 
sincerity and faithfulness [ʾĕmet]’ (Josh 24.14).307 The textual difficulties with Psalm 51.6 (51.8) 
do not obscure that ʾĕmet clearly stands in parallel to wisdom here, such that truth in a person 
comes from God’s instruction of wisdom. Fear of the Lord and personal ʾĕmet go hand in hand. 
If ʾĕmet is essential to wisdom, how does it assist the pursuit of wisdom? Divine truth, it 
would seem offers illumination and faithful guidance. Jepsen draws together that ʾĕmet appears 
to be an illumination and guide (Ps 43.3), presumably of God’s paths, which are all ʾĕmet and 
ḥesed (25.10); likewise, Abraham’s servant thanks God for leading him on the ʾĕmet path (Gen 
24.27, 48).308 As we saw in the judicial context, walking in truth appears coincident with the path 
of faithfulness, for which God faithfully illuminates and offers guidance. Wildberger importantly 
points out that one must not divide interpersonal ethical considerations from those of piety here: 
'the response to God’s faithfulness can only be faithfulness toward one’s fellow human 
beings.’309 ʾĔmet behaviour ‘toward God is demanded of Israel, not primarily in the sense of 
“faithfulness” … but “uprightly, genuinely, honestly”.’310 While these senses of faithfulness and 
kindness certainly predominate here, Silva points out that a thin sense of truth as related to 
‘reality’ is also at play, saying Ps 43.3 ‘is not a prayer for God to remain faithful, but a request to 
be able to see things for what they really are in the face of the enticing words of “deceitful” 
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people (v. 1).’311 Thick truth is very much in evidence, and it plays a crucial role in guiding one 
towards wisdom.  
From this examination of ʾĕmet in relation to seeking wisdom, conceptual parameter (j) 
the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth will be further developed, this time focusing 
on wisdom. Fear of the Lord, appropriately enacted, is congruent with serving Yahweh with thick 
truth; God’s instruction in wisdom is both the consequence of fearing the Lord and what brings a 
person into truth. Similarly, the righteous path is the way taken by those who walk in truth and 
God’s truth illuminates and guides people along this path. In this pursuit, individual piety and 
inter-personal ethical action are conjoined, such that one is not present without the other. 
Likewise, the thin element of truth continues to weave through truth’s senses of faithfulness and 
devotion: one is exhorted to honesty and truth in speech. Additionally, walking in the way of 
truth explicitly enables recognition of the world as it truly is; the world is made plain in the light 
of the Lord.  
This concludes this study’s examination of action-oriented domains of ʾĕmet in the Old 
Testament, leaving the conceptually-oriented domains to be taken up in the next section.  
 
III.6 Conceptual Frames of ʾĔmet 
 
The previous section developed conceptual parameters from an examination of ʾĕmet’s 
role in viewing them as scripts of action which form a domain to ʾĕmet’s senses (profiles) (see 
III.5). This section considers conceptual domains, or ‘frames’, which I judge to be relevant to 
properly explicating the understandings of truth that appear in the Old Testament. These four 
conceptual domains salient to for this study of ʾĕmet are: words and things (dābār), God (named 
yhwh), the word of God (dəbar yhwh), and wisdom (ḥokmâ),  
 
The Words and Things of dābār 
 
One domain of ʾĕmet is speech. By far the most prominent Hebrew lexeme translated as 
‘word’ is dābār.312 Once its use in the Old Testament is examined, this study will find that words 
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and the things they speak of are elided together. The result is that the underlying image of the 
relationship between the thin truth of language and reality is less like a relationship of matching 
correspondence but rather, more like a filling in or making-solid. This is a useful insight for 
conceptual parameters. 
Dābār, like ʾĕmet, appears to have two categorically different senses when translated into 
English. On one hand, there is a cluster of translations related to speech, including ‘word’, 
‘dispute,’ ‘lyrics,’ ‘whisper,’ etc..313 On the other hand, dābār is often translated as ‘thing’ or 
‘matter’ (e.g. Prov 11.13), an indefinite ‘something’ (e.g. Amos 3.7), or even an event (e.g. Gen 
22.1, 20 ‘some time later’ literally after these events).314 This second usage of dābār as ‘thing’ is 
‘widespread, ancient, and unusually variable in the OT’ and it usually involves an ‘intellectual’ 
element in that ‘one is occupied with something intellectually.’315 Again, as with ʾĕmet’s senses 
of thin truth and faithfulness, there are passages where it is uncertain whether dābār is better 
translated as ‘thing’ or ‘word’ (e.g. Exod 35.1 “these are the things the LORD has commanded;” 
cf. Eccl 12.13).316 That the preferred sense is at times indeterminable means there is no 
antagonistic mutual exclusion between these two senses. This indicates that ‘word’ and ‘thing’ 
are not two entirely distinct senses for dābār (recalling our principles of full sense boundaries 
from cognitive linguistics).  
How can words and the matter they touch upon be elided together? Schmidt proposes an 
insightful solution. Old Testament texts frequently describe dābār as an object completed by 
something beyond the utterance itself. Schmidt explains: ‘The word that announces the future is 
connected with the expectation that it will be fulfilled. This idea of the fulfillment or realization 
of the word is expressed by the greatest variety of verbs. In this sense, [dābār] appears both as 
object (a) and also as subject (b) of these verbs.’317 Instances include ‘to fulfil a word’ (e.g. 1 
Kngs 1.14) ‘to fully execute’ (e.g. Num 22.20) or to ‘confirm’ a word (e.g. Deut 9.5). In these 
cases, dābār is an object completed by something beyond the utterance itself. Similarly, the 
‘word’ and the matter it speaks of go undistinguished, being ‘regarded as a unity,’ as a unified 
subject: e.g. when dābār ‘comes true’ (e.g. Deut 18.22) ‘comes to pass’ (e.g. Isa 55.11), is 
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completed/accomplished (e.g. Ezra 1.1), or happens (e.g. Num 11.23).318 From all these 
passages, we may conclude that the Old Testament texts exhibit a strong conceptual proclivity to 
seeing speech as incomplete when what they assert is not yet the case and empty when what they 
speak of is not the case. When what is said is also the case (real/reality) the result is that the word 
and the matter spoken of are regarded as a unified phenomenon: they are true. Schmidt observes 
that frequently ‘the fulfilment of the word is regarded as a decisive and sufficient criterion of 
truth,’ (e.g. Jer 28.8f.).319  It is then intelligible that in addition to speaking, hearing, trusting, or 
scorning a particular dābār, one may ‘do’ dābār—in the sense of fulfilling or executing the 
word.320 This is simply an extension of the elision between word and thing (including actions).321  
If a fulfilled, accomplished, or executed dābār is ʾĕmet, then Procksh is right to observe 
that ‘there should be a relation of truth between word and thing, and a relation of fidelity 
between the one who speaks and the one who hears. Hence the word belongs to the moral 
sphere.’322 Just as Yahweh’s words are ʾĕmet, so should human ones be. Moreover, one speaks 
ʾāmēn to the words one believes; the ʾāmēn is a self-involving commitment to sustain the spoken 
word, to make it true by bringing it to pass (e.g. by upholding the commandments of God). 
At this point, it is useful to think of the pioneering work of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson in Metaphors We Live By,323 They persuasively argued that metaphors underlie many of 
the notions that structure daily life, for instance, that time is money or that argument is war.324 If 
we consider the ‘thin truth’ sense of ʾĕmet against the conceptual frame of words and things as 
elided by dābār, then it appears the thin truth sense of ʾĕmet does not have an underlying image 
of corresponding so much as fulfilling. The underlying metaphorical image of correspondence-
truth is of matching, like a mirror, but the dynamic among dābār’s senses indicates that the 
underlying metaphor of truth is of filling in or making solid. Furthermore, the image of 
correspondence implies that speech and its matter are similar but independent of each other, 
whereas if a word can be fulfilled or completed, then speech and its matter are mutually involved 
and effected. Future-oriented speech may be lacking and uncertain until fulfilled, and words that 
speak truly to the present or past are already reliable, they are full, solid, accomplished, ʾĕmet.   
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Given Hebrew’s word-thing elision, it is perhaps not surprising that proper names are 
strongly connected with the person or thing they name. In Old Testament narratives when 
characters have names that speak meaningfully to who they are (e.g., Gen 27.36, 1 Sam 25.25), 
the name is no mere label or arbitrary designation; it conveys the object’s ‘existence, identity, 
and character’ or even ‘nature.’325 Though a name may not reveal everything about a person, it 
will provide characteristic insight.326 With the name’s grasp on the named-one’s very self, there 
arises an association of power with the name, such as the power ‘to summon him to his/her aid’ 
(cf. Gen 32.24-30 (32.25-31), Adam attaining or enacting dominion over the animals by knowing 
and naming them (Gen 2.20), or the power of knowing the name/answer of Samson’s riddle 
(Judg 14.17-20).327       
To conclude, dābār’s purport includes both what is said and the matter spoken of, such 
that there is no full sense division between these senses. When this is taken as a conceptual frame 
in which to understand ʾĕmet’s sense of thin truth, the nature of truth is re-characterised. Rather 
than self-sufficient speech corresponding (or not) to the referenced realities, dābār is empty and 
unfulfilled until it is accomplished, fulfilled, made ʾĕmet by that of which it speaks. This 
suggests a fundamental metaphor of filling, solidifying, or completing for speech, rather than 
corresponding, matching, or mirroring. In the case of names, because they pick out an important 
quality of the one whom they name, there are both non-arbitrary and give the speaker some 
power regarding what they named and thereby know.  
 From this, conceptual parameter  (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth 
draws material regarding ‘word’. Speech is treated neither as arbitrary set of labels nor 
independent verbal entities that may or may not correspond to reality. Meaningful utterances are 
only true when they are completed and fulfilled by the reality they speak to. False speech is 
empty, and some speech which has not yet ‘come to pass’ is not empty though also not yet 
entirely true. Names appear to have these qualities as well, in that knowing a true name gives one 
some power or grasp over the one who is named. Finally, there are strong normative 
connotations and moral freight to the state of one’s words, for they ought to be true.             
 
The God called ‘yhwh’ 
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Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament is el ʾĕmet, the God of Truth, and so an obvious 
domain to attend to, a task which will cover the significance of God’s name and creedal 
statements in the Old Testament.  
The Tetragrammaton, yhwh, is not merely the personal proper noun for Israel’s God, it is 
also ‘by far the most common designation for God in the OT’, used 6,282 times.328  Though its 
use declined in the post-exilic period, this is due to its eternal significance: yhwh was considered 
too holy to utter329, being replaced with the words for ‘Lord,’ ‘God,330’ or simply ‘the Name.’331 
Since an ancient Near Eastern name frequently indicates the nature, essence, or key traits of its 
reference, we ask what significance ‘yhwh’ had. The vast majority of scholars agree that it in 
some way plays on the Hebrew verb hyh for ‘to be or become,’332 but etymologising beyond that 
is contentious territory and, as James Barr and cognitive linguistics make clear, etymology is 
extraneous to semantic considerations unless proven otherwise. Fortunately, in Exodus 3, when 
Yahweh reveals his name to Moses, there appears to be a sort of ‘folk’ etymology, a story of the 
name’s origin in the narrative.333 Regardless of its linguistic accuracy, a folk etymology’s textual 
presence proves its semantic relevance for the authors.  
 In Ex 3.14 God declares to Moses I AM WHO I AM, which could also be translated 
severally: “I will be what (who) I will be”; “I will cause to be what I will cause to be”; or “I will 
be who I am/I am who I will be.”334 In all cases, the Hebrew phrase ‘consists of the repeated 
form of the verb to be (hyh, earlier form hwy) in the first person singular plus the relative 
particle.335 At this juncture, Moses is concerned about facing Pharaoh on the Hebrews’ behalf. 
Yahweh replies that he will be with Moses, that he has heard the misery of his people, then 
provides his name as a cryptic being-statement, which he then truncates into ‘I AM’ has sent you, 
then as yhwh, the one who was present to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and whose title will last 
forever. The narrative next indicates how Yahweh’s presence will deliver his people from 
bondage in Egypt. Clearly, the whole passage is geared towards God’s lasting, reliable, 
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efficacious presence: I will be with you. As it is said, ‘The force of the name is not simply that 
God is or is present, but that God will be faithfully God for them in the history that is to follow 
(see Ex 3.16-17).’336 The same verbal form in 3.12, 4.12, 15 (cf. 6.7, 29.45) supports this. God is 
not to be capricious or arbitrary, but to live up to his name.337  
If we have seen that the purport of ʾĕmet includes lasting reliable firmness, a presence 
which can be depended upon, and that names are expected to articulate something essential, then 
all the language about yhwh as ʾĕmet perfectly accords with the word play in Exodus 3.13-15. 
This elides God’s Truth with God’s Being. As Noth rightly points out, this is not an allegedly 
‘Greek’ idea of pure ‘being’, pure ‘existing’ but rather an ‘active being’ who appears and acts in 
history.338  Childs agrees on this point: ‘The major witness of Ex. 3 lies in the revelation by God 
of himself to Moses as that divine reality who had already made himself known in the past to the 
Fathers and who promised to execute his redemptive will toward Israel in the future.’339 He 
warns against straying too far in emphasis either on ontology or on history, noting that 1) God’s 
being and activity are not divided, 2) that ‘the concept of history can be just as much a 
theological trap as ontology if it is divorced from the divine reality which appeared in its fullness 
in the incarnated Lord, who is both ‘first and last’, and 3) that this revelation is not mere 
information giving but should ‘evoke a response of obedience within God’s plan.’340 This recalls 
how ‘ʾāmēn’ simultaneously recognises truth and declares one’s allegiance to it.  
Thus far, we may conclude, yhwh is the personal name for God but it was not an arbitrary 
set of syllables which merely designate the divine. The folk etymology of Exodus 3 shows that 
the name’s perceived relation to verbs of being and creation was taken to bear on the name’s 
meaning and thus on the nature of God. The narrative context involves God declaring God’s 
efficacious presence to Moses and the ancestors, further informing ‘yhwh’’s significance with the 
personal experience of God in history. The much debated I AM THAT I AM phrase is an almost 
philosophical statement or koan about the being thus encountered. God is a lasting stable 
existence, who has reliability in presence (being) and creativity in giving life (also being) to 
others (in a form yhwh determines—I will make what I make). Language referring to God is 
semantically related to the divine reality in itself, and as such is to be revered and respected. The 
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precise significance of yhwh and God’s answer in Exodus 3.13-15 is uncertain in details, but we 
have found broad agreement is on these overall aspects.  
The abiding presence of yhwh in Ex 3.14 illuminates the narrative’s later declaration that 
God is full of ḥesed and ʾĕmet in Exodus 34.6. Exodus 34.6-7 is one of a few creed-like 
statements in the Old Testament (‘others e.g. Deut 26.5-9; Josh 24.2-13; Neh 9.6-31’).341 
Fretheim points out that other divine speeches in Exodus (3.7-10; 34.6-7, cf. 2.23-25) are also 
‘sharply oriented towards images of grace, love, and mercy’, and these recurrences add to their 
creedal tone.342 Childs adds that the OT’s widespread repetition of the ‘ḥesed and ʾĕmet’ phrase 
from Exodus 34.6 indicates its centrality.343 Indeed verses 6-7 have been central to Jewish 
liturgy, possibly since the Second Temple period, classically being divided into 13 characteristics 
of God.344 
Because God’s speech comes on the heel of the golden-calf apostasy, Childs tells us ‘The 
faith which Israel learned to prize was not a proud tradition that once in the past God had singled 
out a people, but rather that God had continued to sustain his original purpose with a sinful 
nation both in mercy and judgment.’345 The passage emphasises God’s constancy even in the face 
of Israel’s infidelity, a clarification on yhwh’s abiding active presence as conveyed in Exodus 3.  
A recent Jewish commentary parses it similarly: translating it ‘kindness and faithfulness’ and 
teaching that  
 
Each of the components has a wide range of meaning. [Ḥesed] involves acts of 
beneficence, mutuality, and often also obligations that flow from a legal 
relationship. … [ʾĔmet], usually translated “truth,” encompasses reliability, 
durability, and faithfulness. The combination of terms expresses God’s absolute 
and eternal dependability in dispensing His benefactions.346 
 
It is as if the nature and significance of yhwh’s presence that Ex 3 has established is then parsed 
in Ex 34, to explain what God’s abiding lasting reliable presence is in truth.  
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The final element of Yahweh’s nature that cannot go unmentioned is established in what 
becomes the Shema Yisrael prayer of Deuteronomy 6.4:  ‘Hear, O Israel: the LORD our God, the 
LORD is one.’ Yhwh (translated ‘the LORD’) is not as a diverse conglomerate but a unified 
being, a coherent consistent whole, one to be held above all other would-be gods that offer 
themselves for human devotion.  
From this subsection’s analysis of the God Yahweh (yhwh) who is ʾelʾĕmet (God of 
Truth), further content can be drawn for conceptual parameter (h) understanding Yahweh as 
truth, pertaining to God’s abiding being, love and truth. By reading Exodus 34 in light of Exodus 
3, the fundamental connection becomes clear between God’s lasting presence actively engaged 
with Israel and God’s character as ḥesed and ʾĕmet. God’s presence is that which IS, both eternal 
through all time and space as well as actively engaged in history. Furthermore, divine presence is 
to be ḥesed and ʾĕmet, and from the Shema we know that these are in some sense unified in 
God’s person. Yahweh’s character and mode of dealing with God’s people (which is itself 
unified,) does not alter, even when they do. He is compassionate towards Israel yet unbending 
from justice, and actively engaged even as Yahweh himself is reliably constant and unaltered.  
 
Word of God: dəbar yhwh 
 
The third conceptual frame of ʾĕmet combines the first two; the word of God. The truth of 
God’s word is seen to signify more than divine honesty or thin truth’s accuracy, once the 
significance of the phrase is fully unpacked. The most common phrase for the word of God is 
dəbar yhwh and it always takes a definite article in the prophetic books; prophets receive the (not 
a) word of God.347 Besides prophetic words, dābār is also used for divine commandments and 
God’s creative word.348 In addition to being described as being ṭôb (good, full of promise, 
comforting) and yāšār (upright,) the dəbar of God is ʾĕmet (e.g. 2 Sam 7.28) and neʾĕmān (e.g. 1 
Chr 17.23).349 The profile of truth acquires particular significance when framed by the divine 
word that encompasses commandments, teaching, and prophetic pronouncements, with its own 
creative and salvific power.  
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The most well-known use of dābār in one form or another as God’s law and 
commandments is the Decalogue—ten words—of Exodus 34.28 and Deuteronomy 4.13, 10.4. 
Though dābār does not become a technical term for apodeictic (clearly established) 
commandments,350 a commandment may be referred to as a singular dābār (e.g.  Deut 15.15) and 
the (non-decalogue) commandments often with the plural (e.g. Deut 1.1).351 Over the course of 
Deuteronomy, these ‘words of the Torah’ come to be written of as ‘the single uniform revelation 
of the will of Yahweh to Israel’ upon which Israel is totally dependent and by which they will 
live long and prosper (e.g. Deut 17.19, Deut 32.47).352 Unity is a prominent theological theme of 
Deuteronomy, as it focuses on ‘the one God (6.4), the one sanctuary (12), and the one “word” 
(4.2).’353 As a result, the dābār in the singular sometimes designates the entire ‘divine will for 
justice imparted to Israel in the covenant’ (e.g. 30.14).354   
 Similarly, the unified word of God appears in Psalm 119. Here, dābār is normally 
singular and is freely identified with the Torah, whose teachings encompass the covenant’s 
promises and the prophets’ demands. One scholar notes at length,  
 
The Word stands in heaven (v. 89). Its sum is truth (v. 160). It is a light on the 
path (v. 105). It has the content of life, for according to its measure God quickens 
the righteous (v. 25, 107, 154) and gives him understanding (v. 169). It has within 
it power, for the poet trusts in it (v. 42) and hopes in it (v. 74, 81, 114, 147; cf. Ps 
130.5). It demands obedience and observance (v. 57, 101). It thus has moral 
significance for man. It is both promise and hope, demand and power. As one may 
say that both the motivation and the rest of faith and of the moral life are to be 
found in the [Torah], so one may find these in the Word because it contains God’s 
revelation. Since its quintessence is truth, one can rely on God’s Word 
absolutely.355 
 
The importance of dəbar yhwh as ʾĕmet is brought to the fore here. 
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The singularity of the divine word may inform the prophets’ view of their commission, in 
that the word of God they receive is a reassertion of God’s word in the law, i.e. they are 
‘validating the authority of the covenant commandments against judicial malpractice and law-
breaking in Israel.’356 For instance, Amos 2.4-8 condemns oppressing the poor as a violation of 
the covenant order; Jeremiah 7.9 condemns a ‘decalogue-like array of transgressions’; and 
Ezekiel 22.2 warns that violating the covenant endangers the people.357 In this way, prophets do 
not speak a new word from God but speak God’s single word to their own time and place. We 
could say that the prophetic words are a working out of God’s ʾĕmet and ḥesed according to 
God's promises, and so are too the dəbar yhwh.  
Nor is the word of God always verbal; sometimes it appears in a sign or vision instead of 
speech and has non-verbal features.358 For instance, prophets frequently refer to the divine word 
with an ‘event-word formula’, such as ‘and the word of the Lord came to . . .’ as if the word is 
something that happens and becomes effective, i.e., as if ‘the word of God became active 
reality.’359 This divine prophetic word has dynamism, as if it is an ‘urgently pressing force.’360 
Thus, the prophet has encountered something in history, not simply observed a generalised word-
presence in the world.361 Dəbar yhwh has what Procksh calls ‘a dynamic creative and destructive 
element’—its great blessings being apparent in Isaiah 9:7-8, the combination of blessing and 
rebuke in Isaiah 2.3-4, and the downfall that comes to those who scorn it (28.13); he concludes 
that ‘Revelation is a blessing whose absence is felt as a judgment, for they will thirst for the 
Word of Yahweh and they will not find it. The Word of Yahweh is the vital force whose 
withdrawal means that grace ceases.’362 The power of the word of God is clearly evident in Old 
Testament utterances.  
Beyond the law and the prophets, the Deuteronomistic history relates to God’s word as 
well because this history traces the fulfilment of the word. Recall dābār’s elision of speech and 
the matter it speaks of, and that true speech is fulfilled by the reality it speaks of. History fulfils 
God’s word, describing the ‘fulfillment of the covenant commandment proclaimed by Moses 
with its possibilities of blessing and curse’, and prophets continually demand the people return to 
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fulfilling the divine word, conveying its combined summons, promise, and judgment.363 The 
sense of the word of God as a ‘historical force’ develops further in Deutero-Isaiah, but it never 
goes so far as to confuse the divine word with history itself; instead, the divine word brings to 
pass its own fulfilment on earth. Procksch explains:  
 
Nature passes away, but the Word of Yahweh lasts forever [cf. Is 40.8] … The 
dəbar yhwh is presented as absolute by nature in the well-known comparison with 
rain and snow in Is 55.10f. As rain and snow cannot be unfruitful but soak into the 
earth and cause seeds to sprout, so the Word of Yahweh cannot return to heaven 
without accomplishing its mission . . . The Word is seen to be a heavenly force 
which creatively accomplishes its work on earth.364  
 
This calls to my mind Psalm 85.8-13 (85:9-14), where the psalmist promises to heed Yahweh's 
word, with full expectation that truth will spring from the earth.  
This specifically creative power of God’s word in the natural world, as well as the law 
and the prophets, should not be overlooked. Though the phrase dəbar yhwh is absent from 
Genesis 1, God clearly creates though speech, setting the God of Israel apart from other ancient 
Near Eastern creation myths which rely on violence (e.g. Marduk vs. Tiamut).365 God’s word-
driven creativity appears in other early biblical texts as well, such as the prophets (e.g. Ezra 37.4, 
Isa  40.26), and the Psalms (e.g. 147.15-18).366 Furthermore, the wisdom literature touches upon 
God’s creative word, this time associating it ‘ontologically’ with wisdom in Proverbs 8.22-31 (a 
theme developed further in Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon).367  
Israel’s elision of God’s creative words with the word of salvation and the word of law 
distinguishes it from other instances of powerfully creative divine words elsewhere in the ancient 
Near East.368 Psalm 33 praises God’s word as the force of creation and source of salvation, and 
Psalm 147 links the divine word with natural forces and divine commandments (147.4-5, 15). 
Anderson puts it nicely, emphasising truth’s central role: 
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 The source of cosmic (and political) order is thus neither violence nor force, but 
truth, conveyed by a feeble word. God’s same word orders lives of humanity in 
the Decalogue and the Torah, and confronting kings and the powerful, authentic 
representatives speak God’s word with prophetic clarity and penetrating 
relevance.369  
 
Silva agrees and stresses that the creative word of God is also the covenant’s word of law and its 
salvific promises; this unification is unique, characterising ‘the specifically Israelite 
understanding of the true word of God.’370 Looking beyond Psalm 119—where this coincidence 
of creative word, law, and salvation’s promise is obvious— Schmidt sees the broad activity of 
the God’s word in evidence throughout the Psalter: it effects the life of individuals and nations, 
the course of nature and the content of commandments, and brings life and healing.371 The word 
of God is one.  
By examining the word of God, dəbar yhwh, the significance of God’s truth becomes 
more apparent. Specifically, the significance of God’s truth for creation and humanity has come 
into focus, and from these insights conceptual parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and 
wisdom to truth received further development.  Most importantly, the word of God is true, i.e., it 
is good, upright, thinly true, and reliable in its accuracy to reality and as a guide for a good life. 
Divine commandments and the pronouncements of the prophets are unified expressions of God’s 
word, not many and various individual words received as if by dictation. The word may appear 
as harsh judgment, but more characteristically it heals, guides, and restores. The prophetic 
excoriations are a unified part of this process rather than divine fickleness. Indeed, one of the 
divine word’s characteristics is consistency. In this way, the word has power and efficacy among 
the creatures of the world, which is most pronounced in God’s creation and sustaining of the 
cosmos through the divine word. Ultimately, the word of God has creative, salvific, and 
normative qualities for personal conduct and courts of law. 
 
Wisdom (ḥokmâ)     
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In earlier sections of this chapter, we have seen Old Testament texts that closely associate 
ʾĕmet, God’s creative Word, and the Torah with wisdom. This indicates that the biblical approach 
to wisdom is an important conceptual domain or frame for this study. The central Hebrew term 
for wisdom or being wise is ḥokmâ, which Dell defines as ‘having the ability to make the right 
use of knowledge, being learned, discreet, skillful, perceptive, and judging rightly.’372 Far from a 
secular concept, the term is closely connected to God and it has the remarkable quality of 
appearing as a personified female figure, Lady Wisdom, ‘who mediates among human beings, 
the wider world, and the divine real.’373 In this section we will consider the diversity of human 
wisdom, how to attain it, its relation to God, and finally the figure of personified Wisdom.  
Old Testament ḥokmâ encompasses what in English is divided among knowledge, 
learning, and skill. Fohrer documents ten English subdivisions of Hebrew wisdom: skill and 
ability, cleverness, slyness and cunning, practical wisdom, magic and manticism, cultural 
wisdom, rules and behaviour, ethical conduct, piety, academic wisdom, and eschatological 
blessing and apocalyptic endowment.374 Although biblical texts are by no means above 
criticising another society’s wisdom there is an explicit acknowledgment that Israel is not alone 
in its pursuit of wisdom (e.g. Jer 50.35, Isa 47.10) nor above adopting wisdom others have 
codified (Prov 22.17-23.11 strikingly resembles Wisdom of Amenemope).375 Perhaps more 
significantly, wisdom is accessible to all, and is noted in men, women, children, slaves, and 
foreigners.376  
Biblical scholars have attempted to unite the disparate content of wisdom under a single 
characterisation, but the Old Testament does not offer theoretical formulation for the nature of 
wisdom. Instead, it repeatedly essentialises the pursuit of wisdom: ‘the fear of the Lord is 
beginning of wisdom’ (e.g. Prov 9.10). This is Hebrew wisdom’s distinguishing trait; it begins 
with knowledge and fear of God. Rather than being stark terror, fear of Yahweh is a commitment 
to heed God above all.377 Murphy puts it nicely: ‘To know God, in the Wisdom Literature, is to 
 
372 Katharine J. Dell, ‘Wisdom in the OT,’ in NIDB, v, 869. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Georg Fohrer, ’σοφια: B. The Old Testament,’ TDNT, vii, 476-489. 
375 Silva, NIDNTTE, iv, 333. 
376 Carole, R. Fontaine, ‘Sophia,’ in NIDB, v, 356. 
377 Silva, NIDNTTE, iv, 332. 
   
 180 
be in, and to do, the truth. This is as much a faith experience as any of the cultic acts in the 
Jerusalem temple.’378 
Until the recent decades, biblical scholarship neglected wisdom literature because its lack 
of explicit reference to the Pentateuch’s salvation history made it appear extraneous to the main 
religious purport of the Old Testament.379  It appeared too philosophical to not be secular, but 
appearances can be deceiving and its innately religious orientation has come to be recognised, as 
has that the secular/religious distinction is ill-suited for biblical texts.380 As we have seen, fear 
and knowledge of Yahweh is wisdom’s driving impulse, and wisdom gained from human 
experience and the natural world is an intimate possession, aspect, or companion of God. 
Furthermore, the Psalms integrate wisdom with Yahweh, salvation history, and the law. ‘Many 
psalms are concerned with personal piety, and these embody a certain type or aspect of such 
piety, but they also state or imply an association between wisdom and the Jewish law, such as we 
suspected might underpin Proverbs 1-9.’ 381 For instance, Psalm 93.1-5 moves from creation to 
the temple and Psalm 96 combines thanksgiving for salvation to celebration of creation.382 
Likewise, Psalms 1 and 119 link personal piety and law, distinguishing the pious adherent to the 
Torah from the wicked one who disregards it, a distinction matching that between the wise and 
wicked in Proverbs.383 
Dell helpfully illustrates the process of gaining wisdom as a triangular structure. On one 
corner is humanity, on another nature: ‘the world to which the wisdom writers look is the natural 
one; proverbs often draws comparisons between unlike phenomena: one human, one 
nonhuman.’384 Humanity and nature form the base and God is the peak, as the ‘creator of the 
world, of humans, animals, plants, the elements, and of the order that holds the fabric of life 
together … God is the head of the social order for human beings, the king being God’s 
representative on earth.’ 385 Murphy says Israel experienced no disjuncture between knowledge 
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and faith for God was experienced in the world.386 Thus Wisdom is a divine gift informed by 
experience (Isa 28.23-29).387 
Now we come to consider God’s relationship to wisdom, as it is portrayed in the Old 
Testament (overlooking the deutero-canonical books). As implied by God gifting wisdom to 
certain people, wisdom is treated as God’s possession (e.g. 2 Sam 14.20), and as such it is 
beyond human skill (Jer 10.7) and greater than any human understanding (e.g. Prov 21.30).388 
The Wisdom of God has generative and ethical connotations as well. References occur to God’s 
technical and artistic mastery in creating (e.g. Is 40.13 f.) and sustaining creation (e.g. Job 
37.16).389 As for moral conduct, Fohrer tells us that God’s ḥokmâ is also God’s manner of action, 
of establishing justice, on which is founded human ethical codes (e.g., Ezra 7.25).390 God is said 
to attain and create wisdom, not merely possess it. Job 28 lengthily portrays how no-one can find 
wisdom; neither humans nor even death, the sea, or the deep know where to find it/her (28.14, 
22). Only God finds the way of wisdom among the heavens, and the chapter ends by declaring 
that humanity only finds wisdom through God. Opinions differ as to whether wisdom is pre-
existent to God’s discovery or God knows where wisdom is found because God established the 
word with wisdom.  
This distinct hypostatisation of an appealing elusive wisdom becomes an explicit 
personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 1-9. Within Dell’s triangle of humanity, nature, and 
divinity, she notes this additional figure who takes ‘a mediating role, imparting wisdom to human 
beings, acting for the divine, primeval yet herself created … a gift from God to the whole 
creation, attainable to all who seek to follow its ways.’391 In Proverbs 1-9 wisdom is undeniably 
personified and female: she calls out in the market place (1.20), prepares and invites people to a 
banquet (9.1, 4), she offers love (8.17) is to be embraced (4.8) and spoken to like a sister or close 
friend (7.4). Proverbs 8.3-36 explicitly describes her role in relation to God, repeatedly 
emphasising her existence before any other created thing and that she is at God’s side.   
There is dissension over how to make theological sense of personified wisdom. At times 
the pursuit of wisdom is described through the image of a relationship with Lady Wisdom. She is 
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personified, feminine, and speaks in a manner with has more in common with God’s speech than 
that of sages and wisdom teachers. Murphy explains that to some scholars ‘she seems to be 
something of God, born of God, in God. Usually she is said to be a divine attribute, a 
personification of the wisdom with which God created the world,’ while other scholars disagree, 
taking the view that ‘wisdom [is] an attribute of the world’ made by God and as the mysterious 
world order she ‘beckons to human beings.’ 392 For his part, Murphy sees wisdom as coinciding 
with Yahweh: ‘Is Wisdom not the Lord, who turns toward creatures and summons them through 
creation, through the wisdom experience?’393 These various interpretative options have been 
debated since ancient times, so reaching a consensus is unlikely. Lady Wisdom has been 
interpreted variously as a hypostasis, a primordial creation, co-eternal with God, or an 
aspect/trait of God, but in any case Lady Wisdom is a guiding central figure to the pious quest 
for wisdom and how to live in its way—not unlike the guidance given by God’s word.           
In conclusion, these findings regarding the approach to wisdom in biblical texts now 
informed the last conceptual parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth. 
the pursuit of wisdom is fundamentally devotional: fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom 
and all wisdom is a gift from God. This premise is held, without any sense of contradiction, with 
the views that growth in wisdom is supported by experience, the natural world, and tradition, and 
can occur in other nations than those devoted to Yahweh, though with mixed results. Virtually all 
realms of knowledge, skill, craft, and cleverness are encompassed by wisdom, and it is 
something available to men, women, children, regardless of social standing or national origin. 
Adherence to the Torah, moral action, and honesty are aspects of wisdom as will, and wisdom is 
the path of the created world as set by God, for God created through wisdom. Like the word of 
God, wisdom is instrumental in the creation and sustaining of the cosmos as well as in guiding 
humanity to live godly lives. 
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The preceding chapter has made two significant contributions to this study. First, it has 
explicated and demonstrated the application of its novel theological methodology through its 
productive approach to the Bible, successfully engaging with biblical studies and cognitive 
linguistics while also producing conceptual parameters for use in constructive theology. Second, 
it has done original work to explicate the understanding of truth and divinity in the Old 
Testament, yielding five conceptual parameters which are of value to theological approaches to 
truth.  
The first subsection (III.1) built on the methodological section in Chapter I (I.5), setting 
out the plan to investigate both textual meaning and sense relations in the Old Testament that 
relate to truth and divinity. It justified the decision to consult historical criticism for the 
interpretation of biblical passages and to restrict its inquiry to the Protestant canon, naming this a 
’historical canonical’ approach. The benefit of engaging with cognitive linguistics was also made 
apparent. Finally, the effect of aiming to be congruent with the biblical text rather than merely 
informed by it was clarified.  
The following five sections of analysis were developed into five conceptual parameters. 
The following section (III.2) had immediate occasion to make rigorous use of cognitive linguistic 
categories, and its examination of the senses of ʾĕmet, the Hebrew word usually translated 
‘truth’, was developed into this study’s first biblical conceptual parameter: (f) that truth is thick 
rather than thin. Section III.3 attended to the many entities that are called true (ʾĕmet) in the Old 
Testament, drawing from this (g) that all existing things may be truth bearers, including God, 
humans, speech, things, and actions. Additionally, it added further support for (f) thick truth and 
some initial material for (h) understanding Yahweh as truth. The word family associated with 
ʾĕmet was the topic of section III.4, which yielded a rich dynamic of sense relations, one from 
which this theologian theorised (i) that truth may be substantial, relational, and transferable—
meaning that truth can be a quality of substance and/or of relationships, and that the substantive 
truth of one thing can become transferred to or shared by another through a true relationship. 
After three sections investigating sense relations, the final two turned to textual meaning, looking 
to flesh out the Bible’s domains of practice and thought that contextualised the many biblical 
senses of ʾĕmet. III.5 looked to scripts, or action oriented domains, in which ʾĕmet figured 
prominently, focusing on devotional contexts, legal contexts, and wisdom-seeking contexts. III.6 
turned to conceptual domains or frames, focusing on words and things (encompassed by dābār), 
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Yahweh, the word of God, and wisdom. These two sections yielded detailed material for both (h) 
understanding Yahweh as truth and (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth. 
These importantly included the theological positions that: first, God’s presence is that which IS, 
both eternal through all time and space as well as actively engaged in history, a presence marked 
by steadfast love and faithful truth, such that he is compassionate towards Israel yet unbending 
from justice, and actively engaged even as Yahweh himself is reliably constant and unaltered; 
and second, that the word and wisdom of Yahweh are both a powerful active force which creates 
the cosmos, maintains its existence, are found in the Torah and commandments—both are true in 
the sense of thin truth and in that they are reliable for pursuit of a good and godly life.    
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Chapter IV: A Constructive Theology of Truth   
   
Chapters II and III yielded ten conceptual parameters concerning the nature of God and 
truth. This chapter aims to form them into a constructive theology of truth. To that end, it 
considers how conceptual parameters are turned into a constructive theology and provides a brief 
overview of the parameters developed in Chapters II and III. The remainder of Chapter IV then 
presents this study’s constructive theology of truth, synthesising and augmenting the parameters 
into an alethiology that addresses truth in general, God as Truth, and truth in creation. Its 
implications for epistemology, relevance to theological discourse, and relation to the 
philosophical and theological accounts of truth in Chapter I will be noted as well.       
 
IV.1 Theological Construction and Parameter Review 
 
From Conceptual Parameters to Constructive Theology 
 
This study has articulated ten conceptual parameters regarding truth and divinity. The 
constructive theological task is to develop this list of independent ideas into a coherent 
theological alethiology. The process of turning independently articulated conceptual parameters 
into a coherent theological proposal is a creative process that will vary depending on the topic at 
hand. Instead of prescribing a regimented process, this method allows the approach to vary as 
needed as long as the chosen process is transparent and accountable to the reader. The theologian 
may construct as s/he wishes, as long as it is transparent (i) when a conceptual parameter is being 
implemented, (ii) how conceptual parameters are being related to or synthesised with each other, 
and (iii) when a material is being added by the constructive theology. This transparency and 
accountability enables the comprehension, evaluation, critique, and implementation of this 
study's findings for other projects.  
One goal of this conceptual parameter method is to clearly display the influence of 
ancient Christian sources on the conceptual parameters while also indicating that the resulting 
theological account is not identical with its sources. This Chapter IV synthesises multiple ancient 
positions, uniting them in a manner that is both new and congruent with traditional Christian 
thought and practice. This theology is intelligibly ancient and new. The methodology likewise 
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makes clear in what sense the proposed theology of truth is biblical, Christian, and Augustinian. 
This study does not claim to present the ‘biblical’ view of truth as if it were what the historical 
persons who wrote the canonical texts had in mind at the time. It is ‘biblical’ in the sense of 
being congruent with defensible interpretations of the Bible. Furthermore, the theology of truth 
is ‘Christian,’ but not because it is the view held by all or most Christians. Rather, it is 
essentially Christian because it is congruent with the Nicene Creed and the biblical text. Finally, 
it is Augustinian by virtue of being informed by three of his texts, without precisely reiterating 
his own position.394  
 
The Ten Conceptual Parameters 
 
The conceptual parameters developed from the Bible and Augustine’s selected writings 
are summarised below. They are lettered instead of numbered to reinforce that their order does 
not indicate priority among them. Their order of development and presentation was chosen for 
clarity with the reader in mind. 
 The following five Augustinian conceptual parameters have been developed: 
(a) understanding God as truth names God as Truth itself, unbounded by time and space, 
superior to all creation, who is apprehensible through the constant truths of mathematics and the 
wise principles for a good life. Though this God yet remains mysteriously beyond 
comprehension, he is personally relatable in prayer and devotion by the names Truth, Love, and 
Eternal (a position we might call an apophatic realist position).   
(b) the human apprehension of divine truth reiterates the incomprehensible nature of God 
as truth, noting that it nonetheless may be apprehended, learned, discovered, abided in, held in 
faith,  and brought into understanding. Divine truth is not subjected to the human mind, for it is 
unaltered by human apprehension which is always limited, fallible, diverse, and variable. It is the 
condition of possibility for human understanding, already present to the mind and closer than one 
is to oneself.  
(c) the human pursuit of truth is never finished—though a decisive threshold is crossed 
when one accepts the divine Truth as one’s God with all one’s heart, soul, and mind (this being 
 
394 Being informed is a lesser hurdle than being congruent, in that one may be informed by some elements of 
Augustine’s writings and yet not be congruent with his entire body of thought. 
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the same God who is incarnate in Christ). The constancy and reliability of divine Truth affords 
the seeker peace, security, and freedom (especially from sin), affecting the entire human person 
(intellect, emotions, bodily life), who is entirely engaged in the pursuit. Additionally, creation 
aids the search for divine truth, as it always refers one to its maker. 
(d) the Trinitarian God as truth took on three principles of Trinitarian language: that it 
always falls short of God; that all names attributing a divine trait treat God’s entire substance 
indivisibly; and that only relational names (excluded from the previous principle) are not 
necessarily convertible with each other. Furthermore, ‘Truth’ is a substantive divine name which 
is convertible with Love, Goodness, Being and all other substantive divine names. 
(e) the relationship between human wisdom and knowledge holds that knowledge is an 
awareness of temporal and bodily things (i.e. creaturely things and the cosmos) whereas wisdom 
is an awareness of eternal things (i.e. divine things, God). Humans cannot advance in either 
wisdom or knowledge without the other, and when the pursuits of wisdom and knowledge are 
properly integrated, wisdom holds primacy. 
The following five biblical conceptual parameters have been developed from the Old 
Testament: 
(f) that truth is thick rather than thin states that truth encompasses many senses alongside 
the ‘thin’ truth of speech agreeing with reality. These include: faithfulness, truthfulness, honesty, 
integrity, reliability, firmness/solidity, enduring constancy, being genuine real and actual, and the 
sublimity and stability of divine presence.  
(g) all existing things may be truth-bearers means that no category of existence is 
excluded from being able to bear truth, including concrete and abstract objects, utterances, 
humans, God, and both verbal and non-verbal actions. This parameter allows that different things 
may bear truth in different manners, but also notes that attributions of truth frequently blur 
boundaries, such as when it groups together the truth of a witness, their testimony, and the event 
testified to. 
(h) understanding Yahweh as truth holds that Yahweh’s truth is normative, constant, and 
united with God’s active presence, steadfast love, and faithfulness. God’s Truth consists of 
constant devotion despite apostasy and wickedness, throughout time, manifesting in concrete aid, 
protection and guidance, meant for all those in need, and that all God’s words and works are 
categorically true in this sense. God’s truth and God’s being—experienced by Israel as God’s 
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constancy and abiding presence—is that which IS, both eternal through all time and space as 
well as actively engaged in history. Additionally, divine truth always coincides with divine 
steadfast love. The thin sense of divine truth is apparent in that God’s commandments are thinly 
true and valid/dependable for a living a good life, often cultivated by instruction in wisdom. The 
appropriate human response is to act truly towards God and other humans. The human failing to 
fulfil this norm is always apparent in comparison to God’s faithful truth.  
(i) that truth may be substantial, relational, and transferable indicates that truth can be a 
quality of substance (e.g. firm, enduring, constant; also reliable, dependable), and quality of 
relationships (e.g. when one element relates to another element as true, through reliance, trust, 
belief etc.), and that, through a true relationship, the substantive truth of one thing can become 
transferred to or shared by another. This transference is a form of creative making, in that truth is 
brought to be where it was not, as when building a firm foundation. 
(j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth covers more ground than any 
other conceptual parameter, articulating how divine truth cannot be understood apart from divine 
law, word, and wisdom. In this biblical view, the underlying metaphor for speech is that speech 
that is true is being filled or solidified by the reality it speaks of: true speech has been fulfilled, 
false speech is empty, and some speech has not yet come to pass. God’s word effectively and 
powerfully creates its own truth, enacting what it expresses, for instance, in the creation of the 
world. God’s word is also singular, such that divine commandments and prophetic 
pronouncements are diverse expressions of the same divine word. While retaining its constancy, 
God’s word can variously heal, guide, restore, and harshly judge. Divine commandments and 
Torah are true in that they derive from God’s very character (steadfast love and faithful truth) 
and as they are dependable guides to a good godly life. Ultimately, the word of God has creative, 
salvific, and normative qualities for personal conduct and courts of law. Finally, to walk in the 
way of truth is to live by God’s word. This is closely related to the pursuit of wisdom, itself a 
fundamentally devotional pursuit, one which brings a person into the true path. It begins with 
fear of Yahweh, who is the giver of all wisdom, as it is found through experience, tradition, and 
the natural world. Virtually all realms of knowledge, skill, craft, and cleverness are encompassed 
by wisdom, and it is something available to men, women, and children, regardless of social 
standing or national origin. Wisdom illuminates the righteous path, which is marked by honesty, 
piety, and ethical treatment of others. Like God’s word, divine wisdom powerfully creates and 
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maintains the cosmos, is found in the Torah and commandments, and is reliable for pursuing a 
good life.  
These ten conceptual parameters should act as guardrails in this study’s effort to create a 
Christian theology of truth. Here they will be synthesised and augmented for just that purpose. 
Following the relational order explained in I.1—in which alethiology lies implicit within all 
epistemology—this section begins its theology of truth with alethiology, considering truth in 
general. It then elaborates by addressing God as Truth and truth in creation. Finally, it relates the 
alethiology’s impact upon the search for knowledge, i.e., epistemology. Throughout, provisional 
indications will be made as to the relation of this study’s proposal to other accounts of truth and 
to promising avenues for further development.  
 
IV.2 Alethiology: What is Truth? 
 
Choosing Thick Truth 
 
In John 18.38 Pilate asked Jesus: What is truth? The answer looked him in the eye. In the 
Christian tradition, Jesus Christ, God made human, is truth. This declaration makes little sense, 
however, if one thinks of truth only in its ‘thin’ sense—the notion that truth is a thought, 
sentence, or similar which agrees with an aspect of reality. Truth, in this sense, is only a property 
of propositions, sentences, thoughts, ideas, or the like, not of persons. The implication of 
exclusively ‘thin’ truth is that the cosmos is divisible into two categories, wherein mental or 
linguistic entities (whether thoughts, propositions etc.) are fundamentally distinguished from the 
rest of reality (in which all material being is included);395 only members of the thought-like 
contingent can be true or false and are so in virtue of their relationship to the latter.  
This study’s alethiology begins with conceptual parameter (f) that truth is thick rather 
than thin. Further, it holds a more expansive view: any existing thing, action, or relationship may 
be true—an insight taken from biblical conceptual parameter (g) that all existing things may be 
truth bearers. This includes human persons, e.g. Jesus. Importantly, this understanding of truth 
refuses any binary division between mind and body or between language and reality. Something 
may be true in itself or in relationship to something else, and actions and relationships may ‘true’ 
 
395 A division reminiscent of Descartes’ mind-body dualism. 
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themselves. This dissolves ‘thin’ truth’s absolute distinction between intellect and thing and the 
emphasis on their relationship. Classic truth-bearers in analytic thought (propositions, sentences, 
beliefs, etc.) are merely one truth-bearer among all the rest of the created world/existence. The 
word-to-world relationship is simply another sort of world-to-world relationship.  
Considering all existence to be potential truth-bearers may exceed the intuitive notion of 
‘thin truth’, but it does not contradict English usage, which applies ‘truth’ and ‘true’ to persons, 
objects, and actions. In common speech, a ‘true’ individual is loyal or faithful, (‘true friend’, 
‘truehearted’) or, archaically, honest (‘all good men and true’). ‘True’ can indicate something is 
real or actual (‘her true intentions’) or that something is genuine, rightly/strictly so called (‘true 
craftsmanship’, ‘true love’, ‘true north’). An object can even be true to another, as in the phrases 
‘true to form’ and ‘true to life’ (‘the film was true to the book’). The verb ‘to true’ is still used in 
architecture and engineering, for when a beam is brought into alignment, making it reliable for 
construction. When something ‘comes true’ it becomes a reality, as when dreams or wishes 
‘come true.’ Thus, while ‘thin truth’ is a common intuitive sense of truth in English, the word’s 
purport is by no means restricted to it. In this way, conceptual parameter (g) gives this 
alethiology an advantage over exclusively ‘thin’ truth by accounting for common usage of ‘true’ 
in English. 
This thick conceptualisation of truth includes the senses of ‘thin’ truth, but also 
faithfulness, reliability, honesty, and being genuine or actual—senses evident in the common 
English phrases above. Truth is indivisibly thick and includes senses of uprightness, honesty, 
integrity and truthfulness; the sublimity and stability of divine presence; the genuine, real and 
actual; and of course, 'thin truth', 'faithfulness', 'reliability', and firmness/solidity. Though it takes 
many English words to express the full range of truth’s significance, this thick account of truth is 
not alien to the English language.  
How are all these senses are united in this alethiology’s concept of ‘thick’ truth? The 
cognitive linguistic concept of micro-senses is instructive here. It describes the phenomenon of a 
single word appearing to have separate senses on different occasions but upon reflection, the 
word has a single conceptual core.396 To illustrate, the word ‘card’ has different micro-senses in 
the following sentences: ‘this deck is missing a card’, ‘a card from Jo arrived in the post’, and 
‘I’ll pay by card’. Most of the time ‘card’ is used in obviously specific ways, such as (post)card, 
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(business)card, (credit)card, and (birthday/greeting)card. The word ‘card’ defaults to the 
specificity of a micro-sense. These are not, however, full sense divisions, for the specific senses 
can be included within a single concept: ‘a piece of thick, stiff paper or thin plastic.’ The word 
‘card’, however, is so rarely used this way in speech that an additional phrase must indicate it is 
meant in a general sense, e.g. ‘any kind of card will do.’ A word with micro-senses at first 
appears to have many fully autonomous senses, but upon reflection they are all unifiable. In this 
way, the many senses included within thick truth (for which English uses different words but 
Hebrew does not), can be united under a single concept conveyed by the term ‘truth.’   
There are multiple ways one might begin to articulate the unifying definition of truth, a 
task that has preoccupied analytic philosophy for over a century, often coining a summarising 
slogan for major truth-theories. For this study’s alethiology, if one wanted a slogan, one could 
say that ‘truth is what is real.’ This would directly pick out the senses of genuineness, actuality, 
firmness/solidity, and the sublime stability of the divine presence. By extension, this could be 
seen to entail what is reliable, dependable, and has integrity. It is more of a stretch for ‘thin’ truth 
which emphasises a relational quality, but one can see that thin truth is nevertheless directly 
related to what is ‘real,’ and that the falsehood of empty words have less purchase with reality 
than they pretend.  
This slogan falls short, however, because the quest for a definition of truth which 
encompasses its fullness and does it justice will never succeed. There is no single comprehensive 
definition which can unite these many senses of truth because the one instance where they are all 
truly united and fully displayed is in God, and God is beyond comprehension. This was learned 
from Augustinian conceptual parameter (b) the human apprehension of divine truth, which 
describes God, who is Truth, as being impossible for human beings to understand fully or 
exhaustively.397   
The resulting inability to satisfactorily define ‘truth’ (which has also plagued analytic 
philosophy) is not a flaw in this proposal; it is a feature. One should expect all definitions of 
truth to fall short, to be incomplete when truth is grounded in incomprehensible God. In this way, 
this alethiology explains the irresolvable state of analytic truth debates. It also holds that while 
all analytic truth theories are mistaken insofar as they purport to exhaustively define truth, they 
 
397 Exodus 33-34 may be read to a similar effect. Moses is not permitted to see God face to face because it would be 
too much for his mortal frame to sustain. He is told, nonetheless, that Yahweh is the one who abounds in steadfast 
love and faithful truth. 
   
 192 
each do have genuine (though limited) insight into the nature of truth. For instance, this theology 
of truth endorses the medieval formulation that truth is adaequatio rei et intellectus —an 
intuition that lies at the heart of correspondence theories—as accurate as far as it goes but 
incomplete in itself. Unlike many who adopt this Latin phrase, this alethiology insists that it does 
not exhaustively define all that truth is.  
Though incomprehensible, Divine Truth itself is still apprehensible (again, drawing on 
conceptual parameter (b)), preserving the pursuit of truth from futility. One can gain greater 
understanding of truth in time, though not completely comprehend it. Further, Augustinian 
conceptual parameter (c) the human pursuit of truth is never finished teaches that this pursuit is 
worthwhile on both an intellectual and personal basis. 
This theological alethiology has the potential to harmonise the insights of each analytic 
truth-theory, showing that it is their claims to exclusivity and exhaustive definition of truth 
which renders them mutually exclusive, and that if they were seen as limited incomplete 
apprehensions of the incomprehensible nature of truth this modification would enable them to be 
complementary formulations. Recall, additionally, that the postliberal theologians surveyed in I.3 
wished to maintain a conviction in truth’s reality while also refusing to define it too clearly; this 
study’s alethiology could furnish a more robust defence of that position. Fleshing out these 
comparisons is one potential avenue for subsequent development of this alethiology  
 
The Fullness of God as Truth 
 
The Hebrew experience of God as recorded in the Old Testament is foundational for 
understanding God as truth, indeed, as Truth itself.398 Biblical conceptual parameter (h) 
understanding Yahweh as truth dovetails nicely with Augustinian conceptual parameters (a) 
understanding God as truth and (d) the Trinitarian God as truth because each of their distinctive 
accounts of the divine as truth is conceptually compatible when each is taken to refer to the God 
who is revealed in Jesus Christ. 
For a Christian alethiology, the understanding of God as truth begins with the experience 
of Yahweh in the Old Testament, among the Israelites. God’s truth and God’s being—as 
 
398 In Exodus 3 God self-identifies to Moses as Yahweh and promises to set his people free. After saving them from 
bondage and witnessing their first wayward idolatry, God again reveals Godself to Moses on Mt. Sinai: Yahweh, the 
one who IS, abounding in steadfast love and faithful truth (34.6). 
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experienced by Israel is Yahweh’s constancy and abiding presence—is that which IS, both 
eternal through all time and space as well as actively engaged in history. Likewise, Augustine 
names God as Truth itself, unbounded by time and space, superior to all creation, but expands 
this application to encompass the Trinity. 
This is not an Aristotelian eternal divinity who simply lasts forever, unchanging and 
inactive within time and space. Instead, the character of God is both constancy and activity, 
maintaining devotion to Israel despite apostasy and wickedness, providing aid, protection, and 
guidance to those in need, sometimes being moved to rebuke. An aspect of God’s truth is not to 
overlook wickedness, but to ensure justice. Fundamentally, the eternal character of God is 
steadfast love and faithful truth, as Israel knew throughout its history and Augustine declared in 
prayer to the God who is Eternal, Love, and Truth. In this way, God’s truth is God’s very self 
and eternal being. God’s constancy of character does not waver, forever acting with faithful truth 
and steadfast love. God’s word and works are categorically true in this sense, the character of 
their action.  
Bringing to bear biblical conceptual parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and 
wisdom to truth, recall that the divine word is singular, interpreted and re-articulated in many and 
various ways into commandments and by prophets. It also creates the cosmos and sustains the 
universe, maintaining the natural world. I find this understanding of God’s word combines well 
with Augustine’s identification of the eternal truth of mathematics as indicative of God’s 
existence and truth (parameter (a)). The laws of physics, chemistry, and mathematics are eternal 
truths that generate, sustain, and maintain the universe. The thin sense of divine truth comes to 
the fore when considering these natural laws. Furthermore, to live according to God’s word 
means to be guided into the wisdom of a good and holy life—wisdom being the second sort of 
eternal truth, after that of number, which leads Augustine to see God as truth. More will be said 
on this topic when we consider the human apprehension of truth and epistemology, but for the 
moment the Augustinian parameter (a) which holds that the truth of God is mathematical as well 
as wise can be seen to dovetail with the biblical parameters (h) and (j) that articulate God’s truth 
as intimately bound to God’s word which sustains the cosmos. The appropriate human response 
is to live in truth towards God and one’s fellow humans, but the insufficiency of the human 
response only serves to highlight God’s constancy despite human failings.  
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Now, God as truth is clearly experienced personally and intellectually; the truth of God is 
found and named for what it is in the first instance through the history of Israel and their 
relationship with Yahweh. It is also encountered—though not always recognised for what it is— 
in the eternal truths of mathematics and hard sciences that uncover the underpinnings of the 
created cosmos, and in the principles societies uncover for living a good life. These 
apprehensions of facets, features, and events of divine truth, however, never amount to 
comprehension of God who is Truth itself. God always remains mysteriously beyond complete 
comprehension, whether it is Moses’ unfulfilled wish to see Yahweh face to face, or the 
continually elusive theory of everything sought by physicists.  
The Trinitarian God is Truth as well. Taking up conceptual parameter (d) the Trinitarian 
God as Truth, this alethiology is congruent with the Nicene Creed using an Augustinian 
approach to divine names. Because God is one,399 all names that attribute a divine trait are 
substantive attributions. God not only is true; God is Truth. Each of the three persons, Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit, are themselves Truth just as each is God. This accords with the New 
Testament, which calls the Holy Spirit the Spirit of Truth, and in which Jesus says he is the 
Truth. God’s Truth is convertible with all other substantive names of God, such that God’s Truth 
is identical with God’s Being, Love, and Goodness, to mention a few divine name. The 
convertibility of the divine names Being, Love, and Truth harmonises well with the constant 
conjunction of Yahweh’s steadfast love and faithful truth in the Old Testament.  
This study goes further than the Augustinian parameter (d), however, in that it holds truth 
to be a relational name of God as well as a substantive name.400 Relational names include 
relations to creation (e.g. Creator, Redeemer) as well as relations within the Trinity (Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit are relational names). In keeping with biblical conceptual parameter (i) that truth 
may be substantial, relational, and transferable, Truth can also be a relational name for the 
relations between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Each one is always true to the others, being in 
complete accord.  
This alethiology has implications for Christian theology, drawing on the account of 
speech in conceptual parameter (j) illuminates both the significance of Jesus being God’s word 
and one sense in which the humanity of Christ is the Truth. A word in the general sense of 
 
399 Cf. the Shema of Deuteronomy 6.4. 
400 Augustine provided the distinction between substantive and relational names, and in Trinity he does not designate 
‘Truth’ to be a relational divine name. 
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speech is said to be true when it is fulfilled, when the reality it speaks of has come to pass, 
making it metaphorically solid and dependable. At this point, the truth of the speech, the speaker, 
and the spoken-of reality are tied together—truth is transferable and shared among them. God’s 
singular word expresses God’s character as eternal constancy, steadfast love, and faithful truth. 
Included in this is a promise of redemption, of grace for those who have gone astray. Charis and 
alētheia ‘grace and truth’ in John 1 is a direct allusion to ḥesed and ʾĕmet of yhwh in Ex 34. 
When God’s word is made flesh in the incarnation, God’s word is fulfilled in that the reality it 
promises comes to pass and is complete (through the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection). 
Christ’s humanity fulfils the divine word, eliding their truth together. Furthermore, the life of 
Jesus is perfectly emblematic of the one who follows in the way of truth, the way of the 
righteous, as described in the wisdom literature and the psalms. The hypostatic union 
metaphysically describes the union of a human being living truly to God’s word, a reality only 
truly accomplished in Christ. More will be said about Jesus as the ‘way’ and the ‘life’ when we 
come to the human pursuit of truth. 
Of course, this is in no way fully explicates what it means to call God ‘Truth,’ and much 
more could be said about Yahweh, the Trinitarian godhead and each of the Trinitarian persons in 
this regard without even beginning to plumb the depths. Having said this much, however, should 
convey that the divine name Truth has rich theological significance beyond what a consideration 
of attributes would suggest. The implications go further as we turn to truth in creation, given an 
understanding of God as truth.  
 
Truth in Creation  
 
Everything that is not God is God’s creation. Taking creatio ex nihilo as a given, we now 
revisit biblical conceptual parameter (g) all existing things may be truth-bearers to begin the 
extension of this alethiology to creation. This central parameter means that inanimate and 
abstract objects, human beings, thoughts and propositions, verbal and non-verbal actions, and 
relationships between these existing things are all possible truth-bearers. Compared to the eternal 
God, these creations exist in a limited way as bodily temporal entities within time and space 
(which are also creations). Divine Truth is eternal, it fully encompasses all the ‘thick’ senses of 
truth, and is indivisible from God’s steadfast love. There is truth in creation, but unlike God’s 
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Truth, it is limited by time and space, as are all of God’s creatures. The only truly universal truth 
is the divine Truth who is God, true in all times and place, in regard to all things. All other truths, 
the creaturely ones, are limited, true only for a certain time, or certain places, or in regard to 
certain things.  
While all created things may be truth bearers, different truth-bearers may bear truth 
differently. The variety among creaturely manifestations of truth is similar to how beauty and 
goodness will manifest differently in one situation or another, or how a mathematical formula 
will have different outcomes when its variables are given different values. The truth of a person 
includes the sense of honesty as a result of the person’s volition, but a while one may speak of ‘a 
true honest word’, the sense of honesty which true speech has does not result from the speech’s 
volition, for it has none. In God alone do all the senses of truth become fully manifest. These 
differences in how truth is borne, however, are not disjunctures that isolate different instances of 
truth from each other, as if being distinguishable made them separate. On the contrary, the 
transferable nature of truth gifts it with a web-like quality, joining together disparate portions of 
creation. For instance, the truth of a witness, of their testimony, and of the event testified to are 
indivisible despite there being three distinguishable truth-bearers. Hence, the attribution of truth 
often combines together the truth of ontologically distinct entities as a possessing a single truth 
together. 
To explain this dynamic joining quality of truth, it is instructive to turn to biblical 
parameter (i) that truth may be substantial, relational, and transferable. ‘Truth’ can indicate the 
firm, enduring, constant, reliable, and dependable quality of one of God’s creations. ‘Truth’ can 
also describe a quality of relationship when one entity is oriented to rely or depend upon the truth 
of another entity. This reliance may involve trust and belief or it may be an unthinking reliance. 
At this point, truth then becomes transferred or shared, from the relied upon entity to the one 
which then relies. This transference is a form of creative making, in that truth is brought to be 
where it was not, as when building a firm foundation.  
Hence, a core image for this constructive theology is that truth is like a gathering 
firmness, dynamically building. This image differs markedly from both the concealing/un-
concealing dynamic Heidegger explores and the receptive self-surrender to truth that Balthasar 
portrays. I would also suggest that this dynamic is the opposite of what Nietzsche describes as 
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the pursuit of truth (an unrelenting hunt to uncover and demolish falsehood). Fleshing out these 
comparisons is one potential avenue for subsequent development of this alethiology.  
Truth that is substantial, relational, and transferable has a creative quality, as suggested by 
the image of a gathering firmness. To elaborate, this alethiology details the role of God’s Truth in 
creation by appealing to conceptual parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to 
truth. This study then adds the constructive move of stating that God’s law, word, divine wisdom, 
and the truth of number  are one and the same (see (a) understanding God as truth, which holds 
that the truth of God is mathematical as well as being wisdom), and furthermore, that they are 
properly thought of as God’s Truth. When God created all that is not God, the cosmos was and 
remains completely dependent upon God for its continuing existence, and that includes a 
dependence upon God’s Truth—the word, wisdom, law, number that are everywhere apparent.401 
God’s truth (word/law/wisdom) effectively and powerfully creates more truth, enacting what it 
expresses in the creation of the world, while remaining beyond full comprehension. Even the 
divine Truth of number which governs the most basic matter of the universe is not fully 
articulable.402  
Understanding this Alethiology of creation can be useful when considering other 
theological issues. For example, God’s Truth (word/law/wisdom) is singular, such that divine 
commandments and prophetic pronouncements are diverse expressions of the same divine word. 
But one may wonder how God’s Truth as Law and Wisdom relates to the many disparate 
instances of divine law or wisdom found in the Pentateuch or Wisdom literature (not to mention 
the laws of physics, mathematics, and so forth). How is it that they are so often spoken of as one 
and the same? Here, cognitive linguistics’ category of ‘sense facets’ is illuminating. A word has 
‘sense facets’ when particular senses of a word are, upon reflection, ontologically distinct as 
different kinds or categories that cannot be unified, and yet are often invoked together in what 
functions as a unified sense. For instance, the word ‘book’ can have the sense of a physical tome, 
and also the sense of a story that is written in multiple physical tomes. An immaterial story and 
material tome are clearly utterly different categories of existence, and yet, ‘book’ is frequently 
used to mean both simultaneously without confusion. This is because the two senses (book as 
 
401 Even God’s truth of number which governs the basic matter of the universe is not fully articulable. There are 
irrational numbers which cannot be expression in fractions or decimal points. It is not that there is complete order 
per se. 
402 E.g., irrational numbers such as pi  and the square root of two cannot be expressed in fractions or decimal points. 
The governing power of God’s Truth includes infinite and chaotic aspects of creation. 
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tome and book as story) coincide in reality to such a great extent. Similarly, God’s ‘law’ and 
‘wisdom’ is often used with two ontologically distinct senses at the same time. God’s truth which 
is eternal and single, and the many human articulations of God’s truth, which are various, 
limited, and even occasionally incompatible (e.g. Newtonian physics and sub-atomic physics are 
both true but incompatible). This again reiterates the limited nature of created truth compared to 
divine Truth. However, because all human articulations of truth are dependent upon the Truth of 
God in order to be true themselves, the two ontologically distinct forms of truth are at times 
spoken of as one and the same. 
One benefit of this insight is that it credibly prevents the Bible from becoming the bearer 
of Christian truth which must be defended, in a fundamentalist manner, as absolutely and 
completely true. Only God is absolute Truth; the Bible is not. Likewise, the word of God is 
Truth, but the word of God is not the text of the Bible. The text of the Bible is a human 
articulation of its experience of and relationship with God who is Truth and God’s Word who 
became incarnate in Jesus Christ. The Bible is true in a limited creaturely way. In this account, 
the Bible remains a true guide to the true God, to the pursuit of wisdom, and to a godly, 
righteous, and truly happy life. This is not achieved by following its laws to the letter or 
believing every chapter and verse with complete fidelity. The life of truth does not consist in 
devotion to the words of the book. It is, rather, the devotion to the God that is everlasting 
steadfast love and faithful truth, who is revealed in Jesus Christ’s life, death, and resurrection.  
This concludes this study’s alethiology, but as was noted in Chapter 1 (I.1), alethiology 
always lies implicit in epistemology. Because of their intimate relation, the next subsection 





Instead of beginning with a definition of knowledge, the epistemology developed from 
this study’s theology of truth begins with God. It should now be a familiar idea from Augustinian 
conceptual parameter (b) the human apprehension of divine truth that the incomprehensible God 
is Truth, who is never subjected to the human mind (being always superior and impervious) and 
yet may be apprehended or understood in part while remaining beyond comprehension. 
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Furthermore, as we have seen, divine truth is the condition of possibility of human knowledge 
because it is the source of all being for the knowing creature.  
Conceptual parameter (b) further specifies that human apprehension of divine truth is 
limited, fallible, diverse, and variable. ‘Limited’ refers to the limit of apprehension that falls 
short of comprehension. ‘Fallible’ means that sometimes humans misunderstand divine truth 
even as they are directly reckoning with it, as when a person miscalculates their arithmetic. To 
say that humans’ limited apprehensions of divine truth are diverse indicates that they will differ 
from each other even when no mistakes have been made. This diversity can at times appear as 
contradiction, as in Augustine’s example, where what is a just law in one society might be an 
unjust law to those who live under different societal or materials conditions. Finally, 
apprehension of divine truth is ‘variable’, which means that it can increase and decrease 
overtime. It is possible for one’s errors to be corrected and for one’s understanding to be 
expanded.     
 The absolute distinction between God and God’s creation has already been noted: that 
God is eternal, unbounded by time and space, while all of creation is limited, being temporal 
and/or bodily. Building on this distinction (and drawing from Augustinian conceptual parameter 
(e) the relationship between human wisdom and knowledge), knowledge is an awareness of 
temporal and bodily things (i.e. creaturely things and the cosmos) whereas wisdom is an 
awareness of eternal things (i.e. God). This Augustinian parameter accords nicely with biblical 
parameter (j), the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth, which found that wisdom 
begins with fear of Yahweh, who is the giver of all wisdom, as it is found through experience, 
tradition, and the natural world. Knowledge is the rational apprehension of what is bodily and 
temporal (creation), and wisdom is the rational awareness of what is eternal (God).  
Knowledge requires wisdom because wisdom’s awareness of eternal truth is necessary 
for making judgements regarding the created world. Conversely, wisdom requires knowledge 
because humans cannot conceive of that which is uncreated apart from creaturely terms. There 
can be no knowledge without at least implicit wisdom. One cannot judge a quantity without a 
sense of unchanging number and measure. One cannot judge the truth of statements without 
having a sense of what it would mean for something to be true or false, that is, an apprehension 
of ‘truth’ itself. One cannot make moral judgments without an awareness that there is ‘goodness’ 
in some sense. On the other hand, God is never encountered by creatures apart for their own 
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creatureliness, and that of the world they inhabit. This is to say, God is never apprehended in 
isolation from creaturely things. This account of an awareness (even unnamed) of God in all 
human knowledge has the potential to make the centrality of religious experience and the 
concept of sensus divinitatus proposed by some reformed epistemologists more recognisable to 
those who have not had a visceral spiritual experience of God’s presence.  Once again, the 
connections between this theology of truth and other approaches is a promising avenue of further 
investigation.  
In this view, knowledge and wisdom are neither separate nor independent of each other, 
for in the human mind, knowledge is impossible without some measure of wisdom, and wisdom 
is impossible without some substance of knowledge. Of the two, wisdom must always hold 
primacy of place, or else no knowledge will be found. This is apparent in that wisdom ultimately 
concerns God who is Truth. Unless truth is one’s ultimate goal, genuine knowledge will never be 
found. In this way, even scholarly pursuits which are not explicitly devotional must be at least 
implicitly aligned with fear of Yahweh, in that to devote oneself to Truth is in essence to devote 
oneself to God (even if this devotion is based on an incomplete and partial understanding of God 
and truth).  
This approach works well with conceptual parameter (j) where virtually all realms of 
knowledge, skill, craft, and cleverness are encompassed by wisdom, and it is something available 
to men, women, children, regardless of social standing or national origin. Even people who have 
not accepted Yahweh or Jesus Christ as their God can pursue divine wisdom (though, admittedly, 
at a disadvantage without the insight into the character of truth that is inherently bound up with 
God’s everlasting being and steadfast love, as most clearly revealed in God’s incarnate life, 
death, and resurrection). The refusal to specify the appropriate method for pursuing truth beyond 
devotion to God has some resonance with Gadamer’s position that no single method can 
encapsulate or codify the process of finding meaning. This is another comparison waiting to be 
fleshed out. 
In this Christian epistemology, more can be said about the role of devotion in the human 
pursuit of truth, wisdom, and knowledge, drawing on Augustinian parameter (c) the human 
pursuit of truth. Since one never fully comprehends God, the pursuit of truth never ends but at 
best continues indefinitely in an asymptotic fashion, drawing closer but never reaching complete 
understanding. Nevertheless, the accumulation of wisdom and knowledge is not a simple gradual 
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aggregate. There are threshold points in the process, the most important of which is when one 
accepts the divine Truth as one’s God with all one’s heart, soul, and mind (this being the same 
God who is incarnate in Christ). At that point, the constancy and reliability of divine Truth 
affords the seeker peace, security, and freedom (especially from sin). Even when one knows very 
little, this creates a qualitative difference in one’s search for truth compared to even those who 
possess vast bodies of knowledge but are still putting other priorities ahead of the divine Truth 
(who is the everlasting constant God, who named godself Yahweh and is made manifest in Jesus 
Christ). Just as the fullness of divine truth affects every aspect of a person’s life, the entire human 
person become engaged in the pursuit of truth, mind, body, etc. The truth is not only what some 
call facts, but also the wisdom of living a good life, principles articulated at times as divine law 
or commandments which can rebuke, heal, guide, and restore one to fulness of life. See biblical 
conceptual parameter (j) the relation of divine law, word, and wisdom to truth. Love is an integral 
part of the epistemic pursuit, for one must love truth to seek it. To walk in the way of truth, 
pursuing truth, is to seek and love God, a fundamentally devotional pursuit. Wisdom illuminates 
the righteous path, which is marked by honesty, piety, and ethical treatment of others. 
One final word needs to be said about the nature of falsehood, because the position of this 
theology of truth regarding falsehood is a genuinely constructive move. Falsehood is not to be 
confused with the limited nature of creaturely truths, just as creaturely finitude in itself is not 
sinful. All creaturely truths are limited even when they are entirely true. For instance, it is true 
that two parallel lines will never meet, but only in Euclidian geometry (imagine railroad tracks). 
In spherical geometry, they do (imagine the lines of longitude that are parallel at the equator but 
meet at the poles). This does not render them false but only true in limited circumstances. 
Likewise, the truth of a person, even a completely morally upright one, is limited because mortal 
flesh will eventually fail and die. Falsehood, however, is not limitation in this sense.  
This alethiology also contends that falsehood is not equal and opposite to truth. This 
involves rejecting the common view that falsehood and truth are bivalent (opposite, equal, and 
mutually exclusive). Instead (and this is a genuinely constructive move), falsehood is a privation 
of truth. This is analogous to Augustine’s depiction of evil as a privation of the good. There is 
always some degree of truth to a falsehood, and this is part of what makes it deceiving. False 
statements are ones that purport to be true but which are not reliable, accurate, and so forth. A 
falsehood which one has discovered is false and has been labeled as ‘false’ is, in this account, a 
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redeemed falsehood. The redeemed falsehood functions as a ‘It is not the case that . . .’ statement. 
The falsehood becomes reliable once again once it is recognised as a falsehood (otherwise one 
could not build logical deductions from it). A false friend, false gold, and so forth purport to be 
something other than what they are. The falsehood is redeemed what it is recognised as what it is 
(fool’s gold or a traitor). Another way to think of the privation of falsehood is to consider that 
nothing can be false unless there is a presumption of truth, whereas truth requires no such 
presumption of falsehood.  
 
This constructive theology of truth could be worked out in greater detail and precision 
and there are questions about it which remain to be answered. Nonetheless, it is complete enough 
as it stands to present an intelligible account of truth founded upon approaching God as truth 




This study has engaged with a live contemporary question that draws attention in 
philosophical and theological spheres: what is the nature of truth? In reply, a theology of truth 
has been offered, one that is both a novel addition to current debates and is deeply indebted to 
seminal strains of thought in the Christian tradition.  
This study’s first significant contribution is its new methodological approach to 
constructive theology, which characteristically develops conceptual parameters from source 
material that are then employed in constructive theology. This beneficially distinguishes the 
goals and claims of constructive theology from those of historical theology.  
A second significant contribution is that this methodology provides theologians with a 
tool to engage productively with biblical scholarship, in a manner that respects the integrity of 
those disciplines, and has demonstrated its worth by making extensive use of the Bible for 
constructive theology. Further, it has been shown that this methodology capably engages with 
other disciplines too, such as cognitive linguistics, such that constructive theology is not limited 
to drawing on disciplines that it has traditionally made use of. The particular insight of cognitive 
linguistics for theology concerned with language has been notably apparent.  
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In addition to the constructive methodology itself and its use of biblical studies for 
theological work, a third contribution resulted from its specific application to Augustinian texts 
and the Old Testament: a fresh harvest of previously underappreciated insights into the 
understanding of truth and divinity in these texts. It was seen that naming God ‘Truth’ is a central 
topic in Free Will, Confessions, and Trinity, with robust metaphysical and prayerful content. 
Likewise, the Old Testament exhibited a rich and complex approach to truth, in relation to both 
God and creation. The work done here, while not presented as historical theology or biblical 
studies, indicates that greater attention to these two areas by historical theology and biblical 
studies respectively would  be rewarded with fresh insight into their respective views on divinity 
and truth.  
This thesis, as constructive theology, developed ten conceptual parameters from 
Augustine and the Bible and reconfigured them into a constructive Christian theology of truth. 
This is its ultimate contribution, in that it has responded to a pressing philosophical and 
theological concern—truth—by producing a new alethiology that is demonstrably biblical, 
Augustinian, and Christian, simultaneously both rooted in the ancient Christian tradition and 
relevant to contemporary debate on the important topics of truth, divinity, and Christian truth 
claims.    
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